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I. INTRODUCION
More than a century ago, Congress enacted the general federal question
statute (now section 1331) and granted the lower federal courts the power to
hear civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.I The statute embodies Congress' decision to delegate to those courts the
power to frame specific standards for defining the scope of their federal
question authority.2 Thus, section 1331 enables the federal courts, as front-line
arbiters of jurisdiction, to refine their general arising under power on a case-
by-case basis in accordance with Congress' legislative directive. 3 In this way,
1 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)); see infra note 40 for the original text of this section. The statute, its
essential language virtually unchanged, now reads: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." For a discussion of § 133 l's origin and evolution, see infra notes 40 & 46. A study
of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over federal question cases is beyond the
scope of this Article.
2 See Althouse, How To Build A Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (1987) ("Although Congress initially prescribes the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, the courts themselves find extensive room for
interpretation of these grants of jurisdiction.") (footnotes omitted); Althouse, The Humble
and the Treasonous: Judge-Made Jurisdiction Law, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1035, 1048
(1989-90) [hereinafter Althouse, 7he Humble and the Treasonous] ("judicial interpretation
of statutes is an inevitable aspect of legislation; and, except where the statutory language is
completely clear, interpretation is unavoidably influenced by judicial notions of what
jurisdiction should be"); O'Neil, Foreword: Symposium on Federal Judicial Power, 39 DE
PAUL L. REv. 229, 229 (1989) ("Congress and the federal courts together. . . define the
federal judicial power" in a "joint effort."); Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 577 (1985) ("productive dialogue" occurs "between the courts and
the legislature when each recognizes the shared responsibility for defining the contours of
judicial authority"); cf Matasar & Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional
Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1356 (1986) (the Supreme Court's procedural common law
defining its own appellate jurisdiction facilitates an "evolutionary dialogue between the
Court and Congress" by which "the Court fills gaps in enacted law and frees a Congress,
otherwise occupied by matters of substance, from constant jurisdictional fine tuning"). But
see Friedman, A Different Dialogue: 77Te Supreme Court, Congress and Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 49, 54-55 (1990) Gurisdictional "uncertainty is
resolved on a case-by-case basis through an elaborate dialogue between" Congress and the
courts who share, as virtual equals, the responsibility for jurisdiction).
3 See Althouse, The Humble and the Treasonous, supra note 2, at 1049 (in the
jurisdictional "partnership .... Congress sets the initial broad outlines ... [and] the Court
adapts those statutes in response to actual case settings"); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 547
(enabling federal courts to choose whether to assert jurisdiction aids "development of rules
for the finer tuning of general jurisdictional grants"); C. MONTGOMERY, A MANUAL OF
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 128-29 (3d ed. 1927) (the general federal
question statute "is evidently so indefinite as to leave much to judicial interpretation" and
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the federal courts have the responsibility to articulate and implement Congress'
section 133 1's forum intent in the context of particular controversies. 4
Since its enactment, however, section 1331 has eluded precise definition
and consistent application, causing well-documented chagrin to courts and
commentators alike.5 The statute's interpretation has been complicated by the
"the courts have reserved a right to decide each particular case in view of the facts
thereof"); cf Wachtler, Judicial Lwmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18 (1990) (the "central
ingredient" of the judicial process "is the constant bombardment, in the crucible of the
lawsuit, of law as applied by the judge to specific factual real-world events and persons....
[Where judicial rules are subject to legislative revision, the courts' rational tradition,
independence, and most of all its intimate view of existing real facts and the impact of law,
make it a superb and legitimate lawmaking partner with the legislature.") (footnote omitted).
Recent litigation trends make it particularly important to discern the scope of federal
question jurisdiction as the docket assault on federal courts intensifies in both quantity and
complexity of cases. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMMrrTEE 6 (April
2, 1990) ("It appears that the long-expected crisis of the federal courts, caused by unabated
rapid growth in case filings, is at last upon us."); Rehnquist, 1989 Year End Report, 22 THE
THIRD BRANCH 2 (Jan. 1990) ("Complex cases that require extensive judicial time now
represent a greater portion of the overall [federal] caseload.").
4 Congress, of course, can correct the courts' jurisdictional missteps. Take, for
example, Congress' passage of the supplemental jurisdiction statute. Act of Dec. 1, 1990, §
310, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991)). In §
1367, Congress codified the long-recognized authority of the federal courts to exercise
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and overruled Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545
(1989), in which the Supreme Court had "cast substantial doubt" on the federal courts'
power in this area. See 136 CONG. REC. S17580-81 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (section-by-
section analysis) ("This section would authorize jurisdiction in a case like Finley, as well as
essentially restore the pre-Finley understanding of the authorization for and limits on other
forms of supplemental jurisdiction."); see also Althouse, 77w Humble and the Treasonous,
supra note 2, at 1049 ("Congress retains the ultimate power to redefine jurisdiction, subject
to constitutional limitations, defined by the Court.") (footnote omitted).
5 E.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8
(1983) ("the statutory phrase 'arising under'.. . has resisted all attempts to frame a single,
precise definition for determining which cases fall within ...and ... outside" original
district court jurisdiction); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,
378 (1959) (the statute's "simple language.. . conceals complexities of construction and
policy"); McGoon v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 204 F. 998, 1000 (D.N.D. 1913) ("Few
subjects.., are involved in greater perplexity" and the "[m]any criteria" established for
determining arising under jurisdiction can be "classified," but not "harmonized");
AMEIUcAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIvISION OF JURISDICTION BE'wEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 482 (1969) ("In determining which cases are federal question cases,
within the statutory grant ofjurisdiction, there is a proliferation of theories, but the case law
cannot be rationalized by any one of them."); P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN, & D.
SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 966
(3d ed. 1988) ("Section 1331 is encrusted with a complex gloss of interpretive doctrines.");
D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 174 (4th ed. 1990) ("the question whether a suit seeking a
state-created remedy for violation of federal law falls within federal-question jurisdiction has
long perplexed both the Court and the scholars"); M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
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fact that the Congress which first enacted section 1331 provided little indication
of its intended scope, 6 particularly with respect to hybrid state law causes of
action with federal elements. 7 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court,
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 96 (2d ed. 1990) ("substantial
disagreement exists over [§ 1331's] exact meaning and scope"); 13B C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562, at 17 (1984)
(defining "arising under" has been the "most difficult single problem in determining
whether federal question jurisdiction exists"); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §
17, at 91 (4th ed. 1983) ("it cannot be said that any clear test has yet been developed to
determine which cases 'arise under'"); Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that
a Case Arise "'irectly" Under Federal Lav, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 890 (1967) (arising
under jurisdiction "has been a puzzle to judge and scholar alike") (footnotes omitted);
Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 HARV. L. REV. 289, 322 (1969)
(federal question law is a "nightmarishly confused jurisdictional tangle").
6 Infra note 46. This absence of congressional guidance may, in part, explain why the
Supreme Court has not developed an approach to § 1331 that explicitly and consistently
addresses the purposes underlying federal question jurisdiction and applies the factors
influencing § 1331 allocations. See infra notes 77-194 and accompanying text; see also
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 825-28 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (admonishing the majority for failing to analyze the § 1331 case before it in
fight of the reasons for federal question jurisdiction); Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan
Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded
Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn't Looking, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 529,
535 (1989) (noting that the Supreme Court has never "affirmatively delineat[ed] the
characteristics of a federal question case") (footnote omitted); Doerberg, 7here's No
Reason for It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the
Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 647 (1987) [hereinafter
Doernberg, 77re's No Reasonfor It] (noting in connection with the well-pleaded complaint
rule that "the current structure [of federal question jurisdiction] arose with little
consideration of the reasons for [its] existence."); Friedman, supra note 2, at 22 ("lacking in
any grounding in the federal statute or its legislative history... are the perplexing cases
addressing what constitutes a 'federal question' for the purpose of lower federal court
jurisdiction.") (footnote omitted).
7 By their nature, hybrid claims pose delicate questions of forum allocation. They test
the § 1331 reach of the federal courts precisely because they defy neat categorization as
either "federal" or "state" claims and require close judicial analysis of the mingled federal
and state interests they embody to determine whether Congress would sanction extension of
the courts' federal question power to the hybrid controversy. See Romero, 358 U.S. at 393
n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting "the problem of interpreting, in its periphery where
state and federal elements are blended, the scope of the arising-under provisions of §
1331"); I-irshman, Whose Law Is It Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question
Jurisdiction over Cases of Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17, 17-18 (1984)
("Determinations about hybrid cases are important, because they mark the limits of the
exercise of original federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and federal
adjudication of whole categories of litigation depends upon where that line is drawn.")
(footnote omitted); Comment, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson:
Limitations on Federal Question Jurisdiction, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 543, 547 (1987) ("The
problems of federal jurisdiction are most visible in cases where the plaintiff's claim states a
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without congressional contravention, 8 has attempted to strike a principled
accommodation of congressional and judicial perspectives in its interpretation
of section 1331, mindful that "in our federal system allocations of jurisdiction
have been carefully wrought to correspond to the realities of power and interest
and national policy."9
That accommodation, by and large, gave the federal trial courts
considerable discretion l within the broader congressional directive to
federal cause of action incorporating state law or a state cause of action incorporating
federal law.") (footnote omitted).
Thus, the judiciary's discretionary power to refine its own jurisdiction is especially
important in the close cases presented by the federalism prisms of hybrid claims. This
Article will focus on state law causes of action implicating federal statutes. For illuminating
discussions of hybrid claims, see generally Greene, supra note 5; Hirshman, supra; see also
Hornstein, Federalism, Judicial Power and the "Arising Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts: A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563 (1980-1981); Comment, State
Incorporation of Federal Lanv: A Response to the Demise of Implied Federal Rights of
Action, 94 YALE L.J. 1144 (1985).
8 Through the years, Congress has amended the federal question statute, but has
preserved the crucial arising under language in virtually the same form and left undisturbed
the classic Supreme Court cases construing it. Infra note 40.
9 Romero, 358 U.S. at 411 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 379 (§ 1331 must
be treated in "the interpretative setting of history, legal lore, and due regard for the interests
of our federal system").
10 See, e.g., Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810 ("exploring the outer reaches of § 1331
require[s] sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal
system"); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 20
(1983) (§ 1331 should be construed "with an eye to practicality and necessity"); Romero,
358 U.S. at 379 (the federal question statute is not "a wooden set of self-sufficient words"
and must be construed "in the light of the history that produced it, the demands of reason
and coherence, and the dictates of sound judicial policy"); Cohen, supra note 5, at 905 (§
1331 determinations involve "weighing countervailing pragmatic considerations in
determining whether classes of cases should be eligible for initial trial in federal courts");
Shapiro, supra note 2, at 566-70, 588 (federal court adjudication of § 1331 disputes "does
and should carry with it significant leeway for the exercise of reasoned discretion").
See also Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary,
36 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 233, 292 (1988) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered]
(noting that even a Supreme Court dedicated to following Congress' jurisdictional will for
the federal courts "still will have a great deal of discretion in fashioning jurisdictional rules
[and] will need some principle for exercising this discretion... where Congress is silent or
its intent is unclear"); see also id. at 294 ("there will be many jurisdictional issues where
congressional intent is nonexistent or unclear, providing the Court with substantial discretion
in defining federal court jurisdiction").
In this way, § 133 I's expansive language and resistance to pinpoint definition represent
a plus rather than a problem: both give the statute a resilience necessary for the courts'
exercise of case-specific discretion to derive and implement Congress' directions for
allocating claims between the federal and state judicial systems. Cf. Redish, Federal
Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretative Process: An "Institutionalist"
Perspective, 83 NW. U.L. REV. 761, 785 (1989) (a court must not use statutory
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determine the jurisdictional sufficiency of hybrid actions by examining the
centrality of the federal issue to resolution of the state law claim before the
court.11 This important strain of the Court's section 1331 precedent endorsed a
forum test that focused on whether plaintiff's right to relief under state law
required the trial court to construe an implicated federal statute, rather than on
the possibly pertinent substantive intent of Congress reflected in that statute as
it might bear upon the section 1331 forum determination. In essence, this case-
centered approach attempted to measure the importance of the federal element
in terms of its dispositive effect upon the claim and presumed the desirability of
a federal forum option when that element was prominent enough to influence
case outcome.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 12 however, dramatically
changed this case-centered approach. The jurisdictional dilemma presented in
Merrell Dow arose out of defendant Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'s
argument that plaintiffs' hybrid claim-a state law negligence cause of action
alleging that defendant's violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act 13 constituted negligence under Ohio state lawl 4-was sufficiently federal in
construction "as a mere guise for substitution of its own policy choices, in derogation of
those made by the representative branches" and must interpret a statute "in the manner most
consistent with attainment of the policies" it seeks to achieve).
II E.g., see the discussion of Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180
(1921), infra notes 104-12 and accompanying text, and Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
12 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
13 Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93 (1988)
[hereinafter FDCA or the Act].
14 Respondent-plaintiffs, residents of Scotland and Canada suing individually and on
behalf of their minor children, brought two separate but almost identical complaints in Ohio
state court. Each alleged that petitioner-defendant Merrell Dow's drug Bendectin caused
multiple birth deformities in their children. Brief of Petitioner On Writ of Certiorari to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at 3, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (No. 85-619). See generally 2 M.G. DIXON & F.C.
WOODSIDE, DRUG PRODUCT LIABIY § 15.64[1] at 186, 190 (1988) (Pregnant women
used Bendectin to alleviate the nausea and vomiting of morning sickness. Estimates connect
its use in more than 33 million pregnancies around the world.) In particular, plaintiffs'
Fourth Cause of Action alleged that Merrell Dow's misbranding of Bendectin violated the
FDCA's labeling requirements (§§ 352 and 321), proximately caused their children's birth
defects, and constituted a rebuttable presumption of negligence under state law. See
Complaint and Jury Demand, 25-27 (Ohio C.P. Sept. 1, 1983) (No. A8307058) (on
microfilm at the University of North Dakota Law School Library).
Relying upon the federal law allegations in the Fourth Cause of Action to establish
federal question jurisdiction, Merrell Dow removed the actions to Ohio federal district
court, where they were consolidated. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 806. The propriety of
Merrell Dow's removal "turn[ed] on whether the case [fell] within the original 'federal
question' jurisdiction of the federal courts"-the issue before the Supreme Court because a
defendant can only remove a case that could have been brought in federal court originally.
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character to justify the district court's exercise of federal question
jurisdiction.15 A five to four majority of the Supreme Court disagreed.
Bypassing classic section 1331 precedent that could have supported a finding of
jurisdiction based on the centrality of the federal issue to plaintiff's recovery, 16
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808; 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982). (§ 1441(b) precluded diversity
jurisdiction as a ground for removal because Merrell Dow was a citizen of the state (Ohio)
in which the action was brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 806 n.1.)
Plaintiffs then moved to remand. Conceding that the FDCA did not create a private right of
action, plaintiffs argued that their fourth count did not arise under any federal law, and that
they had merely invoked the FDCA's misbranding provisions for the "appropriate standard
of care to be employed by the Ohio Court in determining if Merrell has been negligent."
Plaintiffs' Motion To Remand Under § 1447(c) For Lack of Jurisdiction, at 5a-6a (Oct. 14,
1983); cf. 2 M.G. DIXON& F.C. WOODSIDE, DRUG PRODUCt LiABmn=r §14.0413] at 74-
77 (1988) (because the lower federal courts have refused to imply a private cause of action
for damages directly under the FDCA, plaintiffs in drug liability cases often allege that
violations of the Act's labeling requirements amount to negligence per se, or to evidence or
an inference of negligence under state law).
District court Judge Carl B. Rubin, finding § 1331 jurisdiction, denied plaintiffs'
remand motion, but dismissed the action (as Merrell Dow had urged) on forun non
conveniens grounds. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 806. In a two-page opinion, the Sixth Circuit
reversed, finding no federal question jurisdiction, and ordered both cases remanded back to
Ohio state court. Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 766 F.2d 1005, 1006
(6th Cir. 1985), aft'd, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth
Circuit's judgment, offering, however, its unique § 1331 analysis. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S.
804, 817, 817 n.15 (1986); infra notes 153-94 and accompanying text.
15 Merrell Dow might have preferred the federal forum because it had a strong
argument that the action, once in federal court, should be dismissed on forn non
conveniens grounds. E.g., Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727 F.2d 608, 616 (6th
Cir. 1984), af/'g and nodifying, In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) (Rubin, C.J.) (upholding Judge Rubin's order dismissing 12 actions brought by
United Kingdom citizens against Merrell Dow onforum non conveniens grounds given the
United Kingdom's significant interest in the manufacture, marketing, prescription, and
regulation of Debendox (Bendectin's British counterpart) administered by British physicians
to British citizens); In re Richardson-Merrill, Inc., "Benedectin" Products Liability
Litigation, MDL No. 486, slip op. at 7a (S.D. Ohio May 14, 1984).
Other practical considerations that might explain Merrell Dow's preference for a
federal forum include greater uniformity of procedural and evidentiary rules, the potential
for consolidation or common issue trials in what defendant believed to be a strong case in its
favor, the benefits of coordinated discovery or defenses generally, and a larger, more
diverse pool of potential jurors. See 3 F.C. WOODSIDE III, DRUG PRODUCT LAB LrrY §
21.02[2] at 5-6 & § 30.02[2] at 7 (1988).
16 That precedent, as noted, is Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180
(1921), a case both Justice Brennan (in his Merrell Dow dissent joined by Justices White,
Marshall, and Blackmun) and district court Judge Rubin relied upon heavily to conclude
that § 1331 jurisdiction existed. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 820-24, 827-28 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that "[t]he continuing vitality of Smith is beyond challenge" and
applying Smith to find federal question jurisdiction over plaintiffs' hybrid claim because the
statutory issue it raised required the court to discern the meaning and application of the
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the Court instead focused on the specific substantive statute raised by the state
law claim (here, the FDCA) to determine whether Congress had provided
either an express or implied cause of action or remedy to privately enforce that
statute. 17 Acknowledging the novelty of making the test for statutorily implied
private remedies part of its section 1331 methodology,18 the Court emphasized
the importance of testing the substantive statute for implied remedies and
attempted to reconcile or at least to couple the Court's federal question doctrine
with its implication doctrine. 19
The Court then concluded that Congress' failure to provide either a cause
of action or remedy within the FDCA necessarily precluded the court's exercise
of federal question jurisdiction over the state law claim which incorporated that
Act regardless of the dispositive effect of the federal issue within the lawsuit.20
Thus, Merrell Dow approved a mechanistic jurisdictional formula: If there is no
federal cause of action or remedy (either express or implied) in the
incorporated federal statute, then there is no federal jurisdiction over state law
claims seeking to enforce the implicated federal standard.
A number of federal circuit and district courts have adopted this strict
reading of Merrell Dow.21 There are, however, gerious shortcomings to this
approach. Merrell Dow's inordinate emphasis on the cause of action or remedy
FDCA and was an "essential element" of the state claim); see also id. at 806-07. For a
discussion of Smith's importance in the Court's § 1331 jurisprudence, see infra notes 104-
12, 145-50, 314-15 and accompanying text.
17 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810-14.
18 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, admitted that "[t]his is the first case in
which we have reviewed this type of jurisdictional claim in light of these [implied right of
action] factors." Id. at 811.
19 Id. at 810-12. For an explanation of the Supreme Court's federal question and
statutory implication doctrines, see infra notes 63-194 and accompanying text and infra
notes 230-59 and accompanying text, respectively.
20 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 (footnote omitted); id. at 812. Courts use the
terms "cause of action" and "remedy" somewhat interchangeably in the implication context.
E.g., id. at 810-12.
21 Infra notes 195-227 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 7, at
560-63. For enlightening treatments of Merrell Dow, see, e.g., E. CHEMERMNSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 239-41 (1989); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1020-21;
M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 99-105; Doernberg, 77re's No Reasonfor It, supra note 6, at
635-40, 649, 657-58; Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 6, at 539-40, 586-87; Friedman,
supra note 2, at 21-24; Luneburg, Nonoriginalist Interpretation: A Comment on Federal
Question Jurisdiction and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 48 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 757 (1987); Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of
Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 711-16 (1987); Comment, supra note
7; The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 230-40 (1986); see also
Collins, "Economic Rights," In plied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983,
77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1526 (1989) (Menell Dow indicates that state causes of action




as a jurisdictional determinant improperly grounds the federal question analysis
on a congressional substantive intent that is not dispositive of Congress' forum
intent under section 1331 and amounts to a virtual substitution of the remedial
for the jurisdictional inquiry. 22 As a result, Merrell Dow's remedy requirement
unduly inhibits judicial prerogative sanctioned by section 1331 to explore the
considerations necessary to principled allocations of hybrid claims, most
notably the dispositive nature of the federal issue within the lawsuit. 23
Despite these shortcomings, Merrell Dow spotlights the provoking question
whether the case-centered approach to hybrid claim determinations has failed to
adequately account for Congress' substantive objectives within the implicated
statute as they bear upon the forum determination. Perhaps, as Merrell Dow
22 Under a strict reading of Merrell Dow in the hybrid claim context, the implication
test essentially doubles for the federal question test because the federal statute involved in
the state claim typically fails to provide expressly for private enforcement and the court has
to determine whether to imply a remedy, and consequently under Merrell Dow, supply the
basis for federal jurisdiction. Thus, the § 1331 inquiry often reduces to the finding about
implied remedies. See infra notes 195-227 and accompanying text.
As Professor Doernberg noted, a strict reading of Merrell Dow may mean "no cause of
action not created by Congress will be able to be heard in the federal courts pursuant to
section 1331." Doernberg, There's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at 638 (footnote
omitted); see also E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 240 ("[Fjederal question jurisdiction
[under Merrell Dow] exists only if the federal law itself creates a cause of action, albeit one
not relied on by the plaintiff."); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 21, at 236
& n.34 (1986) ("The Court has never before [Merrell Dow] held that sustaining federal
jurisdiction requires the presence of a federal remedy."). This Article will shorthand Merrell
Dow's virtual equation of remedy (or cause of action) and jurisdiction as the "remedy
requirement."
23 See Cohen, supra note 5, at 916 (§ 1331 considerations include the potential
caseload increase, the extent to which the class of case turns on issues of state or federal
law, the need for federal expertise to handle federal law, and the need for a sympathetic
federal tribunal); Solimine, Enforcement and Interpretation of Settlements of Federal Cvil
Rights Actions, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 295, 309 (1988) (§ 1331 considerations include
"congressional intent, the degree of federal interest in the litigation, the relative prominence
of federal and state issues, and the likely burden on federal judicial resources in accepting
jurisdiction") (footnote omitted); cf Friedman, supra note 2, at 52 (delineating the
"protection of federal rights and interests, considerations of comity and federalism,
caseloads and.., judicial resources, and the need for uniformity" as appropriate factors to
consider in shaping federal jurisdiction); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 579-88 (delineating
"equitable discretion, federalism and comity, separation of powers, and judicial
administration" as appropriate criteria for guiding discretion in federal jurisdictional
determinations); see also Cohen, supra note 5, at 907 ("A frank recognition of the
pragmatic nature of the [federal question] decision-making process would help throw light
on the factors which actually induce decision."); Luneburg, supra note 21, at 758 ("Since
[judicial] lawmaking may form a significant element in statutory interpretation, candor by
the courts in what they are doing would seem to be clearly called for."); Shapiro, supra
note 2, at 578-79 (stressing the importance of "principled discretion" and candor in
jurisdictional determinations).
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implies, a more "comprehensive" approach to section 1331 distributions is
appropriate. This approach might require examination of all considerations-
both jurisdictional and substantive-relevant to whether a state law claim
warrants the protective offerings of federal trial forums. To experiment, this
Article posits such an approach, but concludes that it is ultimately subversive of
the general federal question statute and should be rejected in favor of a return
to the case-centered analysis (measuring the centrality of the federal issue to
plaintiffs recovery) absent further word from Congress.
In overview: Part II of this Article sets the larger constitutional framework
for section 1331 hybrid determinations by exploring the article III origins of the
jurisdictional collaboration and Congress' delegation of case-specific federal
question authority to the lower courts. Part M shows how Merrell Dow
unnecessarily and unjustifiably sacrifices this congressionally-sanctioned
judicial prerogative-without any indication from Congress that this change
should occur-in its confusion of remedial with jurisdictional intent. To
illuminate Merrell Dow's impact on the Supreme Court's statutory federal
question doctrine, Section B (after Section A reinforces the purposes of federal
question jurisdiction, often ignored in the Supreme Court's section 1331
opinions) revisits classic pre-Merrell Dow federal question cases (1) to show
the development of the discretionary case-centered emphasis of pre-Merrell
Dow precedent and (2) to explore the Court's treatment of jurisdictional and
substantive considerations in hybrid claim allocations, especially the value
attached to the substantive cause of action as jurisdictional determinant. Then,
Section C shows how Merrell Dow has altered the Court's former
accommodation of judicial prerogative in the federal question collaboration by
essentially substituting a remedial for a jurisdictional inquiry. Lower court
decisions following Merrell Dow's restrictive approach are reviewed in Section
D. These cases illustrate the dampening effect Merrell Dow has had on judicial
prerogative or initiative to assess traditional section 1331 considerations,
especially the role played by the federal issue within the claims before the
court.
Part IV demonstrates in detail why Merrell Dow's remedy requirement
threatens the integrity of a discretionary section 1331 inquiry and cannot stand
in place of a full-blown jurisdictional assessment. Section A explains the
Supreme Court's statutory implied remedies doctrine, itself discretion-
restrictive. Section B then demonstrates that Merrell Dow's blend of statutory
implication and federal question doctrines fails to achieve a coherent
jurisdictional formula and inhibits judicial discretion under section 1331. The
ostensible benefits of making a private action or remedy within the implicated
federal statute the jurisdictional barometer are exposed as illusory in Section C.
Lastly, Section D of Part IV explores Merrell Dow's invitation to consider
a section 1331 inquiry that assesses the substantive aspect of hybrid claim
allocations. It presents a preliminary sketch of an alternative to Merrell Dow's
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objectionable remedy requirement-a multi-factor federal question inquiry,
consistent with the purposes of federal question jurisdiction, that is both
respectful of judicial prerogative and responsive to specific congressional
substantive aims that may relate to forum selection. It concludes, however,
that this approach is ultimately unsound and urges a return to the pre-Merrell
Dow case-centered approach to section 1331 allocations.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: ARTICLE III ORIGINS OF THE
GENERAL FEDERAL QUESTION POWER
Article 1I1 created a disembodied federal judicial power ("The judicial
Power of the United States"), 24 which it defined by limitation to the specific
types of "cases" and "controversies" enumerated. 25 The article vested the
judicial power directly "in one supreme Court" and indirectly "in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 2 6 Thus,
article II itself established the Supreme Court, but gave Congress the power to
constitute the lower federal courts should Congress see fit to do so.27 Notably,
article I gave no explicit direction about Congress' ability to control the types
of cases or controversies those courts might hear, once created. 28
24 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
25 See id. at § 2. Article MII's restriction of the federal judicial power to specified
subjects of interstate, national, and international significance is a respectful acknowledgment
of the state courts' pre-existence and preeminent status in the new system of government,
which was fashioned to accommodate the state sovereigns already in place. See L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 155 (2d ed. 1988); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 5, at 13-18 (Article m's nine heads of federal jurisdiction reflect its focus on the
vindication of federal authority, admiralty and maritime cases, foreign relations, interstate
umpiring, and controversies between citizens of different states.); THE FEDERALIST No. 81,
at 485-86 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (noting that the inferior federal courts will
be especially suited to determine "matters of national jurisdiction," but that the "fitness and
competency" of state courts "should be allowed in the utmost latitude"); THE FEDERALIST
No. 82, at 491-93 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (describing state court retention of
pre-existing authority and exercise of concurrent jurisdiction).
26 U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 1 (emphasis added); see also id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 9
(empowering Congress "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court").
27 E. CHEMlERINSKY, supra note 21, at 3; HART & WECHsLER, supra note 5, at 10-
11; see also Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLuM. L. REv.
157, 157 n.1 (1953). For concise overviews of the vigorous debate about Congress' power
to restrict or revoke entirely lower federal court jurisdiction, see E. CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 21, at § 3.3 and M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 29-52; see also Article III and 77e
Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499 (1990).
28 See London, "Federal Question" Jurisdiction-A Snare and a Delusion, 57 MICH.
L. REV. 835, 836 (1959) ("the extent to which this constitutional grant of judicial power
would be exercised, particularly with respect to the type and number of inferior courts and
the scope of their jurisdiction, was left to the discretion of Congress") (footnote omitted).
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Congress lost little time in interpreting and exercising its article I
prerogative. The first session of the first Congress authorized the first set of
inferior courts in The Judiciary Act of 1789,29 but stopped short of vesting
them with the full range of the federal judicial power delineated by article Mn. 30
To date, Congress has never granted the lower federal courts full article mH
authority,31 and the Supreme Court has respected Congress' sizable power to
control lower court jurisdiction.32 Thus, the lower federal courts not only exist
by virtue of congressional directive, but the nature and breadth of their
jurisdiction is also controlled by Congress.33
Contrast this silence with article IlI's express mandate that Congress shall regulate the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
29 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789); Warren, New Light on the History
of 77Te Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REV. 49, 49 (1923).
30 The First Judiciary Act, for example, did not give the federal courts federal question
authority (although article III expressly provided for it) and established an amount in
controversy requirement for diversity cases (although article In nowhere mentioned it).
London, supra note 28, at 836; compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 with Act of Sept. 24,
1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (requiring a $500 diversity threshold).
31 E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 149-50.
32 E.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) ("Article Im left Congress free
to establish inferior federal courts or not as it thought appropriate. It could have declined to
create any such courts, leaving suitors to the remedies afforded by state courts, with such
appellate review by this Court as Congress might prescribe."); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,
260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (Congress "may give, withhold or restrict [lower court]
jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the
Constitution.") (citations omitted); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448 (1850)
("Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the
enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the
statute confers."); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 43; Redish & Woods, Congressional
Power To Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a Nev
Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 46 (1975) ("[l1t has generally been accepted that
Congress may adjust the jurisdiction of the federal courts in virtually any manner.")
(footnote omitted).
33 Accordingly, the lower federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, able to hear
only cases or controversies that are both constitutionally ordained and congressionally (i.e.,
statutorily) sanctioned. Professor Forrester has explained this principle of dual
authorization: "Congress must give the [lower federal] courts authority to exercise the
power which is created by the Constitution. The Constitution contains the reservoir or
potential of judicial power which Congress may confer, piecemeal, upon the courts."
Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," XVI TUL. L. REv. 362, 362-63 (1942)
(footnote omitted); see also The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868) (to
create lower court jurisdiction, "[t]he Constitution must have given to the court the capacity
to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it"). Contrast the limited jurisdiction
of the federal courts with the general jurisdiction of the state courts, which can hear a broad
range of cases in the absence of statutory authorization. L. BRILMAYER, AN
INTRODUCrION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 43 (1986).
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That control, however, is not absolute. Congressional grants of lower court
jurisdiction must comport with article III strictures34 or risk invalidation by the
Supreme Court.35 And, within the confines of broad jurisdictional grants,
Congress itself has often accorded the courts-in part by silent
acquiescence 36-considerable discretion to refine the contours of their own
jurisdiction, consistent with legislative intent, on a case-by-case basis. 37 Thus,
Congress has given the federal courts the simultaneous power to exert and to
police the jurisdictional power they possess, a unique manifestation of systemic
trust ultimately grounded on the fact that the representative Congress may
always readjust, consistent with the Constitution, the jurisdictional perimeter
sculpted by the judiciary. 38
The constitutional authorization for federal question jurisdiction resides in
article I's "arising under" clause, which states that the federal judicial power
"shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority." 39 Section 1331, Congress' counterpart bestowal of
3 4 E.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983) ("This
Court's cases firmly establish that Congress may not expand the jurisdiction of the federal
courts beyond the bounds established by the Constitution."); National Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 607 (1949) ("If we accept the elementary doctrine
that the words of Article Im are not self-exercising grants of jurisdiction to the inferior
federal courts, then I think those words must mark the limits of the power Congress may
confer on the district courts.") (Rutledge, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); id. at 652
("Article III defines and confines the limits of jurisdiction of the courts which are established
under [it].") (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
For discussions of non-article II constitutional limitations on Congress' article III
power, see, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 468 (1944) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one thing for Congress to withhold jurisdiction. It is entirely another to
confer it and direct that it be exercised in a manner inconsistent with constitutional
requirements, or, what in some instances may be the same thing, without regard to them
[i.e., due process, the separation and independence of government powers, and the
constitutional integrity of the judicial process]."); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169
F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948) (positing a fifth amendment limitation
on Congress' article III power).
35 The Supreme Court has the power to review the constitutionality of congressional
enactments under the doctrine of judicial review. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803).
36 In the statutory federal question area, for example, the historical reality is that
Congress, to this point, has left intact the Supreme Court's complicated trail of precedent.
37 Supra notes 2-3, 10, 23 and accompanying text; see also Shapiro, supra note 2, at
568 ("no [§ 1331] formulation can possibly explain or even begin to account for the variety
of outcomes unless it accords sufficient room for the federal courts to make a range of
choices based on considerations of judicial administration and the degree of federal
concern") (footnote omitted).
38 Supra note 4.
3 9 U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, cI. 1.
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general federal question jurisdiction, borrows liberally from the constitutional
language, stating that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." 40
40 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
Congress' authorization of general federal jurisdiction has a curious history. The first
Congress which created the lower federal courts did not invest them with original
jurisdiction over federal questions, arguably the area most warranting their existence. See
Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639,
640-42 (1942) (hypothesizing (1) that federal question jurisdiction was the cost of the
compromise making The First Judiciary Act of 1789 palatable both to those who
championed inferior courts with federal question authority as crucial to the new government
and to those who opposed creation of the inferior courts altogether and (2) that federal
question, rather than diversity, jurisdiction was sacrificed because (a) impartial tribunals,
capable of transcending intrastate, interstate, or international prejudices, were vital to the
economic well-being of the fledgling nation and (b) that jurisdiction could always be vested
when circumstances required it); see also London, supra note 28, at 836 (The First
Judiciary Act's failure to provide general federal question jurisdiction "was not an oversight
but reflected a compromise made necessary by the determined opposition of the
antifederalists to a national judiciary") (footnote omitted). But see Engdahl, Federal
Question Jurisdiction Under the 1789Judiciary Act, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 521 (1989)
(arguing that the distribution of jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789 reveals that the Act
fully vested federal question jurisdiction).
Then, when Congress first authorized the courts' general federal question jurisdiction
12 years later in the Midnight Judges Act of 1801, Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2
Stat. 89, 92 (1801), it repealed the grant in a little more than a year, Act of Mar. 8, 1802,
ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132 (1802). For the next 70 or so years, Congress selectively conferred
federal question jurisdiction on the lower federal courts in specific statutes. See, e.g., the
first Civil Rights Act, Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), which granted
federal jurisdiction over "all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or
cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be
any of the rights secured to them by the first section of this act;" see also HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 960-62.
Finally, in 1875, Congress enacted the general federal question statute (§ 133 I's
predecessor) with a $500 jurisdictional amount. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat.
470 (1875). The post-Civil War "consolidation of national sentiment," HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 960, and suspicion of state courts as adjudicators of federal
rights prompted its passage. Infra note 60 and accompanying text. Section 1 of the Act
provided that the federal courts
shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all
suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds,
exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority ....
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (emphasis added). The statute's
operative "arising under" language has survived a number of amendments, see C. WRIGHT,
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Despite the similarity of the constitutional and statutory federal question
provisions, the Supreme Court has given them significantly different
interpretations. 41 In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,42 the Court broadly
construed article il's arising under clause to permit federal question
jurisdiction whenever a federal issue "forms an ingredient of the original
cause" and might arise in the lawsuit, no matter how remote or actualized that
possibility. 43 In contrast, the Supreme Court has given section 1331 a more
limited construction by requiring the federal question asserted not only to meet
the well-pleaded complaint rule,44 but to be sufficiently substantial and vital to
supra note 5, § 17, at 90, although Congress had raised the jurisdictional amount
requirement to $10,000 before eliminating it entirely in 1980. Act of Dec. 1, 1980, § 2(a),
94 Stat. 2369; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 963 n.32. Interestingly, between 1875
and 1980, Congress enacted numerous jurisdictional provisions in particular substantive
statutes as well as subject-specific jurisdictional statutes that did not contain an amount in
controversy requirement. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 963-66; Lynch v.
Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549 n.17 (listing statutes granting jurisdiction,
"without regard to the amount in controversy, in virtually all areas that otherwise would fall
under the general federal-question statute"). These post-federal question statute enactments
support the inference that Congress, when it wished, specifically provided for jurisdiction,
but otherwise reserved forum allocations (of a minimum threshold value) to the courts'
discretion under § 1331-a discretion Congress broadened by removing the jurisdictional
amount from the statute.
For a detailed history of the statute's development, see, e.g., HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 5, at 960-66; Doernberg, There's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at 601-07;
Forrester, supra note 33, at 374-75.
41 See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1983)
(article 1I arising under jurisdiction is "broader" than statutory federal question jurisdiction
and "this Court never has held [them] ...identical"); Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.51 (1959) ("the many limitations" on § 1331 "are not
limitations on the constitutional power of Congress to confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts").
42 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
43 Id. at 823; accord Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804,
807 (1986) ("the constitutional meaning of 'arising under' may extend to all cases in which
a federal question is 'an ingredient' of the action"); Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 492 (under
Osborn, "Congress may confer on the federal courts jurisdiction over any case or
controversy that might call for the application of federal law."); see M. REDISH, supra note
5, at 86 (Osborn, read literally, means "the mere possibility of a federal issue is sufficient to
authorize Congress to bring a case into federal court ... even though in actuality the entire
case will have absolutely nothing to do with federal law."). Osborn shows Justice Marshall,
with characteristic vision, "construing for the future," Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 40,
at 649, by early establishing in article III a broad constitutional reserve of federal question
power for Congress and the courts to draw upon, especially when Congress had not as yet
given the federal courts general federal question authority. See M. REDISH, supra note 5, at
86; Cohen, supra note 5, at 891.
44 This is the judicial requirement that the federal question supporting § 1331
jurisdiction cannot be supplied by the answer or the reply, but must appear on the face of
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the claim's resolution before it merits federal treatment.45 Significantly, the
Court has exercised its jurisdictional prerogative to narrow section 1331's
plaintiff's complaint, as a necessary part of plaintiff's claim, and not in anticipation of
probable defenses. E.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152
(1908); Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75 (1914); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S.
109, 112-13 (1936). In declaratory judgment actions, the hypothetical underlying coercive
action must comport with the rule. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 16 (1983) ("'if, but for the availability of the declaratory judgment
procedure, the federal claim would arise only as a defense to a state created action,
jurisdiction is lacking'") (quoting 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE § 2767, pp. 744-45 (2d ed. 1983)); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950) (the federal Declaratory Judgment Act does
not expand federal jurisdiction and plaintiff's declaratory complaint, viewed as a coercive
claim for damages, must satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule); West 14th St.
Commercial Corp. v. 5 West 14th Owners Corp., 815 F.2d 188, 194 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 850, 871 (1987) ("a court must look beyond the declaratory judgment
allegations and determine whether a substantial federal question arises either from the
[declaratory judgment] defendant's threatened action . . . or from the [declaratory]
complaint when viewed as a request for coercive relief apart from the defendant's
anticipated suit") (citations omitted); see also Doerberg, There's No Reason for It, supra
note 6, at 640-46 (examining Skelly's and Franchise Tax Board's treatment of declaratory
judgments).
The well-pleaded complaint rule has been justified because it "spares the courts the
uncertainty of guessing whether federal issues will be raised after the complaint and enables
the jurisdictional determination to be made at the outset." See Currie, The Federal Courts
and the American Law Institute, Part 11, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 270 (1969) [hereinafter
Currie, Part 11]. But, "[t]he federal interest in having federal courts adjudicate federal issues
is just as great when the federal question arises in a defense, or in a response to a defense,
as when it is presented in the plaintiff's complaint." E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at
235. And the purposes of federal question jurisdiction "are ill served by a rule that
arbitrarily consigns important federal issues to the state courts because they happen to
appear in the 'wrong' pleading." Doernberg, There's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at 661
(footnote omitted). See generally id. for a thorough critique of the rule.
Despite the rule's shortcomings, recent Supreme Court cases indicate that it is firmly
entrenched in statutory federal question jurisprudence. E.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 840-41 (1989); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486
U.S. 800, 808-09 (1988); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987); Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at
808; Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9-12.
45 E.g., Francise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28 ("Congress has given the lower federal
courts jurisdiction to hear . . . only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint
establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law."); see also
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 (Congress' assumed determination not to provide a private
federal remedy for the FDCA's violation "is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that
the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is
insufficiently 'substantial' to confer federal-question jurisdiction.") (footnote omitted); The
Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 21, at 234 n.30 (federal question formulas "are
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scope despite legislative history-admittedly meager-that Congress intended to
vest the full extent of constitutional federal question power in the lower
courts.46 These court-imposed restrictions have worked to preserve the
all some composite of a substantiality test, generally requiring that an important federal
issue be an essential element of the plaintiff's claim"). See generally ALI STUDY, supra
note 5, at 484-87. But see Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 824 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(substantiality means that the federal question is "colorable" and has a "reasonable
foundation").
It is interesting to note that in evaluating the jurisdictional sufficiency or substantiality
of the federal issue raised by state claims, the Court has variously appraised (a) the issue's
authenticity, non-frivolousness, or basis in federal law, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) (the federal issue must "rest[ ] upon a reasonable
foundation" and not be "merely colorable."); Robinson v. Anderson, 121 U.S. 522, 524
(1887) ("the case made by the complaint was fictitious and not real" and should be
dismissed under § 5 of the 1875 Act because the suit "'does not really and substantially
involve a dispute or controversy'" within the court's jurisdiction) (citing Starin v. New
York, 115 U.S. 248, 251 (1885)), (b) the likelihood of its actual contest, e.g., Gully, 299
U.S. at 117, 118 ("the most one can say is that a question of federal law is lurking in the
background" and that courts have distinguished between "basic" and "collateral"
controversies and "necessary" and "merely possible" disputes); Smith, 255 U.S. at 201 (the
federal issue must be "directly drawn in question" and the "decision depend[ent] upon
[its]... determination."), and (c) the outcome determinative nature of the federal issue or
the centrality of its resolution to the relief requested. E.g., Gully, 299 U.S. at 112 ("[A]
right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an
element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action."); Smith, 255 U.S. at 199
("the right to relief [must] depend[ ] upon the construction or application of the Constitution
or laws of the United States").
46 Congress, in its debates over the Act of 1875, paid scant attention to the general
federal question provision of the bill-which was one among several sections-and its
significance seems to have escaped general notice. Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 398-99 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Forrester, supra
note 33, at 375. Nonetheless, the parallel language of the constitutional and statutory
provisions, what little circumstantial evidence can be gleaned from the congressional floor,
e.g., 2 CONG. REc. 4987 (1874) (remarks of Sen. Carpenter, a primary author of the Act,
declaring generally that "[tihis bill gives precisely the power which the Constitution confers
nothing more, nothing less"), and the dearth of contemporary commentary about the 1875
provision may indicate that Congress intended to and did grant the full constitutional power,
as the bill in plain terms purported. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. 804, 818 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Franddse Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8 n.8; Forrester, supra note 33, at 374-77; cf
Doernberg, There's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at 603-04 (although the Supreme Court
"appeared to adopt [the] broad view" of the 1875 Act shortly after its enactment, "it is clear
that the statutory provision has not generally been accorded the same breadth as the
constitutional grant") (footnote omitted). As an example of the Supreme Court's early
approach, see, e.g., Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 249, 257 (1885), in which the Court
cited Osborn, inter alia, in attempting to define the reach of the 1875 Act. See also
Doernberg, You Can Lead a Horse to Water...: 7he Supreme Court's Refusal To Allow
the Exercise of Oiginal Jurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CAsE W. REs. L. REv.
999, 1003 (1989-90) [hereinafter Doernberg, You Cn Lead a Horse].
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traditional domain of state court adjudication and to protect the federal courts
from the docket paralysis a more expansive interpretation of section 1331
would have fostered. 47
Two vital concepts pertinent to Merrell Dow emerge from this exploration
of article I origins of federal question jurisdiction. First is the constitutionally
ordained role for Congress in authorizing and defining the scope of that
jurisdiction. In effect, Congress is the intermediary between the Constitution
and the lower courts, charged with the fundamental decisions about the
jurisdictional reach of these coordinate-branch forums. Absent
unconstitutionality, Congress controls lower federal court jurisdiction. Second
is that Congress, although the primary determinant of these matters, hardly has
the sole voice in jurisdictional decisions. Congress has permitted the federal
courts to play an indispensable role in defining their original federal question
jurisdiction by accommodating case-specific judicial discretion within the
bounds of the overarching congressional directive.
Accordingly, section 1331 represents a sound congressional delegation to
the federal courts of the power to develop specific standards of federal question
jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court in Merrell Dow surrendered, absent
legislative jurisdictional directives to do so, much of the judicial discretion
Congress has traditionally accorded the federal courts in their case-by-case
attempts to reach principled section 1331 determinations. 48 Understanding
Merrell Dow's abdication of judicial prerogative under section 1331 begins
with exploring the purposes of that statute and then taking a different look at
the classic Supreme Court federal question cases leading up to, and given new
meaning by, Merrell Dow.
But see 2 CONG. REC. 4980-87 (1874) (which reveals that Sen. Carpenter's famous
remark, supposedly the most probative comment made about the federal question provision,
was made during the course of a debate about a different provision of the bill (§ 11)
pertaining to service of process).
47 See, e.g., Gully, 299 U.S. at 117-18; Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569-70
(1912); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900); Cohen, supra note 5, at
895, 903; London, supra note 28, at 838-40; Comment, supra note 7, at 546-47.
48 An enthusiastic proponent of jurisdictional dialogue between Congress and the
courts, Professor Friedman proposes a jurisdictional model which goes so far as to
"challenge[ ] the central assumption that Congress bears primary responsibility for defining
federal court jurisdiction," Friedman, supra note 2, at 2 (footnote omitted), and suggests
that the responsibility for jurisdictional definition is "shared" so that "there is no final
authority." Id. at 61, 54. He appears to view Merrell Dow as an endeavor to enter into
dialogue with Congress by inviting congressional reaction to judicial statements about
jurisdiction. Id. at 24. This Article, however, takes a very different path and views Merrell
Dow more as an abdication of the judiciary's responsibility to exercise its congressionally-
sanctioned jurisdictional prerogative in a federal question collaboration where Congress is
the supreme partner.
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Ill. MERRELL DOWIN CONTEXT: A TURN AWAY FROM THE CASE-
CENTERED APPROACH TO HYBRID CLAIM ALLOCATIONS
A. The Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction
As adjudicators, the federal trial courts are institutionally distinctive.
Unlike the all-purpose state courts, 49 they function especially "to expound
principles of federal law"50 and "to protect federal rights and interests" 51
within their circumscribed sphere of authority. Central to this special role is the
assumption that federal trial forums differ from state trial forums in ways that
work to maximize the correct interpretation and proper effectuation of federal
interests. 52 These distinctive institutional features, particularly pertinent to
adjudications involving explication of national law, include: (1) an expertise in
discerning and interpreting federal interests, 53 (2) a sympathetic, but respectful,
49 See supra note 33.
50 See M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 96; see also H.R. REP. NO. 1461, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5063, 5063 (noting that the
1980 Act eliminating the amount in controversy requirement in § 1331 cases "represents
sound principles of federalism by mandating that the Federal courts should bear the
responsibility of deciding all questions of Federal law"); The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 247, 253 (1868) ("It is the right and duty of the national government to have its
Constitution and laws interpreted and applied by its own judicial tribunals.").
51 M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 96; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 961
(after the Civil War, "the national courts became the primary forum for the vindication of
federal rights"). As Professor Mishkin explained in his enduring observations about federal-
state forum differences, "with the expanding scope of federal legislation, the exercise of
power over [federal question] cases ...constitutes one of the major purposes of a full
independent system of national trial courts." Mishkin, supra note 27, at 157 (footnote
omitted). He has forcefully argued that "institutional variations" between federal and state
forums make the federal courts peculiarly suited to safeguard federal rights. Id. at 176.
52 Of course, the parity debate (about whether the federal and state courts are fungible
forums for vindication of federal rights) still rages. E.g., Chemerinsky, Parity
Reconsidered, supra note 10; Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic
7heoty: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 329 (1988); Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L. REv. 283 (1988) [hereinafter
Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?]; Bator, 7he State Courts and Federal Constitutional
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
53 The federal courts specialize in federal law matters and have developed considerable
expertise in-or at least familiarity with-the meaning and application of the Constitution,
congressional statutes, and federal agency regulations. E.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826-28 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (forums
specializing in federal law with federal question cases as their "basic grist" are more likely
to apply the law expertly, correctly, uniformly, and sympathetically); ALI STUDY, supra
note 5, at 164-65 ("The federal courts have acquired a considerable expertness in the
interpretation and application of federal law which would be lost if federal question cases
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national perspective,54 (3) the potential for uniform interpretation of federal
law,55 and (4) the impartiality and confidence afforded by independence. 56
were given to the state courts."); M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 2 ("[The] federal courts have
developed a vast expertise in dealing with the intricacies of federal law, while the state
judiciary has, quite naturally, devoted the bulk of its efforts to the evolution and refinement
of state law and policy. It would be unreasonable to expect state judiciaries to possess a
facility equal to that of the federal courts in adjudicating federal law.") (footnote omitted);
see also M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 2 ("because of the process of presidential selection
and Senate confirmation, we can usually be assured of a floor of competence in the federal
judiciary.").
54 Federal judges, even if drawn from the state where the federal court sits, are more
likely to have a national perspective on matters before them given their employer, mode of
selection, expertise, and the check of circuit court review. Thus, the federal courts are more
likely to be receptive to federal claims and less likely to sacrifice national for local interests.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 81 at 486 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("the most
discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a local spirit may be found to disqualify
the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of national causes"); ALI STUDY, supra note 5, at
167-68 (federal trial forums offer a "marked advantage" in the face of state hostility
because "[a]n unsympathetic state court may impede the assertion of a federal right by
delay" and Supreme Court review over state courts "is much more limited"); Mishkin,
supra note 27, at 158 (federal judges, paid and selected by the national government and
protected with life tenure for good behavior, "are more likely to give full scope to any
given Supreme Court decision, and particularly ones unpopular locally, than are their state
counterparts") (footnote omitted); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law
Institute, Part 1, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1968) ("Because of persistent state-federal
hostilities .... we do not seem to have reached the point where Supreme Court review of
state courts is always adequate to assure recognition of federal rights.") (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter Currie, Part 11; Neuborne, supra note 52, at 1124-25 (the "psychological set"
of the federal bench makes it "more likely to enforce constitutional rights vigorously"
because of its "elite tradition" or "institutional mission," its apparent acknowledgment of
"an affirmative obligation to carry out and even anticipate" the Supreme Court's direction,
and its distance from the daily business of enforcing constitutional rights at the "cynicism-
breeding" level of state criminal, family, and civil courts, which enhances enforcement of
these rights in the abstract). For a discussion of state hostility to federal law, see Doerberg,
There's No Reasonfor It, supra note 6, at 647-48 n.220.
At the same time, the federal judiciary, cognizant of its limited authority within the
federalist scheme, has generally displayed an institutional humility respectful of state power
and interests. An important and pertinent illustration of this self-limitation is the Supreme
Court's decision to construe the general federal question statute more narrowly than article
m11's reserve of federal question power. Supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. This
restraint, coupled with their national perspective, may peculiarly suit the federal courts to
treat hybrid claims which require balancing both federal and state concerns.
55 Expert judges representing the national judiciary are more likely to provide
uniformity in construing and applying federal law. The regional appellate review structure,
the use of the same evidentiary and procedural rules in courtrooms across the country, and
the selection ofjudges by the same procedures and the same employer also promote system-
wide consistency in the decisionmaking process. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 at 476 (A.
Hamilton) (Rossiter ed. 1961) ("Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the
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While the enacting Congress provided little guidance about section 1331's
scope and application, 57 the federal question statute served these four
institutional distinctions and with them, the federal judiciary's purpose "to
protect the national interest in the application of federal law"58 by making more
same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government from which nothing but
contradiction and confusion can proceed."); ALI STUDY, supra note 5, at 165-66 (federal
courts "are more likely to apply federal law sympathetically and understandingly than are
state courts" and therefore are more likely to achieve greater uniformity in results);
Mishkin, supra note 27, at 158-59, 170 (The federal courts' "sympathetic handling of...
Supreme Court rulings" is key to "achieving widespread, uniform effectuation of federal
law" given that the Supreme Court-the Constitution's "ultimate judicial exponent of federal
rights"-actually decides relatively few cases, and by necessity, relies heavily upon the
lower federal courts to "police" its decisions and to promote "the effectuation of national
rights.") (footnote omitted); cf Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48
(1816) (uniformity is necessary lest federal law "would be different in different states" and
may "never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two
states").
Of course, the uniformity goal for the lower courts is often more aspirational than
achievable given conflicting federal circuit and district court interpretations of the same
subjects. Nonetheless, consistency in federal law treatments is more likely attained with the
federal forum option than without it. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 826 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("while perfect uniformity may not have been achieved, experience indicates that the
availability of a federal forum in federal-question cases has done much to advance that
goal").
56 Article M bars any salary reductions for federal judges and requires lifetime
appointments, subject to good behavior. U.S. CONST. art. fI, § 1. These salary and life
tenure provisions insulate federal judges from political and popular pressures and encourage
fair and impartial decisionmaking responsive to interests before, rather than external to, the
court. Thus, the federal judiciary's independence works to facilitate the courts' other
functions by ensuring that federal judges are free to apply federal law correctly and
consistently, even in difficult or sensitive cases, and have the institutional confidence to
vindicate federal rights in the face of either congressional, executive, state, or popular
resistance. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 81 at 486 (A. Hamilton) (Rossiter ed. 1961) ("State
judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too little
independent to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of the national laws."); M.
REDISH, supra note 5, at 2 ("because federal judges are guaranteed the independence
protections of article 1l1, while many state judges are forced to stand for election, we can
generally be assured of a greater degree of independence of the federal judiciary from
external political forces.") (footnote omitted); Mishkin, supra note 27, at 158 (noting the
advantages of life-tenured, less localized decisionmakers); Neuborne, supra note 52, at
1127 ("Federal district judges, appointed for life and removable only by impeachment, are
as insulated from majoritarian pressures as is functionally possible, precisely to insure their
ability to enforce the Constitution without fear of reprisal.") (footnote omitted); cf Matasar
& Bruch, supra note 2, at 1339 n.240 (deference by the nonmajoritarian federal judiciary to
the majoritarian Congress in interpreting its own jurisdiction might be a default on its role to
protect minority interests).
5 7 Supra note 46.
58 ALI STUDY, supra note 5, at 477.
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claims involving federal interests eligible for expert, sympathetic, uniform, and
independent treatment.59 The circumstances of the statute's enactment evidence
its protective aim. Adopted in 1875 by a post-Civil War Congress apparently
distrustful of the state courts as the primary vindicators of federal rights,60 the
general federal question statute signaled that certain claims formerly confined to
the state courts, absent specific congressional permission for federal
adjudication, might warrant the special protections and early attention of
national decisionmakers (at the factfinding stage) long before the availability (if
any) of Supreme Court review. 61
In this way, section 1331 represented a startling advance for the lower
federal courts. The existence of the general grant of federal question authority
meant that Congress' failure to provide expressly for federal jurisdiction over
particular cases did not necessarily end the federal jurisdictional inquiry if
congressional permission to hear the case could be found by virtue of section
1331. Accordingly, the statute gave to the federal courts greater flexibility to
decide whether certain claims-including state causes of action implicating
federal interests-might merit initial federal adjudication. 62 Federal trial forums
might now be available to hear any number of claims that Congress either did
59 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 826-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing the need for
uniformity, expertise, and sympathy in interpreting federal law as "reasons Congress found
it necessary to add [federal question] jurisdiction to the district courts"); D. CURRIE, supra
note 5, at 139 (federal question jurisdiction "should be retained at the core of district-court
business" given the expertise, uniformity, and sympathy rationales).
60 Among other reconstruction problems, Congress faced southern defiance of the
constitutional amendments and federal statutes aimed to ensure black equality. See, e.g.,
K.M. STAMPP, THE EPA OF RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877, 14-15, 131-32, 135-41
(1965); see also F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
55-59, 64-69 (1928); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 960-61; Doernberg, 7here's
No Reasonfor It, supra note 6, at 603 n.27.
61 Thus, the federal question issue is often one of forum choice: Finding § 1331
jurisdiction may provide plaintiffs (or defendants upon removal) with what may be an
important-perhaps outcome determinative-alternative forum to air grievances even
though the state courts are presumed the adjudicative equals of the federal courts on
questions of federal law. C. Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2438 (1990) ("Federal law
is enforceable in state courts... because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are
as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature. The supremacy clause
makes those laws 'the supreme Law of the Land,' and charges state courts with a coordinate
responsibility to enforce that law .... ."); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S.
473, 478 & 478 n.4 (1981) ("the Constitution limits the powers of each [sovereign] and
requires the States to recognize federal law as paramount .... If Congress does not confer
jurisdiction on federal courts to hear a particular federal claim, the state courts stand ready
to vindicate the federal right, subject always to review, of course, in this Court.").
62 These are precisely the types of claims that the Supreme Court has used to test the
limits of the federal question grant. E.g., Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936)
(rejecting jurisdiction over the hybrid claim); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255
U.S. 180 (1921) (finding jurisdiction over the hybrid claim).
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not anticipate or chose not to "federalize" in gross by statute and delegated to
the federal courts for jurisdictional sorting on a case-by-case basis in
accordance with prevailing legal and political norms. In short, Congress'
general grant of federal question authority not only empowered the federal
courts to hear a wider variety of claims, but enabled them to exercise expanded
front-line prerogative about sometimes delicate claim allocations that were
difficult or impossible to determine from a distant legislative chamber.
B. Pre-Merrell Dow Federal Question Doctrine Revisited
1. A Brief Overview
Logically, then, a coherent federal question inquiry might discern whether
the distinctive federal forum protections of expertise, receptivity, uniformity,
and independence are warranted to vindicate the federal interest at issue. As
this Section shows, however, classic Supreme Court decisions in this area fail
either to articulate or to analyze whether the particular claims before them merit
these protections (even when they reach the correct result). Instead, the Court-
including the Merrell Dow majority-has offered a string of jurisdictional
prescriptions that merely shorthand often unspoken assumptions about the
purposes underlying Congress' grant of the federal question power,63 in part,
perhaps, because Congress has said so little about its section 1331 intent.
But another explanation for this deficiency helps to justify it: Asking a trial
court to determine whether any particular substantive federal interest or
congressional objective merits expert, sympathetic, uniform, and independent
treatment might embroil the court in a subjective, case-by-case assessment of
the need for these federal forum protections-arguably, an impossible and
63 Consider, for example, American Well's cause of action approach, Smith's outcome
determinative approach, Moore's mere incorporation approach, Gully's "essential element"
and "common sense accommodation" approach, and Merrell Dow's remedy requirement.
These prescriptions are compressions-rather than expressions-of the considerations that
might comprise the federal question inquiry. Cf 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 5, § 3562, at 19 (courts deciding federal question cases tend to "repeat
uncritically language from earlier decisions as a substitute for analysis of the case that is
actually before them"); Cohen, supra note 5, 892 n.18 ("The confusion of doctrine in this
area results, at least in part, from the continued repetition of meaningless or even
misleading phrases."); Comment, supra note 7, at 551 ("The [Supreme] Court . . . has
failed to identify the pertinent considerations for determining federal question jurisdiction
and how they are to be applied.") (footnote omitted); see also Cohen, supra note 5, at 911-
12 (urisdictional formulas "tend to obscure the pragmatic considerations which may govern
decisions in the classes of cases for which the formulas are valid"). For amplification of
American Well Works v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916) and Moore v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 291 U.S. 205 (1934), see infra notes 93-103 and
accompanying text and notes 120-26 and accompanying text, respectively.
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impermissible determination more appropriately within the legislature's
province. From this perspective, it is less surprising that the Court's general
federal question doctrine has often avoided the types of jurisdictional value
judgments that would, in effect, require relative rankings of substantive
interests as well as sensitive judgments about state court competence and
receptiveness in determining whether particular hybrid claims warranted federal
forum protections. 64 Accordingly, a dominant strain of pre-Merrell Dow
federal question precedent for hybrid claims collapsed the inquiry from
statutory purposes into the question whether resolution of the state claim before
the court turned on construction of federal law. This test assured the centrality
of the federal question to case outcome (given its dispositive nature) and
therefore patently justified the need for federal forum protections (i.e.,
expertise, receptivity, uniformity, and independence) to ensure the correct and
consistent interpretation of a pivotal federal issue without judicial judgment
about the worthiness of the implicated federal interest or the capability of the
state forum. The Court adopted this approach in Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co.,65 basing federal question jurisdiction on the dispositive nature of the
federal issue within the litigation, rather than on the significance of the
implicated federal substantive interest in the broader scheme of governance.66
A natural component of Smith's jurisdictional theory was rejection of the
substantive cause of action as the ultimate jurisdictional determinant-the
stringent approach endorsed by the Court but five years before Smith in
American Well Works v. Layne & Bowler Co.67-because it hampered a trial
court's discretion to assess the prominence or dispositive nature of the federal
issue embedded within the hybrid claim and undermined section 1331's
purpose to provide federal decisionmakers for cases turning on federal law
constructions. Yet, despite Smith's de-emphasis of the substantive aspect of
jurisdiction (in circumventing American Well's focus on the substantive law
creating the cause of action or remedy and in failing to analyze the nature of the
implicated federal interest), other pre-Merrell Dow Supreme Court decisions
both before and after Smith indicated the possible importance of exploring the
substantive nature of the federal right at issue and its impact upon the forum
determination. 68 Shoshone Mining C. v. Rutter,69 Puerto Rico v. Russell &
64 See infra note 330 and accompanying text.
65 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
66 Infra note 112 and accompanying text.
67 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
68 Professor Wells has proposed this definition of the distinction between substantive
and jurisdictional rules:
Substantive rules are based on legislative and judicial assessments of the society's
wants and needs, and they help to shape the world of primary activity outside the
courtroom. Jurisdictional and procedural rules are addressed to lawyers and judges in
their professional roles and govern the means by which disputes regarding the content
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Co.,70 and Gully v. First National Bank,71 most expressly hinted at an
approach to section 1331 allocations responsive to Congress' substantive intent
as it might bear upon the forum determination-an approach elevated and
expanded by Merrell Dow's focus on the congressional cause of action or
remedy within the implicated substantive statute and its apparent consideration
of the nature of the federal interest at issue.
In this way, Merrell Dow represents a telling, but unnecessary, restriction
upon judicial prerogative in the section 1331 collaboration because of its new-
and misplaced-emphasis on the cause of action or remedy in the implicated
substantive statute as having overriding jurisdictional significance. In
effectively substituting Congress' remedial intent for jurisdictional intent in the
section 1331 hybrid claim analysis, Merrell Dow took "jurisdictional" cues that
Congress, in fact, did not send. The result is relinquishment of the court's
congressionally-sanctioned discretion to entertain hybrid state law claims with
dispositive federal presence whether or not the implicated federal law is
privately enforceable. Thus, Merrell Dow's remedy requirement becomes but
another stylized jurisdictional formula that, in effect, undermines the judiciary's
discretion under the general grant of federal question jurisdiction in hybrid
claim cases.
Accordingly, this Section revisits, through a somewhat different lens,
landmark Supreme Court federal question decisions to illustrate the
jurisdictional-substantive tension in the Court's doctrine and ultimately to
illuminate Merrell Dow's treatment of that tension in the context of
congressional directive and judicial discretion in the section 1331
collaboration. 72 It demonstrates that pre-Merrell Dow case law came to reject
the cause of action as the sole jurisdictional determinant in federal question
hybrid claim determinations and, by and large, endorsed a section 1331 inquiry
based upon a case-centered notion of the dispositiveness of the implicated
federal issue with little overt exploration of the purposes underlying federal
question jurisdiction. Section 11I(C) demonstrates that Merrell Dow significantly
changed this situation (1) by reviving a cause of action emphasis for hybrid
or application of substantive rules should be resolved.... The distinction should not be
overstated, however, for procedural rules may have substantive consequences.
Wells, The Inact of Substanive Interests on the Law of Federal Courts, 30 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 499, 504 (1989) [hereinafter Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests].
69 177 U.S. 505 (1900); see infra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
70 288 U.S. 476 (1933); see infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
71 299 U.S. 109 (1936); see infra notes 127-44 and accompanying text.
72 For works examining federal question statute case law, see, e.g., M. REDISH, supra
note 5, at 95-117; E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 230-41; Doemberg & Mushlin,
supra note 6, at 533-47; Doernberg, 77Tere's No Reason for It, supra note 6; Hirshrnan,
supra note 7, at 22-42; Cohen, supra note 5; Mishkin, supra note 27, at 160-84; Chadbourn
& Levin, supra note 40, at 650-74.
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claim allocations at a second level of the section 1331 analysis and (2) by
giving new prominence to the substantive aspect of jurisdiction by requiring a
cause of action or remedy within the implicated substantive statute to support
federal question jurisdiction, thereby (3) sacrificing the courts' traditional-and
as yet not revoked by Congress-discretion under the general federal question
statute to make hybrid claim allocations by improperly substituting the remedial
inquiry for the jurisdictional inquiry and undermining the case-centered
approach to section 1331 allocations.
2. Revisiting the Classics
Indeed, Merrell Dow's section 1331 analysis "focus[ed] almost entirely on
the significance of Congress' decision not to provide a private cause of action"
under the FDCA, the incorporated federal substantive statute.73 Justice Stevens
opened the Court's opinion stating the question presented as "whether the
incorporation of a federal standard in a state-law private action, when Congress
has intended that there not be a federal private action for violations of that
federal standard, makes the action one 'arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States."' 74 In mirrored response, he closed Merrell Dow
with these words:
We conclude that a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an
element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there
should be no private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a
claim "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." 75
In short, Merrell Dow held that there shall be no section 1331 jurisdiction over
state law claims when the federal element of those claims is a federal statutory
standard, and the federal substantive statute lacks its own private cause of
action or remedy for self-vindication directly under that statute.76
73 The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 21, at 235-36 (emphasis added);
see also id. at 236 ("Here the Court may have gone too far; indeed, it may have
transformed the federal question jurisdictional prerequisite into a requirement of the
existence of a federal remedy rather than the presence of an important federal issue-at least
insofar as a private litigant relies on violation of a federal statute.").
74 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805.
75 Id. at 817.
76 The language of Merrell Dow's concluding paragraph, in terms not limited to the
FDCA, supports this broad proposition. See also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 822 n.2 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring) (restating this broad
holding); he Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 21, at 233 ("the Court appeared
to extend its reasoning beyond the FDCA to cover all federal statutes"). But see infra notes
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But Merrell Dow's emphatic conclusion about the congressional message
conveyed by the cause of action is hardly compelled by previous statutory
federal question precedent, a strong strain of which rejected the cause of action
as the decisive jurisdictional determinant. 77 Eighty-six years before Merrell
Dow, first in Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co.78 and then upon
reexaminati6n of the same issue in Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter,79 the
Supreme Court held that "the mere fact" that Congress had authorized a cause
of action for adverse claimants to settle conflicting mining claims over land
titled in the United States was "not in and of itself sufficient to vest jurisdiction
in the Federal courts." 80 The federal statute at issue in Blackburn and Shoshone
permitted adverse claimants "to commence proceedings in a court of competent
jurisdiction... to determine.., the right of possession" but did not specify
whether federal or state courts should adjudicate these disputes.81 The statute
further prescribed that the right to possession turned on "local customs or rules
of miners . . . so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the
laws of the United States." 82
The Supreme Court in both cases declined federal question jurisdiction
despite Congress' explicit provision for the adverse suit because the claims
before the Court did not involve questions of the federal statute's "construction
or effect," but instead turned on interpretation of the facts under local rules. 83
183-84, 186, 313 (noting that Merrell Dow may still permit § 1331 jurisdiction over state
law hybrid claims raising federal constitutional questions or important federal interests).
77 Unclear is Merrell Dow's meaning when Congress has provided a cause of action or
remedy within the implicated federal statute. A reading of the case in converse suggests that
this automatically signals federal question jurisdiction as long as resolution of the state claim
turned on construction of the FDCA. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 825 n.4 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Under the Court's analysis ...if a party persuaded a court that there is a
private cause of action under the FDCA, there would be federal jurisdiction under Smith
and Franchise Tax Board over a state cause of action making violations of the FDCA
actionable. Such jurisdiction would apparently exist even if the plaintiff did not seek the
federal remedy."). See also infra note 191. In any event, Merrell Dow's focus on Congress'
decision concerning the cause of action or remedy within the incorporated statute is
misplaced.
78 175 U.S. 571 (1900), decided Jan. 8, 1900.
79 177 U.S. 505 (1900), decided Apr. 30, 1900, less than four months after Blackburn.
80 Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 513; accord Blackburn, 175 U.S. at 579, 585.
81 Blackburn, 175 U.S. at 578-79 (emphasis added); accord Shoshtone, 177 U.S. at
506.
82 Blackburn, 175 U.S. at 587; accord Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 508.
83 Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 509 (this dispute did not necessarily "involve any question as
to the construction or effect" of the federal statute); see also id. at 510 (adverse suits do
"not always call for any construction of an act of Congress" or involve disputes which
depend upon the construction or effect of federal law); accord Blackburn, 175 U.S. at 588
("no question is made as to the meaning and construction" of the federal statute); see also
id. at 587-88 (positing that a "disputed construction" of the federal law would present a
federal question); see also Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912) ("A suit to
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In each decision, the Court quoted with approval from Gold-Washing & Water
Co. v. Keyes,84 the Supreme Court's first interpretation of the fledgling federal
question statute,85 in which the Court required actions arising under the 1875
Act to "'really and substantially [involve] a dispute or controversy' as to a right
which depends upon the construction or effect of the Constitution, or some law
or treaty of the United States." 86 Thus, apparently influencing the Court's
enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily, or
for that reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it
really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity,
construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the result depends.").
Blackburn further reasoned that the "fact alone" that a controversy arose under the
federal statute did not automatically create federal question jurisdiction in the absence of a
"showing that the controversy was deterninable by one of two conflicting constructions of
the Federal statute, and not one of mere fact in which the valdty of the statute was not
drawn into question." Blackburn, 175 U.S. at 585 (emphasis added). Notably, Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201, 199 (1921), later echoed the highlighted
language and adopted the "construction or effect" rationale so central to Blackburn and
Shoshone. Infra notes 107 & 109; see also Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248, 258 (1885)
("[tihe decision of these questions does not depend on the Constitution or laws of the United
States" and neither "enter[s] into the determination of the cause" such that construction
"one way will defeat the defendants, or in another sustain them").
84 96 U.S. 199 (1877); see Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 507; Blackburn, 175 U.S. at
580-81.
85 See London, supra note 28, at 841.
86 Gold-Washing, 96 U.S. at 203.04. In Gold-Washing, the Supreme Court,
considering a removed action, made plain that federal jurisdiction can only attach when
"[tihe decision of the case must depend upon [the] construction" of federal law, id. at 203,
concluding that "[tihe suit must, in part at least, arise out of a controversy between the
parties in regard to the operation and effect of the Constitution or laws upon the facts
involved." Id. See also Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 489 (1917) (A case arises under
federal law "where an appropriate statement of the plaintiff's cause of action, unaided by
any anticipation or avoidance of defenses, discloses that it really and substantially involves a
dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of a law of
Congress.").
The Gold-Washing phrase "really and substantially" is derived from § 5 of the Act of
1875, which provided that if the court satisfies itself at "any time" after a suit is commenced
or removed to federal court "that such suit does not really and substantially involve a
dispute or controversy properly within [its] jurisdiction," the court shall dismiss or remand
it. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (1875) (emphasis added) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982) in the removal context). Chadbour and Levin
suggest that § 5 gave federal courts flexibility to weed out claims that technically involved
federal questions as required by § 1 of the Act (which defined "arising under," supra note
40) but which were not actually disputed or presented for determination. Chadbourn &
Levin, supra note 40, at 649-50; see also Robinson v. Anderson, 121 U.S. 522, 524 (1887)
(dismissing under § 5 of the 1875 Act an action commenced in federal court because the
federal allegations were "immaterial in the determination of the matter really in dispute
between the parties" and were made "'for the purpose of creating a case' . . . when none in
fact existed"); London, supra note 28, at 839 n.17 (§ 5 offered a safeguard against an
1504 [Vol. 52:1477
STATUTORY FEDERAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
conclusion was its sense that the mining disputes at issue-though remotely
federal in character because the United States was the title source-did not
present a jurisdictionally sufficient federal question because their resolution did
not turn on interpretation of federal law.87 Neither Blackburn nor Shoshone
expressly undertook the task of defining substantiality. 88
In rejecting the cause of action as the hallmark of the forum determination,
the Court did not explicitly articulate the expertise, sympathy, uniformity, and
independence rationales of federal question jurisdiction. But the Court's finding
that the claims before it did not involve the "construction or effect" of federal
law was tantamount to a conclusion that there was no need for these protections
because federal law did not govern case outcome: Congress specifically
envisioned local resolution of disputed claims in accordance with local rules
and practices. Thus, the Court reached its forum decision by analysis of
Congress' substantive goals under the statute in conjunction with Congress'
jurisdictional goals under section 1331.89 Shoshone in particular examined the
nature and intensity of the substantive federal interest involved, the statute's
scheme and purpose, the states' interest in adjudication, the litigation reality of
these types of disputes, and their potential impact on the federal caseload
should the federal courts be permitted to hear them. 90 Esteeming the nature of
unduly expansive interpretation of statutory arising under); c. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at
813 ("the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically
confer federal-question jurisdiction") (footnote omitted). Chadboum and Levin also argue
that the Supreme Court's initial failure in Gold-Washing to distinguish between §§ 1 & 5
and the Court's consequent blend of the arising under and substantiality concepts has caused
great confusion in federal question doctrine. Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 40, at 650-52;
see also supra note 45.
87 Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 509; accord Blackburn, 175 U.S. at 579.
88 This approach of approving citation to Gold-Washing without explicit amplification
of the substantiality standard it endorsed surfaces in other key Supreme Court federal
question cases. E.g., Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933), infra note 116;
see also infra notes 109 & 143.
89 Significantly, Shoshone acknowledged Congress' ability to legislate substantively in
specific statutes with pre-existing grants of general jurisdiction in mind. The Court noted
Congress' evident contemplation that these title disputes might be properly decided by either
a state or federal court and "left the matter to be determined by the ordinary rules in respect
to the jurisdiction of the Federal courts." Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 511; accord Blackburn,
175 U.S. at 579; see also Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 506-07.
90 Shoshone found that Congress had passed the law to provide procedures to resolve
title disputes between adverse mining property claimants who had yet to acquire title from
the government. Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 513. The Court also found, however, that the
statute's design and its deference to local mining rules indicated that Congress did not deem
this administration of federal lands "so essential" a federal interest as to vest exclusive
jurisdiction in the federal courts, particularly when the state courts heard "the great bulk" of
property rights litigation. Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 511, 506, 508; accord Blackburn, 175
U.S. at 586-87. In effect, Congress had created a forum option for the courts to resolve on
a case-by-case basis under their traditional jurisdictional rules because "in a given case the
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these claims over their technical origin in federal law, the Court then made a
pragmatic forum allocation decision, consistent with Congress' general
jurisdictional mandate and its specific intent to localize dispute resolution, to
keep the federal courts clear of state-centered and potentially voluminous claims
unless they required a dispositive construction of federal law.91 In this way,
Shoshone at once paved the way for Smith's discretionary assessment of the
centrality of the federal issue within the lawsuit, but went beyond Smith's case-
centered approach by buttressing its conclusion with a showing that a federal
forum was not necessary to advance Congress' substantive objectives. 92
But sixteen years after Blackburn and Shoshone, in American Well Works
v. Layne & Bowler CO., 93 the Court endorsed a formalistic cause of action
approach, eventually reincarnated in Merrell Dow seventy years later. 94 In
American Well, plaintiff, a pump manufacturer, sought damages for harm to its
business for trade libel, alleging defendants had defamed plaintiff's title to its
highly regarded pump by falsely asserting that plaintiff had infringed
defendant's pump patent, by suing purchasers of plaintiff's pump, and by
threatening suit against others who used the product. 95 Emphasizing shell over
substance, and minimizing the reality that a central issue in the case required
interpretation of federal patent law, the Supreme Court denied federal
right of possession may not involve any question under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, but simply a determination of local rules and customs, or state statutes, or
even only a mere matter of fact." Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 508, 511; accord Blackburn, 175
U.S. at 585, 587. As to the federal docket, the Court observed that if a suit to enforce a
right originating in federal law necessarily arose under that law "every action to establish
title to real estate (at least in the newer States) would be such a one, as all titles in those
States come from" the federal government. Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 507; accord Blackburn,
175 U.S. at 582.
91 See Cohen, supra note 5, at 903 (In Shoslwne, "[t]he Court, for pragmatic reasons,
had refused to extend the jurisdiction to a large class of cases which would, in most
instances, involve no clearly defined federal interest and no issue of federal law. The
Court's failure if one there was lies in its failure to explain the result.").
92 Shoshone's accounting for Congress' substantive goals seems understandable
because the case involved afederal cause of action (expressly authorized by Congress) with
state elements. Smith, on the other hand, involved a state cause of action with federal issues.
Infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. As shown in Part IV(D) infra, a § 1331
approach to state law claims implicating federal statutes which attempts to discern and
account for Congress' non-jurisdictional intent as it might bear upon the forum
determination has serious drawbacks. Merrell Dow's remedy requirement is an extreme
example of a forum test which attempts to account for substantive intent by its virtual
substitution of the remedial for the jurisdictional inquiry.93 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
94 See Comment, supra note 7, at 559 (Merrell Dow may "signal a return" to
American Well's cause of action test).
95 American Well, 241 U.S. at 258. Plaintiff brought suit in state court. The Supreme
Court considered the jurisdictional question in the removal context. Id.
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jurisdiction on the ground that state substantive law created the cause of
action. 96
By making the cause of action the dispositive jurisdictional factor, the
Court precluded federal adjudication, despite the prominence of a federal patent
question because the State-rather than the United States-authorized the suit.97
The Court made no attempt to confront or distinguish the Blackburn-Shoshone
principle that the sovereign authorizing a cause of action is not necessarily the
sovereign who should hear the claim. The opinion is starkly devoid of any
exploration of the federal patent law's role in resolution of the action or of why
the claim before it might or (in this instance) might not warrant the distinctive
96 Justice Holmes emphatically stated: "[W]hether [there] is a wrong or not depends
upon the law of the State where the act is done, not upon the patent law, and therefore the
suit arises under the law of the State. A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
action." Id. at 260 (emphasis added); cf Note, The Outer Limits of "Arising Under," 54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 978, 982 (1979) ("Holmes maintained that the remedy sought by the
plaintiff must be prescribed by federal law for the suit to 'arise under' federal law.")
(footnote omitted); Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421, 423 (1883) (looking to "the nature
of the plaintiff's cause of action" to determine that a removed suit on a marshall's bond for
unlawful taking of property arose under a federal law expressly authorizing such suits).
Justice McKenna dissented in American Well, stating "that the case involves a direct and
substantial controversy under the patent laws." American Well, 241 U.S. at 260 (McKenna,
J., dissenting).
It is worth noting that American Well made no mention of the general arising under
statute, but involved the analogous question of whether plaintiff's claim arose under federal
patent law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988), which currently provides that the district courts
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction "of any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents." While courts have treated these arising under inquiries
interchangeably, e.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807-09
(1988); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1000, a case like American Well might be
distinguished on the basis of its patent dimension. Because a finding of federal jurisdiction
would have made the action exclusively federal and precluded state adjudication, the Court
may have been especially sensitive to indications from the state sovereign-in the form of
pertinent state-sanctioned causes of action or remedies-that it had an interest in enforcing
these types of claims even if based in part on federal patent law. Id.; c. Doernberg &
Mushlin, supra note 6, at 536 n.33 (suggesting that American Well's result may rest solely
on well-pleaded complaint grounds and may not have been an attempt to fashion new
general federal question standard); Hirshman, supra note 7, at 27 (suggesting that American
Well "may ...rest on the well-pleaded complaint rule" because the federal patent law
question "arguably enters the case as a defense").
97 See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (disputing federal jurisdiction over a state law claim depending upon construction
of the federal constitution because "the cause of action arises not under any law of the
United States but wholly under Missouri law.... [l]t seems to me that a suit cannot be said
to arise under any other law than that which creates the cause of action"); cf. Saturday
Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1195 (7th Cir. 1987) ("merely
naming a federal statute in a complaint vill not confer federal jurisdiction if the only relief
the plaintiff actually wants is based on state rather than federal law").
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treatment of a federal forum. In locking forum selection to the substantive law
providing the cause of action or remedy, American Well defined the
jurisdictional sufficiency or substantiality of the federal question purely in
terms of the sovereign's substantive enforcement or remedial objectives. Thus,
in requiring a federal cause of action for federal jurisdiction, American Well
prefigured Merrell Dow's mechanical equation of an insubstantial federal
question with the absence of federally provided actions or remedies in the
implicated federal substantive statute. 98
Indeed, Justice Holmes' focus on cause of action and the substantive law
that created it is not entirely misplaced. It certainly helps to ensure that federal
law will govern disposition and define the contours of the claim, thus providing
strong justification for section 1331 jurisdiction. In addition, the American Well
rule adds predictability to the federal question inquiry and works to minimize
litigation over threshold jurisdictional questions in the relative ease of its
application.99 But the protective purposes to be served by federal adjudication
under the federal question statute suggest the undue narrowness of the Holmes'
postulate for hybrid claims. 1°° Federal interests may need federal forum
protections even and especially when part of state-created causes of action that
may frustrate them. As Professor Doernberg has noted, the American Well
cause of action test is "dysfunctional" because "[it simply cannot be
98 There is a vital difference, however, between the two opinions: By 1986, Merrell
Dow had at least acknowledged that American Well's cause of action filter was too stringent
a federal question test because, strictly and solely applied, it automatically excluded from
the federal court any claim created by state law, no matter how prominent the federal
question and no matter how urgently the federal interest at stake might warrant federal
forum protections. Cf Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808-09 n.5 (recognizing that § 1331 may
cover state law claims where the vindication of state rights turned on the construction of
federal law). Despite this recognition, Merrell Dow reintroduced the American Well
approach at a later stage of the federal question analysis by requiring a federally-created
cause of action or remedy within the federal statute incorporated by the state claim in order
to sustain § 1331 jurisdiction. Id. at 812, 814, 817; see also infra notes 167-72, 193 and
accompanying text.
99 It is no surprise that Justice Holmes advocated a test which appeared to increase the
reliability of predicting how courts will resolve jurisdictional issues. See Holmes, The Path
ofthe Lav, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) ("The prophecies of what the courts will do
in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."); c. Currie, Part I,
supra note 54, at 1 ("Jurisdiction should be as self-regulated as breathing; the principal job
of the courts is to decide whether plaintiff gets his money, and litigation over whether the
case is in the right court is essentially a waste of time and resources.") (footnote omitted).
100 Note, in this connection, that § 1331 provides jurisdiction over civil actions
"arising under" federal law and not "created by federal law." See also supra note 98,
describing Merrell Dow's acknowledgment of American Well's undue narrowness.
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demonstrated that important federal issues arise only as parts of federally
created causes of action." 101
Moreover, our dual court system "makes some jurisdictional litigation
inevitable" 102 and is the cost of enforcing the jurisdictional limitations on the
lower federal courts in order to preserve the primacy of the state courts as the
general adjudicators in the constitutional scheme. Lastly, American Well's
cause of action test ignores a recognized principle reflected in Shoshone that
jurisdiction and cause of action are not synonymous.10 3 To automatically
101 Doernberg, There's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at 661-62 n.279. Many have
criticized American Well. E.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983) ("even the most ardent proponent of the Holmes test has admitted that
it has been rejected as an exclusionary principle"); T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d
823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, I.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965) (Smith is a "path-
breaking opinion" and "Justice Holmes' formula is more useful for inclusion than for the
exclusion for which it was intended."); D. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICION 104 (3d ed.
1990) ("Holmes' test of the law that created the cause of action is of no help in those cases
in which it is most needed, namely, when part of the cause is created by federal law and
part of it by state."); M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 97 ("Holmes' theory might be accused of
putting form over substance. If many of the significant issues in the case are to turn on
principles of federal law, is it advisable to deny federal jurisdiction merely because the
vehicle for presenting those actions is state-created?"); Cohen, supra note 5, at 898 (the
American Well test has "severe limitations"); Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal
Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 683, 689 (1981) [hereinafter, Field, The Uncertain
Nature of Federal Jurisdiction] (arguing that the American Well test "cannot be the
exclusive test of federal question jurisdiction" because "the cause of action under which a
suit is brought is always properly part of the complaint" such that requiring a federal action
would render the well-pleaded complaint rule "superfluous"); Note, supra note 96, at 1004,
1001 (the American Well standard is "arbitrary and misconceived" because it "could not
account for the fact that federal law creates primary relationships that have dimensions and
applications beyond those points at which express remedies are provided.") (footnotes
omitted).
102 Currie, Part II, supra note 44, at 2.
103 Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900) (holding that federal courts
do not necessarily have jurisdiction over causes of action created by federal law).
So, too, jurisdiction and remedy are separate inquiries. In his Merrell Dow dissent,
Justice Brennan reinforced the importance of the jurisdiction-remedy distinction. Merrell
Dow, 478 U.S. at 825 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that "the decision not to provide a
private federal remedy should not affect federal jurisdiction unless the reasons Congress
withholds a federal remedy are also reasons for withholding federal jurisdiction."); see also
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 391 n.4 (1987) (Brennan, I., for a unanimous
court) ("'The nature of the relief available after jurisdiction attaches, is, of course, different
from the question whether there is jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy . . .")
(quoting with approval Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 561 (1968)). And, as
Justice Brennan has pointed out, persuasive support for the distinction is Smith v. Kansas
City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199-201 (1921), in which the Court found federal
question jurisdiction even though the right and remedy were state-created. Merrell Dow,
478 U.S. at 819 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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equate the legislature's enforcement objectives (i.e., whether a particular right
or interest should be enforceable) with its forum objectives (i.e., which forum
may hear that enforcement action) results in a blur of substantive and
jurisdictional concerns disrespectful of the court's delegated authority under the
general federal question statute to determine whether federal forum protections
are warranted in particular cases regardless of their cause of action labels.
The Supreme Court's rebuff of American Well as the sole jurisdictional test
came just five years later. In Smith v. Kansas City litle & Trust Co., 10 4 the
The Court has often acknowledged the distinctions between jurisdiction, cause of
action, and remedies. E.g., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Public Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246,
249 (1951) ("[Tlhe question whether jurisdiction exists has been confused with the question
whether the complaint states a cause of action. The Judicial Code, in vesting jurisdiction in
the District Courts, does not create causes of action, but only confers jurisdiction to
adjudicate those arising from other sources which satisfy its limiting provisions."); Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-83 (1946) ("Jurisdiction ... is not defeated... by the possibility
that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually
recover.... [T]he court must assume jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a
cause of action on which the court can grant relief... [unless the claim was] made solely
for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or . . . is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.");
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) ("Whether a litigant has
a cause of action 'is analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a
litigant may be entitled to receive.'") (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239-40
(1979)); Davis, 442 U.S. at 240 n.18 ("A plaintiff may have a cause of action even though
he be entitled to no relief at all . . . ."); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 n.5 (1979)
("The question whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction, and
therefore may be assumed without being decided."); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Co., 339
U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (With the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, "Congress enlarged the
range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend their jurisdiction"); The
Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (Holmes, J.) ("Jurisdiction is authority to
decide the case either way.").
See also Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 6, at 539 n.46 ("Congress' determination
not to provide a federal cause of action does not compel the conclusion that ... Congress
was unwilling for federal courts to be open to such actions."); Zeigler, supra note 21, at
715, 722 ("Merrell Dow's inferences about congressional intent to deny a private federal
cause of action and thus to deny federal jurisdiction are shaky at best.... The existence or
nonexistence of a remedy does not affect a court's subject matter jurisdiction. When a
plaintiff alleges the denial of a right created by federal law, the case plainly arises under that
law within the meaning of article 111 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.") (footnotes omitted); Randall,
Federal Questions and the Hwnan Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN. L. REV. 349, 373 n.123
(1988) (Bell contradicts American Well by separating the jurisdictional and cause of action
inquiries); Field, Sources of Law: 77 Scope of the Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 881, 932 n.220 (1986) ("Congress has nowhere manifested an intention that federal
courts exercise federal question jurisdiction only when a federal remedy exists. ... . The
remedy rule itself is a judicial creation [citing American Well] and reflects substantial
judicial restraint; federal question jurisdiction could, consistently with all manifestations of
congressional intent, be defined much more broadly.") (citation omitted).
104 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
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Court's federal question seesaw tilted back towards the Shoshone approach
with its emphasis on a more discretionary assessment of considerations bearing
upon the forum determination, as the Court took definitive steps away from the
cause of action straightjacket and softened American Well's harsh exclusive
effect of precluding state-sanctioned claims with federal elements from federal
court. In Smith, a shareholder of the defendant trust company filed suit in
federal district court to enjoin the corporation from investing in federal bonds
issued under the authority of the Federal Farm Loan Act.105 Those bonds,
plaintiff claimed, were invalid because the Federal Farm Loan Act was
unconstitutional and the corporation's bond purchases would violate Missouri
law, which prohibited the company from investing in unlawful securities.1 06
Thus, resolution of plaintiff's state-created cause of action turned on the
constitutionality of the federal statute.
Without even so much as a passing reference to American Well, the Court
sustained federal question jurisdiction even though the suit arose under state
law because plaintiff's "right to relief depend[ed] upon the construction or
application of the Constitution or laws of the United States." 10 7 The Court in
effect recognized that the centrality or importance of the federal issue to
recovery justified the court's exercise of jurisdiction even though plaintiffs
"actual vehicle for getting into court"108 was purely a creature of state law.109
105 Id. at 195.
106 Id. at 198-99, 201.
107 Id. at 199. The Court, in the tradition of Gold-Washing, Blackburn, and Shoshone,
supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text, announced:
The general rule is that where it appears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff
that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of the Constitution
or laws of the United States, and that such federal claim is not merely colorable, and
rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District Court has jurisdiction under this
provision.
Id.; cf Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 819 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Smith established that there
may be federal jurisdiction "even though both the right asserted and the remedy sought by
the plaintiff are state created.").
Justice Holmes penned a pointed dissent in which he revealed the crux of his
disagreement with the Court and amplified his American Well principle: "[T]he law must
create at least a part of the cause of action by its own force, for it is the suit, not a question
in the suit, that must arise under the law of the United States." Smith, 255 U.S. at 215
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
108 M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 98.
109 Echoing crucial language used by Blackburn, Smith found it "apparent that the
controversy concerns the constitutional validity of an act of Congress which is directly
drawn in question. The decision depends upon the determination of this issue." Smith, 255
U.S. at 201; supra note 83.
Notably, Smith seemed to attempt a formulation of substantiality, requiring that the
claim "is not merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation." Smith, 255 U.S. at
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Accordingly, Smith signaled-as Shoshone before it-that strict classification of
a cause of action as "state" or "federal" could take second seat to the litigation
reality that the outcome of the case depended upon resolution of a federal
constitutional or statutory issue.110 However, the Court again reached its
decision without confrontation and elaboration of the purposes underlying
federal question jurisdiction. The Court implicitly recognized that a
constitutional assessment of a federal statute determinative of plaintiff's claim
warranted the distinctive protections of a federal forum reflected in its
expertise, receptivity, uniformity potential, and independence."' Indeed, Smith
199. The Court indirectly referenced the Gol-Washing standard by specific citation to
"paragraph 3" of the Shulthis decision, in which Shulthi-itself citing to Gold-Washing-
stated that "a suit does not... arise unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or
controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a law, upon the
determination of which the result depends." Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569
(1912).
110 See Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 6, at 537 (Smith permitted federal
jurisdiction if the federal issue was outcome determinative and "appeared unconcerned"
about the cause of action as jurisdictional measure). Judge Friendly has described Smith as a
"path-breaking opinion" in noting its effect on federal question doctrine:
It has come to be realized that Mr. Justice Holmes' formula is more useful for
inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was intended. Even though the claim is
created by state law, a ease may "arise under" a law of the United States [in accordance
with Smith] if the complaint discloses a need for determining the meaning or application
of such a law.
T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915
(1965).
With its emphasis on realistic assessment of the centrality of federal issues, Smith is
consistent with Shoshone. In Shoshone, the Court refused to find federal question
jurisdiction even though federal law created the cause of action and the right at issue
because the federal act directed that "local customs or rules" would determine that federal
right. Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507-08 (1900). Thus, as a matter of
litigation reality, state law would predominate, and the "right may or may not involve the
construction or effect of the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States." Id. at 507-
08. Similarly, in Smith, the Court found federal jurisdiction because the state cause of action
and state remedies depended upon construction of federal law. Cy. M. REDISH, supra note
5, at 103 (Smith can be seen as the "reverse" of Shoshone because "Smith arose from a
state-created cause of action which would ultimately turn on issues of federal law").
111 Cf. M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 98 (noting that the Smith majority offered a
"sympathetic" interpretation of jurisdiction given that "a significant-if not primary-
purpose for providing federal question jurisdiction is to take advantage of the federal courts'
expertise on matters of federal law"); see also id. at 102 (Smith acknowledges the need for
federal expertise in federal law interpretation in the context of state claims); Cohen, supra
note 5, at 906 ("In cases like Sith ... it is certain that the federal constitutional issues will
form the core of the litigation."); Greene, supra note 5, at 324 (federal jurisdiction "has
been justified by the likelihood that a federal question will assume prominence in the
litigation").
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seemed to view the federal courts as appropriate forums for hearing dispositive
questions of federal law and did not find it necessary to evaluate the nature of
the federal statute at issue as part of the forum analysis. 112 Unlike Shoshone-
and perhaps because the Smith cause of action was of state and not federal
origin-the Court did not explore the substantive interests at stake to support its
conclusion, apparently satisfied that the centrality of the federal issue to
plaintiffs recovery alone justified the federal forum. In short, Smith's case-
centered approach offered a relatively efficient measure of jurisdictional
sufficiency for state law hybrid claims, based on the actual role played by the
federal issue in the litigation, which did not depend upon assessment of the
federal interest or congressional objectives served by the implicated federal
statute.
Smith's jurisdictional realism, much like Shoshone's before it, offered the
courts some latitude to explore and balance the forum variables at issue. No
longer need courts slavishly conclude, per American Well, that all state-created
causes of action should be litigated in state court regardless of prominent
federal law presence. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.113 continued this realistic
approach. There, the Court held that a suit brought pursuant to a congressional
law authorizing a cause of action to recover taxes levied by the Puerto Rican
legislature did not give rise to federal question jurisdiction because plaintiff did
not seek enforcement of a federal right.114
Forsaking the stark cause of action approach and cautioning that federal
jurisdiction cannot be invoked "merely because the plaintiff's right to sue is
derived from federal law,"' 1 5 the Court concluded (citing Shoshone,
Blackburn, and Gold-Washing'16) that "[t]he federal nature of the right to be
established is decisive-not the source of the authority to establish it."117
112 See Doernberg, 7here's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at 657-58 (describing the
advantages of the outcome determinative test over Merrell Dow's standardless and abstract
substantiality test, noting that the outcome determinative test "is applied through close
examination of the structure of a specific case and the federal issue's role in resolving the
matter"); see also Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 6, at 540 ("the Merrell Dow majority
seemed to be more concerned about the federal issue's general importance outside the
context of the individual case").
113 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
114 Id. at 482-83.
115 Id. at 483.
116 Id. The Court specifically cited Gold-Washing to the precise page of its "really and
substantially" standard. Id. (citing Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203
(1877)).
117 Russell, 288 U.S. at 483. The Court stressed that:
No question of interpretation or enforcement of the federal statute appears upon
the face of the complaint. Federal jurisdiction may be invoked to vindicate a right or
privilege claimed under a federal statute. It may not be invoked where the right asserted
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Although the Court failed to analyze or even mention the expertise, receptivity,
uniformity, and independence rationales for federal jurisdiction, these factors
seemed central to its decision given the Court's Smith-like observation that the
question before it did not involve "interpretation or enforcement of the federal
statute." 118 While the Court's emphasis on "the federal nature of the right"
may have indicated some sensitivity to the substantive aspect of the
jurisdictional determination, the Court did not confuse Congress' substantive
decision to create a cause of action in the federal act with its jurisdictional
decision to provide a federal forum, noting that Congress' authorization of the
action did not mean that the suit "[arose] under the laws of the United States
within the meaning of the jurisdictional statutes." 119
Less than a year after Russell, however, the Supreme Court further
confounded its federal question doctrine in Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway120 with an apparent affirmation of a narrow cause of action approach.
The Court declined to find original federal question jurisdiction over a state
claim provided by the Kentucky Employers' Liability Act permitting private
enforcement of duties Congress prescribed in the Federal Safety Appliance
Act.121 In the Smith sense, plaintiff's right to recover depended upon
construction of the duties defined by the federal statute.1 22 Nonetheless, the
Court seemed to find the state legislature's affirmative decision to provide a
cause of action to establish liability in accordance with state law-and
Congress' corresponding failure to do so at the federal level-to be dispositive
is non-federal, merely because the plaintiffs right to sue is derived from federal law, or
because the property involved was obtained under federal statute.
Id. at 483; accord Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 510 (1900) ("A statute
authorizing an action to establish a right is very different from one which creates a right to
be established. An action brought under the one may involve no controversy as to the scope
and effect of the statute, while in the other case it necessarily involves such a controversy,
for the thing to be decided is the extent of the right given by the statute.").
118 Russell, 288 U.S. at 483.
119 Id.
120 291 U.S. 205 (1934). In the second count of his complaint, plaintiff, a railroad
employee injured due to a defective uncoupling lever, sued the carrier for injuries received
in intrastate commerce by invoking both federal and state acts. Id. at 208. The Court
construed this count to state a cause of action under Kentucky law. Id. at 217. Note, in
contrast, that the federal law did provide a right of action for employees in interstate
commerce. Id. at 210-11.
121 Id. at 212-15. Interestingly, in rejecting federal district court jurisdiction, both
Moore and Merrell Dow emphasized that the Supreme Court could review the state court
interpretations of the implicated federal statutes. Id. at 214; accord Merrell Dow, 478 U.S.
at 816.
122 See Moore, 291 U.S. at 214.
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of the forum question. 123 Mere adoption of the federal standards did not alter
the state law character of the claim so as to create a substantial federal issue.124
In effect, the Court acknowledged the Kentucky legislature's ability to embrace
federal standards as its own without simultaneously forfeiting control over
hearing the claims that it created. 125 Predictably, the Court did not justify its
decision to preclude initial federal adjudication by disproving the need for
federal expertise, sympathy, uniformity, and independence in resolving a claim
123 Id. at 212-16. Distantly foreshadowing Merrell Dow, the Court pointed out that the
incorporated Federal Safety Appliance Acts did not provide plaintiff's cause of action, but
exactly what significance the Court attached to this fact is difficult to tell. Id. at 215. Merrell
Dow, of course, made explicit the importance of that congressional enforcement decision
and effectively brought Moore full cycle in the context of the state negligence claim before
it: "Given the significance of the assumed congressional determination to preclude federal
private remedies [under the FDCA], the presence of the federal issue as an element of the
state tort is not the kind of adjudication for which jurisdiction would serve congressional
purposes and the federal system." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 (emphasis added); see also
infra notes 184 & 186 (exploring Merrell Dow's treatment of Moore).
124 The Court seemed to conclude that Kentucky's incorporation of federal law into
state legislation reflected a conscious state choice to make a federal standard its own just as
if the state legislature had originally created and adopted it. Thus, the Court explained that
"invoking the Federal Safety Appliance Acts, while declaring on the Kentucky Employers'
Liability Act, cannot be regarded as setting up a claim which lay outside the purview of the
state statute," Moore, 291 U.S. at 213, and noted that plaintiff "relied upon" the laws of
Kentucky, which "determined" what, if any, liability existed. Id. at 212. Justice Holmes had
anticipated Moore's logic in his Smith dissent:
The whole foundation of the duty is Missouri law, which at its sole will incorporated the
other law as it might incorporate a document. The other law or document depends for
its relevance and effect not on its own force but upon the law that took it up, so I repeat
once more the cause of action arises wholly from the law of the State.
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust, Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Cf. Doernberg, 7here's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at 632 (suggesting that
the seemingly disparate results in Smith and Moore can be explained by the well-pleaded
complaint rule); see also M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 99 ("To the extent [Smith and Moore]
were in conflict, it appeared that the principle enunciated in Smith was the one widely
followed by modem lower federal courts.") (footnote omitted). But see infra note 186
(suggesting that the differences between Smith and Moore do not necessarily justify their
different results).
125 Professor Cohen has put Moore in a class of cases where "the law that creates the
cause of action" test has worked well as a jurisdictional formula to keep the federal courts
clear of personal injury claims "unless they contained something more than federal law used
to measure the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct." Cohen, supra note 5, at 911-12;
see also id. at 911 (whether hybrid personal injury cases arise under federal law is "decided
by reference to the question whether federal law gives an express or implied cause of
action, or whether federal law merely sets a standard of conduct for a state cause of action")
(footnote omitted).
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that retained its quintessential "stateness" despite federal traits. Nor did the
Court attempt a definition of substantiality. 126
Gully v. First National Bank 127 then moved the jurisdictional seesaw back
to a more level plane by sanctioning what seemed to be a sensible mix (later
expressly endorsed by the Supreme Court 28) of both American Well's
formalism and Smith's realism. Mississippi's Collector of Taxes sued a national
bank in Mississippi state court for state taxes the bank owed by virtue of its
assumption, by contract, of this debt from an insolvent predecessor bank. 129
The bank removed the case to federal court, arguing that the action arose under
federal law because the state tax collector's authority to sue "by necessary
implication" rested on the federal statute that gave permission for states to tax
national banks. 130
Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court, denied federal jurisdiction and
offered a novel synthesis of prior Court pronouncements.' 31 Cardozo first
addressed American Well's rationale, noting that "[tihe suit is built upon a
contract which in point of obligation has its genesis in the law of Mississippi"
and that the contract's enforcement had "no necessary connection" to "a
controversy arising under federal law." 132 But Cardozo did not stop there, as a
strict application of American Well would have required. Instead, he went on to
examine whether plaintiff relied upon "a federal right in support of his claim
that the contract has been broken," 133 announcing that "a right or immunity
created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element,
and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action." 134 In denying federal
jurisdiction, Cardozo found the federal law permitting the tax assessment to be
126 Not surprisingly, Moore did not cite Gold-Washing. With the federal law at issue
(here, the Federal Safety Appliance Acts) effectively transformed into state law via state
legislative action, there remained no dispute which "really and substantially... depend[ed]
upon the construction or effect" of a federal statute. Cf. Gold-Washing & Water Co. v.
Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203-04 (1877).12 7 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
128 See inifra note 148 and accompanying text.
129 Gully, 299 U.S. at 111-12.
130 Id. at 112, 115.
131 See id. at 114-18; see also Cohen, supra note 5, at 904-05 (Cardozo broke new
ground in acknowledging a common sense pragmatic approach to federal question
jurisdiction).
132 Gully, 299 U.S. at 114. Justice Cardozo did not cite American Well.
133 Id. at 115; see also id. at 114, where Cardozo reiterated: "Today, even more
clearly than in the past, 'the federal nature of the right to be established is decisive-not the
source of the authority to establish it.'" Id. at 114 (quoting Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,
288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933)). He also quoted Shulthis and cited Shoshone in this regard. Id.
134 Gully, 299 U.S. at 112. To stress the centrality of the federal element to the
outcome of the case, Justice Cardozo added that "[tihe right or immunity must be such that
it will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one
construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another." Id.
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too remote-at best "lurking in the background"'135-and unessential to
disposition of the claim. 136
Cardozo's second step is significant. While he examined the cause of action
at the outset of his analysis, 137 he did not resolve the jurisdictional issue until
he had explored the centrality of the federal element to case outcome-a rough
fusion of American Well and Smith approaches. 138 Noting that "the probable
course of the trial, the real substance of the controversy, has taken on new
significance,"' 39 Cardozo cited Shoshone to support his analysis that the
jurisdictional determination does not begin and end with the cause of action,
but should account for additional factors influencing the litigation reality of the
claim, particularly the prominence of the federal right asserted and the
immediacy of its connection to the relief sought. 140 Cardozo gave renewed
emphasis to the view that simplistically classifying the vehicle used to enforce
the right-whether a federal or state cause of action-was not more important
than determining the nature and pertinence of the right itself, thus highlighting
the need for "common-sense accommodation of judgment" in federal question
determinations in order to transcend American Well's inelasticity as a
jurisdictional test. 141 The Court's acknowledgment that the federal nature of the
right at issue had jurisdictional significance suggested Cardozo's sensitivity to a
substantive facet of the federal question determination, but the Court did not
expressly explore this type of approach.
Gully therefore invited the courts to take an active role in federal question
decisions by finding "room . . . for weighing countervailing pragmatic
115 Id. at 117.
136 Justice Cardozo concluded: "That there is a federal law permitting such taxation
does not change the basis of the suit, which is still the statute of the state, though the federal
law is evidence to prove the statute valid." Id. at 115.
137 As Professor Cohen observed: "Inquiry into whether federal or state law confers
the plaintiff's cause of action can be, at most, only a starting point for analysis." Cohen,
supra note 5, at 903.
138 Interestingly, Justice Cardozo did not cite either American Well or Smith; cf.
Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 6, at 538 n.39 (describing Gully's three-part federal
question test). See also Doemberg, supra note 6, at 631-35 (arguing that both Gully and
Moore could have been decided by simple declaration that neither case satisfied the well-
pleaded complaint rule).
139 Gully, 299 U.S. at 113-14.
14 0 Id. at 114.
141 '"his Court," Justice Cardozo explained, "has had occasion to point out how fitile
is the attempt to define a 'cause of action' without reference to the context. . . .To define
broadly and in the abstract 'a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States' has hazards of a kindred order. What is needed is something of that conmon-sense
acconmwdation ofjudgment to kaleidoscopic situations. . . . " Id. at 117 (citation omitted
& emphasis added).
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considerations." 142 In Smith's tradition, Gully recognized that making the
presence or absence of a federal cause of action the dispositive jurisdictional
determinant oversimplified the federal question inquiry and thwarted the courts'
flexibility at the front line to make intelligent forum selections that would
harmonize the litigation reality of the case before it with the overarching
jurisdictional considerations inherent in section 1331 determinations. Gully,
too, failed to make an explicit assessment of the purposes underlying the
courts' general federal question jurisdiction, but instead focused on the
essentiality of the federal right to case outcome and the concomitant, though
unstated, need for expert, sympathetic, and independent federal adjudication.
Nor did the Court overtly tackle a definition of substantiality. 143 Nonetheless,
Cardozo, in Smith's vein, encouraged an approach to federal question
allocations requiring the courts to make discretionary jurisdictional judgments
about the role played by the federal element in the case before it, and, in
Shoshone's and Russell's vein, hinted that substantive considerations, such as
the nature of the federal right at issue, might also play some part in that
assessment. 144
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,145 one of
the Supreme Court's most important statements on statutory federal question
jurisdiction after Gully, reaffirmed in principle the more discretionary approach
with an explicit endorsement of Smith's handling of state law hybrid claims.
Quoting with approval Gully's call for "that common-sense accommodation of
judgment," a unanimous Court, per Justice Brennan, avowed its long-standing
allegiance to interpreting jurisdictional legislation "with an eye to practicality
and necessity" 146 and acknowledged both the difficulty with American Well's
mechanistic approach and the acceptability of Smith's more flexible
contribution to federal question jurisprudence:
142 Cohen, supra note 5, at 905. Although Justice Cardozo did not delineate those
pragmatic considerations, Professor Cohen has suggested that traditional § 1331 factors
courts balance include federal caseload increase, the pivotal nature of federal or state law,
the need for federal expertise, and the need for a sympathetic federal forum. Id. at 916.
143 Notably, Justice Cardozo acknowledged the need to "pick[ ] the substantial causes
out of the web and lay[ ] the other ones aside." Gully, 299 U.S. at 118. He even cited in its
entirety Shulthis's (echoing GoLd-Washing's) admonishment that "a suit does not [arise
under] unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the
validity, construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the result
depends." Id. at 114 (citing Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912)); C Gold-
Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203-04 (1877) (for jurisdiction to attach, the
suit must "'really and substantially involve[ I a dispute or controversy' as to a right which
depends upon the construction or effect of the Constitution, or some law or treaty of the
United States.").
144 See supra notes 89-92, 116-19 and accompanying text.
145 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
146 Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted).
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[I]t is well settled that Justice Holmes' test [in American Well] is more
useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come within the district
courts' original jurisdiction than it is for describing which cases are beyond
district court jurisdiction. We have often held that a case "arose under" federal
law where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some
construction of federal law [citing Smith], and even the most ardent proponent
of the Holmes test has admitted that it has been rejected as an exclusionary
principle.
14 7
The Court then presented a two-step approach-much like Gully's apparent
blend of American Well and Smith-for section 1331 determinations:
"Congress has given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to hear . . . only
those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either [1] that federal
law creates the cause of action or [2] that the plaintiff's right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law."148
Thus, the first step of the Franchise Tax Board synthesis inquired whether
federal law created the cause of action, enlisting American Well at the threshold
to identify those cases most clearly arising under federal law (e.g.,
congressionally authorized claims likely requiring federal law interpretations).
If state and not federal law created the cause of action, the federal question
inquiry did not automatically end, but progressed to the second step, which
examined whether plaintiff's right to relief under state law nonetheless
depended upon resolution of a substantial question of federal law, adopting the
Smith rationale for the closer cases (e.g., state law claims incorporating
dispositive federal statutes or issues).149 Thus, Franchise Tax Board's explicit
147 Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
148 Id. at 27-28. The Court restated this approach two other times, each restatement
requiring a well-pleaded complaint and a "substantial" federal question: (1) "Even though
state law creates appellant's causes of action, its case might still 'arise under' the laws of the
United States if a well-pleaded complaint established that its right to relief under state law
requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law in dispute between the
parties .... " id. at 13 and (2) "As an initial proposition, then, the 'law that creates the
cause of action' is state law, and original federal jurisdiction is unavailable unless it appears
that some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the
well-pleaded state claims, or that the other claim is 'really' one of federal law." Id.
Shoshone fits neatly in Franchise Tax Board's two-step approach as an exception to the
threshold American Well test: Even if federal law creates the cause of action, jurisdiction
may be denied if resolution of the claim does not turn upon the construction or effect of
federal law.
149 In his Merrell Dow dissent, Justice Brennan attempted clarification of Franchdse
Tax Board's requirement of a "substantial" federal question:
In context .... it is clear that this was simply another way of stating that the
federal question must be colorable and have a reasonable foundation. This
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limitation of American Well and simultaneous endorsement of Smith as the
more sensible approach in difficult state law hybrid cases gave Smith new
significance in the Court's updated section 1331 jurisprudence. 150
Given Franchise Tax Board's respectful treatment of Smith (which itself
had roots in Gold-Washing, Blackburn, and Shoshone, which were reaffirmed
by Gully), it is hardly any wonder that the district court in Merrell Dow, less
than a year after Franchise Tax Board, found section 1331 jurisdiction and
cited both Smith and Franchise Tax Board to support its conclusion. 151 It came
as some surprise when the Supreme Court rejected this approach by
sidestepping Smith and breathing new life into American Well's cause of action
approach by centering its section 1331 analysis on the presence or absence of a
federal cause of action in the implicated federal statute. 152 How did the Court
do this?
understanding is consistent with the manner in which the Smith test has always been
applied, as well as with the way we have used the concept of a "substantial" federal
question in other cases concerning federal jurisdiction.
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 824 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
150 See id. at 822 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting Franchise Tax Board's reaffirmance
of Snith). Note, however, that Franchise Tax Board, based on a construction of the well-
pleaded complaint rule and "for reasons involving perhaps more history than logic,"
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 4, declined jurisdiction over a claim removed from
California state court filed there by a California state taxing authority under California's
declaratory judgment statute to collect unpaid state income taxes held in trust by an ERISA-
covered employee benefit plan-a holding the Merrell Dow majority stresses in its cautious
treatment of Smith. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 809. Despite the Court's declination of
jurisdiction, Franchise Tax Board goes out of its way to sanction an expansive reading of
Smith and the federal question statute itself, see Franchise Tax Rd., 463 U.S. at 9, and its
holding-consistent with the practical and realistic approach the opinion purports to adopt-
is guided by a keen respect for California's jurisdictional preference "to enforce [its] own
laws in [its] own courts.. . ." Id. at 21; see also id. at 21 n.22 ("considerations of comity
make us reluctant to snatch cases which a State has brought from the courts of that State,
unless some clear rule demands it"). For an in-depth analysis of Franchise Tax Board and
its curious treatment of the declaratory judgment act's effect on federal question
determinations, see Doernberg, 7here's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at 640-46.
151 In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Products Liability Litigation, MDL
No. 486, slip op. at 6a-7a (S.D. Ohio May 14, 1984). The district court reasoned:
"Although plaintiffs' fourth cause of action is technically a claim for negligence pursuant to
state law, the sole basis for the claim is the alleged violation of the federal Act by defendant.
Therefore, the key issue with respect to that cause of action is whether defendant's conduct
violated the Act." Id.
152 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 812, 814, 817. Justice Brennan dissented vigorously,
countering that the "continuing vitality of Smith is beyond challenge." Id. at 820 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 659 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Snith remains firm authority for the principle that 'where federal law has
inserted itself into the texture of state law, a claim founded on the national legislation could
be brought into a federal forum' even if the right of action was state-created.") (citing
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C. Enter Merrell Dow
In general concept, Merrell Dow seemed to champion discretion in
jurisdictional determinations, acknowledging that "exploring the outer reaches
of section 1331 ... require[d] sensitive judgments about congressional intent,
judicial power, and the federal system." 153 The Court spoke approvingly of
Gully's "emphasis on principled, pragmatic distinctions," 154 reiterated
Romero's directive against treating the federal question statute "as a wooden set
of self-sufficient words," 155 and resounded Franchise Tax Board's call for
interpreting section 1331 "with an eye to practicality and necessity."156 And
much in the manner of Franchise Tax Board, the Court seemed to recognize, at
least initially, that the American Well test was merely a starting point for
section 1331 determinations and was best used as a rule of inclusion to net the
more obvious cases where the federal law at issue created the cause of
action. 157 The Court explained that a case may also arise under federal law
"where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some
construction of federal law," 158 citing Franchise Tax Board and noting Smith
as "[tihe case most frequently cited for that proposition." 159
It is at this point, however, that the Court began its retreat from these
expansive principles. The Court asserted that "[o]ur actual holding in Franchise
Mishkin, supra note 27, at 166); Wells, The Unimportance of Precedent in the Law of
Federal Courts, 39 DE PAUL L. REv. 357, 366 n.57 (1989) (citing American Well and
Smith as evidence of the Supreme Court's "instability" in construing § 1331 and noting
Merrell Dow's reversion to American Well without overruling Smith).
153 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810; cf Luneburg, supra note 21, at 768 ("The notion
that federal jurisdiction depends on a pragmatic assessment of the importance of federal
court adjudication of cases where the issues touch matters of federal concern is seemingly
embraced by the [Merrell Dow] majority .... ).
154 Id. at 813 (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936)).
155 Id. at 810 (quoting Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354, 378 (1959)).
156 Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
1, 20 (1983)).157 Id. at 808 (noting that the "vast majority" of cases falling within the general federal
statute involve federally-created causes of action that are covered by the American Well
test). The Court also noted Smith's effect on American Well, citing Judge Friendly's famous
observation that Justice Holmes' "formula is more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion
for which it was intended." Id. at 809 n.5; cf. id. at 815 n.12 (noting "the usual reliability of
the Holmes test as an inclusionary principle").
158 Id. at 808.
159 Id. at 809 n.5.
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Tax Board demonstrates that this statement[16 01 must be read with caution," 161
explaining that the Court had denied federal jurisdiction even though the
"central issue" in that case "turned on the meaning" of a federal statute. 162
With its warning against unguarded reliance on Smith now in place, the Court
observed that the case before it did not "pose a federal question of the first
kind" (which American Well would have brought within the federal question
statute) 163 because plaintiffs did not allege that federal law created their causes
of action. 164 The Court then acknowledged that this was a closer case involving
"the presence of a federal issue in a state-created cause of action." 165 Under
more traditional section 1331 analysis, the Court would have next determined
whether plaintiffs' right to relief required resolution of a substantial, contested
issue of federal law under Franchise Tax Board and Smith. 166
The Court, however, swerved sharply from this approach. Rather than
analyze whether plaintiffs' alleged right and remedy under state negligence law
turned on construction of the FDCA, the Court veered away from section 1331
doctrine towards statutory implication doctrine, 167 stressing the need for
160 The statement read: "[A] case may arise under federal law 'where vindication of a
right under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal law.'" Id. at 808
(quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9).
161 Id. at 809.
162 Id. But see supra note 150.
163 The Court seemed to assume that plaintiffs had satisfied the well-pleaded complaint
rule, which it clearly delineated as the preliminary federal question requirement, id. at 808,
but never mentioned again.164 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 809.
165 Id. at 810.
166 See id. at 809-10.
167 The Court conceded this novel resort to the implication test as part of its § 1331
inquiry:
This is the first case in which we have reviewed this type ofjurisdictional claim in
light of these [Cori v. Ash implication] factors. That this is so is not surprising. The
development of our framework for determining whether a private cause of action exists
has proceeded only in the last 11 years, and its inception represented a significant
change in our approach to congressional silence on the provision of federal remedies.
Id. at 811 (footnote omitted). The majority then justified this graft of doctrines by asserting
that the reasons giving rise to the Court's modern implied remedy doctrine-the increased
complexity of federal laws, the increased volume of federal litigation, and the need for
more careful study of congressional intent-were "precisely the kinds of considerations that
should inform" § 1331 determinations involving federal issues in state causes of action. Id.
at 811; see also infra note 265. But see infra notes 266-73 and accompanying text
(discussing the differences between the federal question and implication inquiries).
In some respects, Moore presaged Merrell Dow's importation of the implication
doctrine, but itself stopped far short of formulating an integrated approach to the implication
and federal question inquiries. Supra notes 120-26. Merrell Dow did not focus on this
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"prudence and restraint in the jurisdictional inquiry." 168 Offering no
independent analysis of the FDCA, the Court summarily assumed that
"Congress did not intend a private federal remedy" or cause of action for
FDCA violations, whether express or implied. 169 From this conclusion about
remedies, the Court then skipped to a conclusion about jurisdiction, finding that
Congress' presumed failure to provide either an express or implied private
action or remedy in the FDCA meant that Congress had already determined
that the federal question presented by the statute as part of plaintiffs' hybrid
claim was not substantial enough to sustain section 1331 jurisdiction:
The significance of the necessary assumption that there is no federal
private cause of action thus cannot be overstated. For the ultimate import of
such a conclusion ... is that it would flout congressional intent to provide a
private federal remedy for the violation of the federal statute. We think it
would similarly flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent [ 17 0] to
conclude that the federal courts might nevertheless exercise federal-question
jurisdiction and provide remedies for violations of that federal statute solely
because the violation of the federal statute is said to be a "rebuttable
presumption" or a "proximate cause" under state law, rather than a federal
action under federal law.... [171]
aspect of Moore, perhaps because the Court's implication doctrine in 1934 differed
significantly from its post-Cot development. See infra notes 230-39 and accompanying text
for amplication of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
168 Merrell Do)v, 478 U.S. at 810.
169 Id. at 810-11. The Court simply listed the four factors of the Crt v. Ash test for
implied statutory causes of action, see infra note 238 and accompanying text, stating "[Bloth
parties agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that there is no federal cause of action for
FDCA violations. For purposes of our decision, we assume that this is a correct
interpretation of the FDCA." Id. at 810. The two-page court of appeals decision, however,
did not analyze the implication issue, but simply noted the parties' agreement "that the
FDCA does not create or imply a private right of action for individuals injured as a result of
violations of the Act." Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 766 F.2d 1005,
1006 (6th Cir. 1985), af'd, 478 U.S. 804 (1986); see also Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 825
n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the Court does not hold that there is no private cause of
action under the FDCA").
170 Professor Luneburg notes that the Court is unclear about "which congressional
intent" (that is, § 1331 intent or FDCA intent) this phrase referenced, but safely presumes
"the latter, because it is unlikely that Congress in 1875 thought in a specific or general way
about the type of case presented for federal adjudication in [Merrell Dow] and formed an
intent one way or the other." Luneburg, supra note 21, at 763.
171 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 812 (footnotes omitted). The Court did not address the
possibility, as Professor Zeigler points out, that Congress "may have had no intent one way
or the other. Consequently, allowing the case to go forward in federal court on a state cause
of action does not necessarily contradict congressional intent." Zeigler, supra note 21, at
712.
Nor did the Court confront an irony of its own making: While congressional intent is
key to the implied right of action analysis, infra notes 230-59 and accompanying text, the
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•.. We simply conclude that the congressional determination that there should
be no federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a
congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute
as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently "substantial" to confer
federal-question jurisdiction. 172
This conclusion significantly recasts the federal question notion of
substantiality in the restrictive American Well vein. First, it reduces that
determination to a mechanical search for a remedy or cause of action in the
implicated statute. Second, it defines substantiality almost solely as a product of
Congress' substantive remedial objectives, rather than as a product of
Congress' section 1331's jurisdictional objectives, and further offers no means
of reconciling both legislative directives as part of a cohesive federal question
approach.
Lastly, it effectively forfeits judicial control (granted and unchanged by
Congress under section 1331) over the substantiality determination concerning
the federal question within the hybrid claim by making that finding a direct
function of Congress' unrelated decision about private enforcement of the
implicated substantive statute (here, the FDCA) standing on its own. In other
words, the federal question inquiry should ultimately address whether the
federal issue embedded in the state claim warrants the protections of federal
adjudication, but that question is neither directly nor completely answered by
reference to Congress' isolated remedial intent-likely formed without
consideration of the complications of state court enforcement-concerning the
implicated federal statute. 173 Whether Congress intended private federal
enforcement of any particular federal statute does not answer the question
whether Congress intended to provide federal jurisdiction when the state seeks
to enforce that standard as part of a state-defined claim. 174 As explored in detail
in Part IV(B), the jurisdictional and remedial inquiries are not
interchangeable. 175 In short, Merrell Dow's confusion of jurisdictional and
Court itself did nothing to determine Congress' intent under the FDCA and based its
implication finding on the parties' concession "that there is no federal cause of action for
FDCA violations." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810; cf. Finley v. U.S., 490 U.S. 545, 558-59
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If a case is not within one of the specified [article II]
categories, neither Congress nor the parties may authorize a federal court to decide it.")
(footnote omitted) (overruled by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991) on other grounds);
see also Oliver v. Trunkline Gas Co., 796 F.2d 86, 89-90 (5th Cir. 1986) (the parties
rather than the state had "incorporated" a federal standard into their contract, and ultimately
into plaintiff's claim, amounting to an impermissible private attempt to create federal
jurisdiction).172 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 (footnote omitted).
173 Infra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
174 Id.
175 Infra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
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substantive inquiries hampers the court's discretion to determine whether the
federal issue raised by the state claim merits a federal forum in accordance with
the purposes of section 1331.176
Thus, by predicating the substantiality finding about the implicated federal
issue on the legislative decision to provide a cause of action or remedy, the
Court unnecessarily relinquished control of that determination without any
indication that Congress itself intended such a shift of prerogative. In effect,
this shift forces the legislature to make delicate hybrid claim allocations without
knowledge of the types of state claims or federal issues involved. Congress'
narrow decision to preclude a private remedy under a specific statute cannot be
read reliably as a broad preclusion of federal court jurisdiction over any
possible state claim implicating that statute. In its decision to ban private
enforcement under any given federal law, Congress simply cannot be held to
have predicted and accounted for every imaginable state enforcement action that
might threaten the federal interest embodied in that law. Thus, to the extent
Merrell Dow exerts that pressure of prophesy on Congress, the Supreme Court
puts a difficult-and unwarranted-burden on the legislature and unfairly
abdicates its own responsibility within the jurisdictional collaboration (upon
which Congress is entitled to rely) to exercise its general federal question
power to make hybrid claim allocations in the enlightened context of particular
controversies. 177
The Court reinforced this troublesome abdication by rejecting arguments
defendant advanced to support federal jurisdiction despite the presumed
congressional preclusion of private federal enforcement. 178 Significant is that
the theories dismissed by the Court advocated a more discretionary approach to
section 1331 which would have facilitated the Court's consideration of the
importance or predominance of the implicated federal issue in the more
traditional manner.179 Curiously, the Court applauded Franchise Tax Board's
176 Indeed, such a strict application of Merrell Dow's remedy requirement leaves
a court "no room . . . to make exceptions when the federal interest at stake does
warrant federal adjudication." Comment, supra note 7, at 567-68.
177 Congress, of course, could overturn Merrell Dow or revise the federal question
statute. History reveals, however, that Congress has abstained from tampering with the
basic thrust of § 1331 and has left the classic Supreme Court § 1331 decisions untouched.
While it is dangerous to draw inferences from this record of inaction, it may well indicate
that Congress has depended upon the Supreme Court to refine the ebb and flow of judicial
prerogative within the federal question collaboration precisely because jurisdictional
judgments can be so case-specific.
178 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813-17.
179 For example, in response to defendant's contention that Franchise Tax Board-Smith
provided jurisdiction because "some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a
necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims," id. at 813 (quoting Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983)), the Court
warned of Franchise Tax Board's (and therefore Smith's) cautious application, and
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recognition that a reflexive jurisdictional test would undermine the judicial
discretion needed in this unclear area of the law180 but then itself adopted a
cause of action test that seemed to perfunctorily equate the lack of private
remedy with the insubstantiality of the federal issue for federal question
purposes. 181
To be sure, Merrell Dow neither discarded entirely the notion of judicial
prerogative within the section 1331 collaboration between the courts and
Congress nor purported to scrap Smith's case-centered approach. 182 In footnote
twelve of the majority opinion, the Court endorsed evaluation of "the nature of
reiterated the "long-settled understanding that the mere presence of a federal issue in a state
cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction." Id. (footnote
omitted). And to defendant's argument that this case offered "special circumstances" to
justify § 1331 jurisdiction "whatever the general rule" because it involved the novel
question concerning the extraterritorial application of the FDCA to sales in Canada and
Scotland, id. at 816-17, the Court reasoned that federalism concerns "would be ill-served
by a rule that made the existence of federal-question jurisdiction depend on the district
court's case-by-case appraisal of the novelty of the federal question asserted as an element
of the state tort." Id. at 817. "The novelty of an FDCA issue," the Court added, "is not
sufficient to give it status as a federal cause of action.. . ." Id.
The Court also rejected defendant's argument that the federal interest in giving the
FDCA a uniform interpretation warranted federal jurisdiction despite the lack of private
remedy in the Act, id. at 815, noting that preemption, and not federal court review of "state
FDCA-based causes of action," might be the more appropriate approach to ensure "the
order and stability of the FDCA regime," id. at 816, and that the Supreme Court's own
"power to review" federal issues in state actions would provide the ultimate check on
uniformity. Id.
180 Merrell Dow acknowledged:
Far from creating some kind of automatic test, Franchise Tax Board thus candidly
recognized the need for careful judgments about the exercise of federal judicial power
in an area of uncertain jurisdiction. Given the significance of the assumed congressional
determination to preclude federal private remedies, the presence of the federal issue as
an element of the state tort is not the kind of adjudication for which jurisdiction would
serve congressional purposes and the federal system.
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814.
181 Cf. Luneburg, supra note 21, at 770 (Merrell Dow may signal that the Supreme
Court "will not construe section 1331 to encompass state tort actions based on incorporated
federal law, at least where Congress has not created a private federal cause of action, unless
Congress clearly says so."); Hirshman, supra note 7, at 60 (noting pre-Merrell Dow that
"requiring that each statute provide explicitly for federal jurisdiction ...would amend
§ 1331 to read as follows: 'Congress hereby provides that the federal courts have
jurisdiction over cases when Congress provides they do'").
182 Ironically, the Court's decision to short-circuit its own discretion with respect to the
hybrid claim determination was itself an exercise of jurisdictional prerogative. The Court in
effect used its own congressionally-condoned power to invite itself out of the case-centered
approach to § 1331.
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the federal interest at stake" in section 1331 determinations I8 3 and-far from
overruling Smith-even attempted to reconcile it with Moore as a product of
"differences in the nature of the federal issues at stake." 184 Similarly, the Court
cited Shoshone for the proposition that "formally federal causes of action" are
not always indicative of federal question jurisdiction in light of the
"overwhelming predominance of state-law issues." 185 But Smith's and
Shoshone's precise fates are uncertain. The Court made no express attempt to
coordinate either Smith, Shoshone, or its "federal interests" concept with its
new remedy requirement. 186 In addition, the Court failed to define what it
183 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n.12 ("Several commentators have suggested that
our § 1331 decisions can best be understood as an evaluation of the nature of the federal
interest at stake."); see also id. at 815 n.12 (noting "[tihe importance of the nature of the
federal issue in federal-question jurisdiction"); cf. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109,
114 (1936) (noting the importance of evaluating "the federal nature of the right to be
established"); accord Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933). See also
Shapiro, supra note 2, at 570 (Smith and Shoshone "may be better understood if viewed in
terms of the federal interest at stake and the effect on the federal docket") (cited in Merrell
Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n.12).
184 Id. at 815 n.12. As the Court put it, Smith's finding of § 1331 jurisdiction rested
upon the need to determine "the constitutionality of an important federal statute," while
Moore's rejection of § 1331 jurisdiction merely concerned "the violation of the federal
standard as an element of state tort recovery [that] did not fundamentally change the state
tort nature of the action." Id. (emphasis added). As Professor Doernberg reiterated Merrell
Dow's reconciliation: "the federal issue-the constitutionality of a congressional program-
was of considerable importance to the federal government, while . . . the use and
construction of a federal standard to negate a state-created defense to a state-law action was
of insufficient importance to the national government to warrant federal jurisdiction"
(footnote omitted). Doernberg, 77wre's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at 636; see also
Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 6, at 539 n.48 (suggesting that Smith may be
distinguishable from Merrell Dow because plaintiff invoked the Constitution, not a federal
statute, and congressional intent was not at issue); accord Doernberg, 77wre's No Reason
for It, supra note 6, at 635 n. 172.
Thus, Smith arguably distinguishes itself as a case which (1) involves a federal
constitutional assessment and (2) requires a federal trial forum to assure the supremacy of
(or at least extreme sensitivity to) federal law when the continued existence of a federal
program is at stake and erroneous or overbroad state court invalidation of that program
could cause considerable disruption in the interim between the initial decision and ultimate
Supreme Court correction.
185 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 815 n.12. The Court essentially recognized Shoshone
(and Shulthis) as exceptions to the American Well cause of action test. Id.; see also HART &
VECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1004.
186 Here is an interpretation of Merrell Dow which gives cohesion to Smith, Shoshone,
the federal interest standard, and the remedy requirement at the second level of the
Franchise Tax Board framework (supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text):
After Merrell Dow, a federal district court may no longer draw upon § 1331 for
congressional permission to hear state law claims implicating federal statutes lacking causes
of action or remedies unless those claims raise significant federal interests or constitutional
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meant by "federal interests"1 87 or to explain how "the nature of the federal
interest at stake" might be fully assessed if the courts have surrendered the
questions, possibly about "important" federal statutes, whatever those may be (integrating
Smith). Thus, cases turning on the constitutionality of an important federal statute may
activate the court's § 1331 power despite the absence of a federal cause of action or remedy
because of the overriding and obvious federal interest in assessing the legitimacy of a
congressional enactment, particularly one the court deems of some significance (integrating
a federal interest perspective). Conversely, even if Congress provides a cause of action or
remedy in the implicated federal statute, a federal court still may not hear the claim under
§ 1331 if plaintiff's right to relief does not depend upon the statute's construction or state
law issues predominate in resolution of plaintiffs claim (integrating Shoshone). Thus, cases
turning on state law interpretations do not activate the court's § 1331 power even in the
presence of a cause of action or remedy because of the diminished federal interest in
interpreting state law.
And here is a criticism of this interpretation: To the extent Merrell Dow limits Smith's
application to hybrid state claims raising federal constitutional issues, it should be rejected.
There is no less of a need for federal expertise in interpreting a federal question, whether
constitutional or purely statutory in nature, particularly given the judiciary's special function
as independent guardian of all federal rights. Countering legislative improprieties by
majoritarian interests and ensuring effectuation of Congress' remedial aims are important
parts of that protective charge. In addition, the purported distinctions between Smith and
Moore do not justify Smith's limitation: (1) the Moore scenario of statutory incorporation
also carries the potential for disruption of the federal scheme (supra note 184) to the extent
state courts interpret and enforce the federal standard in a manner inconsistent with
Congress' intent and (2) Merrell Dow's observation that the nature of the state claim
remained unchanged in Moore holds equally if not more true in Smith. There, the state
law's prohibition against investment in unlawful securities made necessary a constitutionality
determination as a preliminary step in activating that prohibition, which itself remained
purely of state origin and definition. In Moore, the state voluntarily embedded-indeed,
invited-the federal substantive standard into the heart of its claim, which consequently took
its definition in significant part from federal law.
See M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 101-02 (rejecting the constitutional-statutory
dichotomy and noting that Merrell Dow "has left federal question jurisdiction in an
unfortunate state of confusion" in its attempt "to draw a pragmatically unworkable and
logically indefensible dichotomy among different federal standards which have been
incorporated by reference into state law"); see also Merrell Dow, 478 U.S at 821-22 n.1
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (viewing Smith and Moore as "irreconcilable" and criticizing the
majority's reconciliation of the cases on the basis that the federal interest in Smith was more
important than in Moore as "infinitely malleable" and therefore unworkable).
187 The problems with Merrell Dow's "federal interests" standard have already been
well-documented. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 821 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority's federal interest as "ad hoe" and "infinitely malleable" and questioning "at
what point does a federal interest become strong enough to create jurisdiction?"); E.
CHEMERMNSKY, supra note 21, at 240 (criticizing Merrell Dow's federal interests test as
without structure, inherently unpredictable, and vesting too much "discretion in the district
court to determine the nature of the federal interest and to decide whether that interest
merits federal jurisdiction"); M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 102 (criticizing Merrell Dow's
federal interest standard as "vague and subjective" and noting that it "will translate into any
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opportunity to make the substantiality determination they would otherwise have
made in accordance with their general federal question power. 188 And, to the
extent (if any) that the federal interest standard relates to the Court's
consideration of Congress' substantive intent in the implicated statute as it bears
upon the section 1331 forum determination or to a relative merit ranking of the
implicated federal statute or interest, 189 Merrell Dow provided no guidance
about this assessment (which is more properly within the legislative domain in
any event).
Witness, then, Merrell Dow's dual personality: one strand of the Court's
analysis focuses on the discrete remedy requirement, while another focuses on
the more discretionary need to evaluate the nature of the federal interest at
stake. The two approaches seem inconsistent unless (1) the remedy requirement
applies to only certain types of hybrid claims, preserving the more
discretionary second prong of the Franchise Tax Board standard to assess the
federal issue implicated by a state cause of action that the judge happens to find sufficiently
'important'") (footnote omitted); cf. Doernberg, 77ere's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at
657-58 (criticizing Merrell Dow's substantiality criterion as pliable and incapable of precise
articulation because it "attempts to measure the abstract importance of the issue to the
federal system through consideration of the unexpressed interests of the federal
government"); see also Note, supra note 96, at 980 ("A vague, intuitive 'federal interests'
test is an escape, not an answer.") (footnote omitted).
As Professor Redish pointed out:
[Tihe fact that the Court in Merrell Dow relied in part on Professor Cohen's analysis to
justify its extremely vague, all but unworkable "federal interests" test may underscore
its weakness: its fundamentally unprincipled and unpredictable nature. Thus, while the
pragmatic factors correctly pointed to by Professor Cohen could properly influence
adoption of a principled standard, such as the the Smith test, those factors cannot
themselves fimnction directly as a standard for detenniningfederal question jurisdiction,
as Merrell Dow's muddled analysis unfortunately illustrates.
M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 105 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
188 Indeed, footnote 12 reads like an open-ended savings clause designed to preserve
loose ends of sensible precedent (e.g., Smdth and Slwshone) that did not fit snugly in the
Court's new approach on the facts before it. Cf. M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 101, 102 ("[iut
is difficult to glean a coherent, workable standard for the decision of future cases from this
muddled analysis" and "the Court has left federal question jurisdiction in an unfortunate
state of confusion"); Doernberg, 77Tere's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at 638 n.187 ("the
Court offered no indication of the boundaries of its new theory").
189 The Court's determination that Smith involved "the constitutionality of an
important federal statute," Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 815 n.12 (emphasis added), suggests
that the significance of the statute, in the Court's eyes, helped account for finding federal
jurisdiction over a state law claim concerning it. Merrell Dow did not explain why it
considered the Federal Farm Loan Act to be so important or how courts should gauge the
"importance" of other congressional enactments embedded in state law claims.
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others190 or (2) the Court intended to measure the significance of the federal
interest by the congressional decision about remedies (or the need for
constitutional interpretation). Accordingly, Merrell Dow may view Congress'
failure to provide a cause of action or remedy in the implicated federal law as
the equivalent of a congressional declaration that the federal interest at stake is
not important enough to sustain federal question jurisdiction, especially in the
absence of a constitutional issue.
In short, Merrell Dow obscures-almost to the point of eliminating-an
opportunity for a discretionary approach to federal question jurisdiction over
state law claims. 191 The Court's adoption of the remedy requirement, its failure
to provide standards to assess the federal interest at stake, and its silence about
the types of claims subject to the cause of action analysis only take the Court
farther from a principled section 1331 test that, consistent with the statute's
underlying purposes, determines whether the federal issue at stake warrants the
distinctive treatment of federal trial forums.
Thus, while professing to honor the importance of flexibility and
practicality in section 1331 determinations, Merrell Dow nonetheless adopted a
section 1331 test that sacrificed judicial prerogative under the general federal
question statute for the "certainty" of a congressional intent that had little to do
190 Merrell Dow provides little, if any clue, about the types of cases that will trigger
the remedy requirement. It certainly seems that state law negligence claims are among
them.
191 Professor Chemerinsky has neatly summarized what may be the state of federal
question law with a strict construction of Merrell Dow:
[A] case arises under federal law if it is apparent from the face of the plaintiff's
complaint either that the plaintiffs cause of action was created by federal law; or, if the
plaintiffs cause of action is based on state law, a federal law that creates a cause of
action is an essential component of the plaintiff's claim.
E. CHEMERNSKY, supra note 21, at 231. He views Merrell Dow's remedy requirement as
an additional and "important limitation" on the courts' federal question power over hybrid
claims:
The Court held that it is not enough for a federal law to be an essential component
of a state law cause of action; federal question jurisdiction exists only if thefederal law
itself creates a cause of action .... Merrell Dow narrows the Smith authorization for
federal question jurisdiction for certain state claims....
E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 240-41. This interpretation of Merrell Dow suggests
that while the cause of action or remedy within the implicated federal statute is necessary
for jurisdiction, neither may be suffcient for jurisdiction. Accordingly, even if Congress
provided a cause of action or remedy, the court must still find that plaintiff's right to relief
under state law depends upon resolution of a substantial question of federal law (and, of
course, that plaintiff has satisfied the well-pleaded complaint rule); see supra note 186.
1530 [Vol. 52:1477
STATUTORY FEDERAL QUESTIONDOCTRINE
with the particular state law claim at issue.192 By reviving American Well's
cause of action approach in the context of examining the incorporated federal
statute, Merrell Dow unwisely rerouted the section 1331 inquiry for hybrid
claims through the legislature's jurisdictionally inconclusive remedial intent and
embraced American Well's original and exclusionary spirit with renewed vigor
at the second level of the federal question analysis. 193 A refortified American
Well emerged from the Court's majority opinion. 194
192 But cf. Luneburg, supra note 21, at 759, 761 (the Court in Merrell Dow evidenced
a "creative exercise of discretion" by construing § 1331 in light of modern implied remedy
doctrine rather than by "divination of the original intent of that provision").
193 Indeed, with its emphasis on cause of action, Merrell Dow's remedy requirement is
presumptively pro-state forum. In many hybrid claims, the federal statute involved will not
provide a private remedy, or the parties might have chosen to sue directly under the federal
statute (in the absence of strategic reasons not to do so). See HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 5, at 1020; cf E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 240 (government benefit programs
and regulatory statutes are "prominent examples" of the numerous federal laws that do not
create private causes of action). Accordingly, Merrell Dow puts the courts in somewhat of a
jurisdictional straightjacket. It weights the jurisdictional finding in favor of state forums
while leaving federal courts little discretion to tip the balance towards the federal forum.
This confinement is particularly unfortunate when the need for vindicating important federal
interests or for national uniformity strongly favors a federal forum despite Congress' failure
to designate a federal remedy.
194 In Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988), Justices
Brennan and Stevens had an opportunity after Merrell Dow to reiterate the Court's § 1331
doctrine in an analysis of federal patent jurisdiction under § 1338, which looks to federal
question precedent for its basic definition. Supra note 96. The Court faced the propriety of
defendant's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals from a district court whose jurisdiction, in turn, was "based in
whole or part" on 28 U.S.C. § 1338. Neither patent law nor state law created the claims at
issue, so "the dispute center[ed] around whether patent law 'is a necessary element of one of
the well-pleaded [federal antitrust] claims.'" Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan (who also announced Franchise Tax Board for
a unanimous court) skipped over Merrell Dow's remedy requirement and revived Franchise
Tax Board's two-step standard, supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text, explaining that
district court jurisdiction "extends over 'only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint
establishes either [1] that federal law creates the cause of action or [2] that the plaintiff's
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law,'.., in that 'federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-
pleaded.., claims.'" Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
at 27-28, 13). Explaining that the well-pleaded complaint rule "focuses on claims, not
theories," id. at 811, Justice Brennan observed that an "entire" antitrust claim does not arise
under the patent law simply because "an element that is essential to a particular theory
might be governed by federal patent law." Id. He then concluded that the claims before the
Court failed to arise under federal patent law because the "patent-law issue, while arguably
necessary to at least one theory under each [antitrust] claim, is not necessary to the overall
success of either claim." Id. at 810. "[A] claim supported by alternative theories in the
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D. Illustrations of the Trouble: Restrictive Judicial Readings of
Merrell Dow
A sizable number of lower federal courts have adopted or endorsed this
restrictive reading of Merrell Dow.195 Relying upon the mere absence of an
complaint may not form the basis of § 1338 jurisdiction unless patent law is essential to each
of those theories." Id.
Not surprisingly, Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion joined by Justice
Blackmun, stressed Merrell Dow's approach to the jurisdictional problem. He reemphasized
American Well, entertained the implication question, and found that Congress created
neither an express nor an implied cause of action to enforce § 112 of the patent law. Id. at
821 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). He cited Merrell Dow for its narrow ruling
that "incorporation of [a] federal standard in [a] state-law private action, when no cause of
action, either express or implied, exists for violations of that federal standard, does not
make the action one" arising under § 1331. Id. at 822 n.2.
Justice Stevens' use of the Merrell Dow rationale in a case based not on a state claim,
but on a federal (antitrust) claim implicating the federal patent statute portends its expanded
application beyond state law hybrid claim cases. On the other hand, the Court's seeming
sidestep of Merrell Dow (perhaps because no state claims were at issue) with an analysis
defaulting to the Franchise Tax Board standard suggests that Merrell Dow may not state the
general rule of federal question jurisdiction. Unfortunately, Christianson may be of limited
predictive value given its peculiar patent context, its focus on the well-pleaded complaint
rule rather than on the "merits" of the § 1331 inquiry, and its analysis of federal, rather
than state, claims. In any event, Christianson seems to tighten the general federal question
test in requiring that federal law must be essential to all theories supporting the claim
seeking a federal forum.
195 E.g., infra notes 196-227 and accompanying text (discussing decisions from the
District of Columbia, Fifth, Ninth, First, and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals,
respectively); Emerado Public School Dist. v. Sanford, 750 F. Supp. 418, 419-20 (D.N.D.
1990) (the lack of private action under federal impact aid statutes precludes § 1331
jurisdiction over state claims alleging their violation); Lamson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 724 F. Supp. 511, 513-14 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (failure to demonstrate a private action
under Title VII or relevant EEOC regulation precludes federal jurisdiction over state law
negligence claim alleging the federal standard as an element of the claim); Donofry v.
Nazareth Hosp., 721 F. Supp. 732, 735 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (the lack of private action under
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 660(c) precludes removal jurisdiction over
state law wrongful termination claim alleging § 660(c)'s violation); MidAmerica Title Co.
v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., No. 88C5864 (N.D.JII. April 18, 1989) (1989 WL 39780) (the
lack of private action under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and Federal
Trade Commission Act precludes removal jurisdiction over state law claims under Illinois
consumer fraud and deceptive trade practices statutes alleging the federal violations as
elements in the state claims); Scales v. Memorial Medical Center, 690 F. Supp. 1002,
1007-08 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (the lack of private action under federal Risk Retention Act
precludes arising under jurisdiction); West Virginia v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 681 F.
Supp. 1175, 1176-77 (N.D. W. Va. 1987), appeal disnissed, 857 F.2d 1469 (4th Cir.
1988) (the lack of private action under the federal Job Training Partnership Act precludes
removal jurisdiction over state law civil action related to federal funds obtained under that
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action or remedy in the implicated federal statute in the hybrid claims before
them, these circuit and district courts have discussed or dismissed those claims
with little or no analysis of the purposes underlying, or the factors related to,
section 1331. Instead, following Merrell Dow's lead, they have essentially
substituted the remedial inquiry for the jurisdictional inquiry at the expense of a
Smith-like inquiry or a reasoned exploration of federal question considerations.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Rogers v. Platt,196 for
example, announced this view of Merrell Dow's preclusive effect:
[A] case could "arise under" within the meaning of section 1331 [under
Smith]-prior to last summer-without regard to whether Congress intended a
federal cause of action. But in Merrell Dow... a closely divided Court held
that if Congress affirmatively determines that there should be no private federal
cause action that is effectively the end of the matter.... In that event, it is no
longer necessary for federal courts to consider whether a substantial federal
question is a necessary element of a state cause of action because congressional
intent not to create a federal cause of action is deemed a proxy for the ultimate
question whether or not Congress intended to confer federal jurisdiction. 197
The Fifth Circuit has offered similar views of Merrell Dow starting in
Oliver v. Trunkline Gas Co.19 8 Plaintiffs contended that their state contract
claim supported federal question jurisdiction because of its reliance on rights
created by section 4(a) of the federal Natural Gas Act. 199 Finding Franchise
Tax Board's rule that a state claim requiring resolution of a substantial question
of federal law might support section 1331 jurisdiction to be but a "narrow
exception" to the "general rule" of American Well, 200 the court of appeals
explained that Merrell Dow precluded jurisdiction over state law claims
incorporating federal law as the applicable state standard when Congress
Act); Crouse v. Creanza, 658 F. Supp. 1522, 1528-29 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (the lack of
private action under the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 precludes
jurisdiction over state law custody claim invoking that Act); Geiger v. Cavanaugh, No. H-
87-1200 (S.D. Tex. May 21, 1987) (1987 WL 11715) (the lack of private action under the
Interstate Common Carrier Act and related Interstate Commerce Commission regulation at
issue precludes removal jurisdiction over state law negligence claim alleging the regulation's
violation as an element of the claim); Certified Grocers Midwest, Inc. v. Illinois Dep't of
Pub. Aid, No. 86C4754 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1986) (1986 WL 10041) (the lack of private
action under the Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program precludes removal
jurisdiction over state law claim alleging violation of Program requirements).
196 814 F.2d 683, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act did not confer federal question power on the lower federal courts).
197 Id. at 688 (citations omitted); see also id. at 689.
198 796 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1986).
199 Id. at 87.
200 Id. at 88.
1991) 1533
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
refused to provide a private cause of action in the federal statute.201 The court
expressly reinforced Oliver's view of Merrell Dow two years later in Willy v.
Coastal Corp.202 It reiterated that Merrell Dow "required a federal remedy for
the [implicated federal] statute to be a basis for federal jurisdiction" 203 and
acknowledged Merrell Dow's holding that "a private, federal remedy was a
necessary predicate" 204 or "minimum requirement" 205 for federal question
jurisdiction over a state-created claim with a federal element. 2°6 Neither Oliver
nor Willy examined the claims before them in light of the purposes underlying
section 1331.
The Ninth Circuit has also interpreted Merrell Dow to mean that the
absence of a private cause of action is dispositive of the section 1331
jurisdictional inquiry.20 7 Utley v. Varian Associates, Inc.,208 the leading circuit
201 Id. at 89.
202 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988). The Willy defendants sought removal of plaintiff's
state law wrongful discharge claim, arguing that the federal statutes "that Willy claimed he
was fired for refusing to violate formed a necessary element" of his well-pleaded complaint.
Id. at 1163.
203 Id. at 1168.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 1169.
206 In Willy, the court of appeals noted that defendants did not argue that the federal
regulations implicated by plaintiffs claim provided a private federal cause of action for their
violation. Id. Moreover, the court found that the federal statutes at issue expressly limited
relief to administrative remedies, an independent sign from Congress evidencing the
inappropriateness of judicial action. Id. The court reasoned: "Just as it would 'flout'
congressional intent to allow a federal court to exercise federal question jurisdiction over a
removed claim for violation of a federal statute that does not provide a private cause of
action, it would equally flout congressional intent to give the federal court original (and
hence removal) jurisdiction based on statutes that limit the federal remedy to an
administrative action." Id. (footnote omitted).
See also Griffis v. Gulf Coast Pre-Stress Co., 850 F.2d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir. 1988)
(lack of private action under federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
§ 905(a) precludes federal jurisdiction over negligence claim implicating that section);
Fabrique, Inc. v. Corman, 813 F.2d 725, 726 (5th Cir. 1987) (apparently holding that a
claim for damages under state property law cannot support § 1331 jurisdiction if the only
federal question involved is insufficiently substantial because it is founded on a section of
the Bankruptcy Act which itself provides no federal cause of action).
207 E.g., Krause v. Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., 878 F.2d 1193, 1199 n.3 (9th Cir. 1989)
("Because the Supreme Court now treats the existence of a private cause of action as a
jurisdictional requirement [citing Merrell Dowl our holding that no private cause of action
exists under section 11705 [of the Interstate Commerce Act] is dispositive of plaintiff's
claims that jurisdiction could also be asserted under [§§ 1331 and 13371 . . . ."), cert.
dismissed, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990); see also Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d
1389, 1394 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining Merrell Dow's holding that a state claim does
not involve a substantial federal question sufficient for § 1331 purposes unless the federal
law incorporated in the state claim provided a private right of action); Utley v. Varian
Assocs., Inc., 811 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 824 (1987)
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case, illustrated the restrictive effect of the remedy requirement on section 1331
determinations. Plaintiff Utley brought a state law wrongful termination action
in state court against his former employer Varian Associates, a federal
government contractor. 209 Among other things, Utley claimed Varian
dismissed him because of his race in violation of Varian's affirmative action
duties as a federal contractor under a federal executive order and its
implementing regulations, which in turn constituted an unlawful employment
practice under California statutes. 210
Varian removed Utley's action to federal district court, which had to
decide whether Utley's state law claims arose under section 1331 because they
"implicate[d] federal law." 211 The trial court, pre-Merrell Dow,212 applied the
Smith-like standard developed by the Ninth Circuit and held that the case was
"a clear example of 'a substantial dispute over the effect of federal law' where
'the result turns on the federal question."' 213 The court primarily looked to the
fact that Utley's state law claim depended upon the construction and application
of federal law. 214
The Ninth Circuit reversed, relying on the recently released Merrell Dow
opinion. Unlike the district court, which realistically assessed the centrality of
the federal issue to the success of plaintiff's claim, the court of appeals focused
solely on the narrow question whether the executive order provided a private
right of action against Varian in federal court.2 15 The court described its
mission simply and strictly: "Under Merrell Dow, if a federal law does not
provide a private right of action, then a state law action based on its violation
(explaining that Merrell Dow "found that the lack of a private right of action under the
FDCA disposed of the issue of whether a state claim based on its violation arose under
federal law").
208 811 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 824 (1987).
209 Id. at 1281.
210 Id. at 1281-82.
211 Utley v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 104, 105 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd, 811
F.2d 1279 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 824 (1987).
212 Utley, 811 F.2d at 1283 n.1.
213 Utley, 625 F. Supp. at 106 (quoting Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 656 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982)).
214 "[Resolving plaintiff's claim] will require the Court to determine whether federal
law created a duty, and it if did, the nature of that federal duty and whether defendant's
conduct constituted a breach of that duty." Id.; Utley, 811 F.2d at 1282.
215 "Only if the executive order provides Utley with a private right of action against
Varian in federal court might his complaint raise a 'substantial' federal question ... ." Id.
at 1284. Providing a federal forum in the absence of a private action "would disregard the
will of Congress to preclude a private remedy in federal court for the statute's violation."
Id. at 1283. On the power of this logic, the Court found that federal administrative remedies
available to redress affirmative action violations did not meet Merrell Dow's remedy
requirement because they did not represent congressional permission to sue employers in
federal court. Id.
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perforce does not raise a 'substantial' federal question." 216 It then applied the
implication test set forth in Cort v. Ash to the executive order, searching for
executive (rather than congressional) intent to provide a private judicial
remedy. 217 The court found none, and accordingly concluded that removal was
improper given the insubstantiality of the incorporated federal question. 218
Similarly, the First Circuit adopted a strict reading of Merrell Dow in
Nashoba Communications v. Town of Danvers219 to support its conclusion that
the well-pleaded complaint rule precluded federal question jurisdiction over a
declaratory judgment action based on a cable license agreement referencing the
federal Cable Communications Policy Act.220 Noting twice Merrell Dow's
216 Utley, 811 F.2d at 1283. The court of appeals reached this conclusion in
specifically rejecting Varian's argument based on Franchise Tax Board that a state law
claim may arise under federal law if it raised a substantial question of federal law, here
compliance with the federal affirmative action program. Id.; see also Hedges v. Legal
Servs. Corp., 663 F. Supp. 300, 304-05 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (the district court, faced with a
similar argument, stressed that Franchise Tax Board must be read with caution and
concluded that Congress' determination not to provide a federal remedy for violation of the
federal law at issue amounted to a congressional conclusion that alleging that violation as
part of a state claim could not confer federal question jurisdiction).
217 Utley, 811 F.2d at 1285-86. For amplification of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),
see infra notes 234-39 and accompanying text.
218 Id. at 1286. In its zeal to conform its analysis to Merrell Dow, the court paid but
passing attention to the fact that the Merrell Dow rationale is based entirely on judicial
deference to congressional, and not executive, intent, which in turn rests upon Congress'
unique constitutional power to limit and define lower federal court jurisdiction. See id. at
1285 n.4.
Relying on both Merrell Dow and Utley, the Ninth Circuit in Millers Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Axel's Express, Inc., 851 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989),
held that plaintiff's state law indemnification claim, even though predicated upon federal
law governing interstate carriers, failed to provide § 1331 jurisdiction because Congress did
not intend to provide a private action for the right asserted here. Id. at 270-71. The court of
appeals did not even perform the Cort test to conclude the absence of a private action. Id.
Other courts in the Ninth Circuit following Utley's lead include Gaballah v. PG & E,
711 F. Supp. 988, 991-92 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (plaintiffs state law wrongful discharge claim
implicating interpretation of federal nuclear energy safety policy under the Energy
Reorganization Act did not satisfy Merrell Dow's remedy requirement when Congress
intended an administrative remedy under the Act); Bergkamp v. New York Guardian
Mortgagee Corp., 667 F. Supp. 719, 722-23 (D. Mont. 1987) (the lack of a private cause
of action under the Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act, the federal law implicated in
plaintiff's state law tort claim, frustrated removal jurisdiction under § 1331 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a), the removal statute); see also Hedges v. Legal Servs. Corp., 663 F. Supp. 300,
304-05 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (Congress' failure to provide an express or implied federal cause
of action for violation of § 2996(d)(b)(2) of the federal Legal Services Act precluded federal
question jurisdiction over plaintiff's state claims alleging those violations as elements).
219 893 F.2d 435 (1st Cir. 1990).
220 Declaratory defendant Town of Danvers had granted a cable television license to
declaratory plaintiff Nashoba Communications, a cable operator. The license agreement
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temperance of the Franchise Tax Board-Smith rule,221 the court of appeals
explained that Congress' failure to provide either an express or implied cause
of action in the Cable Act automatically made it insubstantial for section 1331
purposes.222
So, too, the Fourth Circuit championed Merrell Dow's remedy requirement
in aark v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.223 Focusing on Congress' failure to
provide a federal cause of action under the Hazardous Material Transportation
Act and pertinent regulations, the court of appeals refused to exercise section
1331 jurisdiction over a state negligence claim premised upon defendants'
violation of those federal standards. 224 Noting that "[tihe decision in Merrell
Dow turned on the lack of congressional intent to create a private cause of
action,"2 25 the court measured the jurisdictional substantiality of the federal
question within the hybrid claim by reference to Congress' independent
substantive conclusion about private actions directly under the Act itself-
actions plaintiffs conceded did not exist and did not rely upon to supply the
provided that changes in the rate schedule would conform to the federal Cable Act. Id. at
436. When the town resisted intended rate increases by Nashoba, the operator sued the town
in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the
license's rate freeze. Id. at 437. The court of appeals, reversing the district court, held that
the well-pleaded complaint rule barred Nashoba's claim because that claim merely
anticipated a defense to the town's threatened lawsuit, which would be based on state
contract law and, at best, would incidentally implicate federal law. Id. at 438.
221 Id. at 437-38.
222 Ile court stated:
In deciding whether there was present a substantial question of federal law, Merrell
Dow said that Congress' failure to set out a private remedy for violations of the federal
statute at issue was "tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a
claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently
'substantial' to confer federal question jurisdiction."... Nashoba concedes, as it must,
that there is no explicit right to sue to block rate action by a franchising authority set out
in the [Cable] Act. And, as we explain below, there is none implied. This makes the
federal issue insubstantial.
Id. at 438-39 (citations omitted). Also, consider Rodriguez v. SK & F Co., 833 F.2d 8 (1st
Cir. 1987), in which the court of appeals apparently decided that plaintiff's wrongful
discharge claim, based on his refusal to do his employer's bidding in violation of the Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act, did not belong in federal court because the FDCA "does not afford a
private cause of action," relying in part on Merrell Dow and circuit cases denying private
actions under the FDCA. Id. at 9.
223 944 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1991).
224 Plaintiffs, two United Parcel Services employees exposed to toxic insecticide
from a leaking package, brought a negligence claim in federal court based upon
defendants' failure to meet federal regulations governing the packaging, shipping, and
labeling of hazardous materials. Id. at 196, 197.
225 Id. at 198.
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requisite federal law presence to sustain jurisdiction.226 Predictably, the court
attached little, if any, significance to the fact that federal law gave life to
plaintiffs' claim of negligence and would be central to resolution of the
action.227
These circuit opinions illustrate the danger of Merrell Dow's virtually
automatic jurisdictional formula and how the remedy requirement works to pull
the court away from an examination of the purposes underlying section 1331
and toward the more narrow-and perhaps more nebulous-question of
Congress' remedial intent concerning specific statutes. Part IV next shows in
more detail how Merrell Dow's blend of federal question and statutory
implication doctrines in the remedy requirement works to limit judicial
discretion while impairing the viability of the section 1331 inquiry.
IV. UNDOING MERRELL Dow's THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY OF
HYBRID CLAIM DETERMINATIONS: SEPARATING THE
JURISDICTIONAL AND REMEDIAL INQUIRIES
A. The Discretion-Restrictive Statutory Implication Inquiy 228
Merrell Dow, strictly construed, essentially transforms the section 1331
inquiry for hybrid claims into an implied right of action inquiry by requiring
litigants to demonstrate that the implicated federal statute provides either an
express or implied cause of action or remedy as a predicate to federal question
jurisdiction. 229 The implication test, however, cannot stand in place of the
226 Id. at 196.
227 Id. at 197, 198 (noting that "resolution of this issue requires a technical
examination of federal law" and that "[a]pplication of the particular federal
statute. . . would remain but an element in plaintiffs' state negligence action.").
228 Many federal statutes make express provision for their enforcement, whether by
public (e.g., governmental authorities) or by private (e.g., individual citizens) means. The
question of judicial implication of private actions arises when Congress does not explicitly
provide a private right of recovery on a statute's face, yet private parties seek redress for
statutory violations under that law by asking the court to supply the missing right of action.
See Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV.
285, 285 (1963) (implied cause of action is "the extension of a civil remedy to one injured
by another's breach of a statute or regulation not providing for such relief"); see also
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 n.1 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(defining private cause of action). Inherent in the implication question, then, is the tension
between the legislative and judicial branches over exercise of their remedial powers. Should
the federal courts create private remedies or enforcement rights when Congress has not
done so in plain words?
229 See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 7, at 562
(under a literal interpretation of Merrell Dow, "the key" to the "jurisdictional analysis is the
determination whether a private federal right of action under the federal law exists")
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section 1331 test. The considerations for each doctrine overlap, but they are not
co-extensive. The next three sections of this Article demonstrate why, starting
with an examination of the statutory implication doctrine, which is itself
discretion-restrictive.
The Supreme Court's statutory implication doctrine traditionally reflects a
fundamental deference to congressional intent about remedies. 23 0 The intensity
of that deference, however, has varied over time. Pre-1975 decisions show a
Court more willing to imply rights of action as long they furthered Congress'
statutory purposes.23 1 Post-1975, however, the Court has required evidence of
Congress' intent to provide a private remedy and has essentially abandoned
judicial discretion for congressional direction in this area, 232 exhibiting a
marked hesitance to create new causes of action.23 3
(footnote omitted); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 21, at 236 (Merrell Dow
"may have gone too far" by requiring a federal remedy instead of a substantial federal issue
as the prerequisite for federal question jurisdiction).23 0 Infra notes 231-59 and accompanying text.
231 See Zeigler, supra note 21, at 676. Two classic cases will illustrate this more
lenient approach. In Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), the Court found
a "right of private action" residing in the Federal Safety Appliance Act for a railroad
worker injured on a defective car ladder in the course of his duties. Id. at 36. Paying special
heed to the Act's "principal object," the Court required plaintiff to be a member of "the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted" in order to merit a recovery right.
Id. at 39. But the Court did not hesitate to cite-and apply-the common law maxim "where
there is a right, there is a remedy" and to state broadly that a "disregard" of a statutory
"command" may support an implied recovery right for those protected by the Act. Id. at
39-40. As Justice Stevens has described the Rigsby approach, "the denial of a remedy [w]as
the exception rather than the rule." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353, 375 (1982) (footnote omitted). For a view that Rigsby was not an implied private
right of action case at all, see Cannon, 441 U.S. at 732 (Powell, J., dissenting)
("Rigsly,... cannot be taken as authority for the judicial creation of a cause of action not
legislated by Congress."); Noyes, Implied Rights of Action and the Use and Misuse of
Precedent, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 145 (1987); see also Noyes, supra, at 146 (noting that
Rigsby's "specific result.., is not followed today") (quoting Crane v. Cedar Rapids &
Iowa City Ry., 395 U.S. 194 (1969)).
Similarly, in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the Court implied a private
right of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Act of 1934 in order to protect investors, one
of the Act's "chief purposes." Id. at 432. Noting the courts' responsibility to provide the
"remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose," id. at 433, the
Court justified creation of a private remedy as "a necessary supplement" to public
enforcement and to eliminate resort to state remedies that might frustrate § 14(a)'s purpose.
Id. at 432, 434-35.
232 See infra note 257 and accompanying text. Merrell Dow is a parallel endorsement
of this trend in the context of § 1331 determinations.
233 Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 190 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("this
Court has long since abandoned its hospitable attitude towards implied rights of action....
The recent history of our holdings is one of repeated rejection of claims of an implied
right."); E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 315.
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The Court's 1975 decision in Cott v. Ash, 234 featured with approval in
Merrell Dow,235 marked the turning point in the Court's movement away from
the more flexible emphasis on statutory purpose towards the more reflexive
search for congressional intent to provide private remedies. 23 6 In Cort, a
unanimous Court announced a new four-factor test that attempted an amalgam
of prior implication law2 37 and emphasized a more rigorous scrutiny of
congressional intent:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not
expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. [1] First, is the plaintiff
"one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted" . . that
is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? [2] Second, is
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one? . . . [3] Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff?.. . And [4] finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated
to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?238
While Cot's multi-factor test may suggest discretionary balancing, cases
after Cort made its four factors the servants of congressional intent.23 9 In
Cannon v. University of Chicago,240 the Court found an implied private
remedy under section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, but stressed the unusual nature of the case because all four Cort factors
were satisfied. 241 The Court gave primacy to Congress' intent "to have [a
private] remedy available to the persons benefited by its legislation" 242 and
viewed the Cot factors as merely "indicative of such an intent."243 The Court
concluded with a prod to Congress, noting that "the far better course" is for
234 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
235 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810-11.
236 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377-78 (1982).
237 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 945-46.
238 Cot, 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted). Applying this test, the Court held that a
federal criminal statute prohibiting corporations from making certain electoral contributions
could not support an implied private action for damages in favor of a corporate shareholder
against corporate directors. Id. at 68-69, 77-85.
239 Merrell Dow's collapse of the federal question inquiry into the remedial
determination dependent upon congressional intent parallels the Court's development of its
implication doctrine.
240 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
241 Id. at 717.
242 Id.243 Id. at 688 (footnote omitted).
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the legislature to "specify" when it intends private enforcement of statutory
rights.244
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington245 continued the Court's active disavowal
of federal court remedial prerogatives, even if consistent with Congress'
statutory purpose.246 The Court saw its task as "limited solely to determining
whether Congress intended to create the private right of action"247 and looked
to Congress-not the courts-"'to fill any hiatus Congress has left in this
area.' 248 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated that the "ultimate
question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks it
can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law."249
244 Id. at 717. Justice Rehnquist, in his Cannon concurrence, elevated this invitation
into notice to Congress that it should no longer rely upon the courts to fill remedial gaps in
federal statutes: "Not only is it 'far better' for Congress to so specify when it intends private
litigants to have a cause of action, but for this very reason this Court in the future should be
extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on the part of the
Legislative Branch." Id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Powell's forceful
Cannon dissent fortified this warning. He criticized Cot as violating the separation of
powers, arguing that "[the Cor] factors were meant only as guideposts for answering a
single question, namely, whether Congress intended to provide a private cause of action"
and concluding that "[a]bsent the most compelling evidence of affirmative congressional
intent, a federal court should not infer a private cause of action." Id. at 731, 740 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
245 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
246 E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 320 (im Touche Ross, a Court majority "first
articulated" the approach that "the Court will create a private right of action only if there is
affirmative evidence of Congress' intent to create a private right of action.").
247 Toudie Ross, 442 U.S. at 568.
248 Id. at 579 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) (emphasis
omitted)). The Court noted that Cort
did not decide that each of [its four factors] is entitled to equal weight. The central
inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by
implication, a private cause of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Con-
the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose.. .- are
ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent.
Id. at 575-76.
249 Id. at 578. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979),
decided five months after Touche Ross, reconfirmed this: "The dispositive question remains
whether Congress intended to create any such remedy. Having answered that question in the
negative, our inquiry is at an end." Id. at 24. Two years later, California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287 (1981), echoed these sentiments. While Cort supplied the "'criteria through
which.., intent could be discerned,'" id. at 293 (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
241) (1979)), "the ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right of
action," id. at 293, and "[tihe federal judiciary will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no
matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide." Id. at 297; see also
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981) (the ultimate
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The Court's more recent implication decisions adhere to these principles.
In Thompson v. Thompson,250 the Court refused to imply a cause of action
under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, finding congressional
intent to be the "focal point" and "ultimate issue." 251 Justice Scalia, while
concurring in the Court's judgment, wrote separately to emphasize his
disagreement with the Court's "dictum denying the necessity of an actual
congressional intent to create a private right of action, and in referring to Cort
v. Ash... as though its analysis had not been effectively overruled by our later
opinions." 252 He stressed that the Court had "convert[ed] one of [Cort's] four
factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor, with the other three
merely indicative of its presence or absence," 253 observed that the Court had
"long since abandoned its hospitable attitude towards implied rights of
action," 254 and concluded by recommending that the Court "should get out of
the business of implied private rights of action altogether."255 By Karahalios v.
National Federation of Federal Employees,256 Justice White, writing for a
Court denying a private cause of action under Title VII of the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, held Congress "undoubtedly ... aware" by this time that
the Court had "departed" from its once favorable attitude towards statutory
implication and now resolved this issue "by a straightforward inquiry into
whether Congress intended to provide a private cause of action. "257
Whatever the precise status of the Con test,258 the trend is clear: the Court
is loath to imply remedies from silent federal statutes absent some type of
discerned congressional authorization. 259 Merrell Dow's incorporation of this
question is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy and the Cort factors are
relevant to this inquiry).
250 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
251 Id. at 179.
252 Id. at 188 (Scalia, J., concurring).
253 Id. at 189.
254 Id. at 190.
255 Id. at 192.
256 489 U.S. 527 (1989).
257 Id. at 536.
258 See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 n.9 (1990) ("[iln
implied right of action cases, we employ the four-factored Cort test to determine 'whether
Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted' for the violation of statutory
rights.").
259 Cf. Frankel, Inplied Riglts of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553 (1981), where
Professor Frankel argued that the Supreme Court has adopted "an extraordinarily
restrictive" implication doctrine which "treats the implication of private rights of action as a
matter of statutory construction and thereby confines analysis to the question whether
Congress, in enacting a particular statute, intended to authorize the private remedies
sought." Id. at 562 (footnote omitted). Professor Frankel advocates instead an approach
which "does not give federal courts license to substitute their judgment for congressional
decisions," id. at 569, but which nonetheless permits the courts "to supplement[ ] express
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narrow implication test into its section 1331 approach in a manner that makes it
dispositive of the jurisdictional question is troubling, as a number of lower
court 'decisions illustrate by their virtual substitution of the implication test for
the federal question test.260 As the next section demonstrates, the two doctrines
do not blend comfortably because they measure different things-differences
Merrell Dow ignores.
B. The Nature and Purpose of the Section 1331 and Implication
Inquiries Are Different
The section 1331 and statutory implication tests might be confused as
substitute measures to the extent they are rooted in the same or similar
concerns about the distribution of institutional authority in the federal system.
Both approaches implicate fundamental principles at the heart of the
Constitution's separation and assignment of power between Congress and the
federal judiciary. 261 Thus, federal courts deciding whether to exercise section
1331 jurisdiction or whether to imply private actions or remedies might
consider whether their determinations will usurp or undermine Congress'
substantive objectives,262 disrupt Congress' federal-state balance of forum
options, causes of action, or remedies, 263 or impermissibly expand their own
jurisdiction or remedial powers, otherwise limited by Congress, and ultimately,
remedial schemes if they prove inadequate to accomplish clear congressional purposes" and
which acknowledges the "traditional judicial function of compensating the victims of
statutory violations." Id. at 566-67 (footnote omitted).
260 Supra notes 195-227.
261 See Korb v. Raytheon Co., 707 F. Supp. 63, 67-68 (D. Mass. 1989), a case in
which the court adopted Merrell Dow's thesis that the implication doctrine "provides a
useful structure for organizing analysis of the (jurisdictional] question here" because it is
"[iunformed ... by notions of Congressional allocation of federal judicial power."
262 Compare, e.g., Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900) (holding that
federal forums were not necessary to resolve mining disputes local in character and
consequences) with Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981)
(rejecting a private right to contribution under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, noting
"[tihe judiciary may not, in the face of such comprehensive legislative schemes, fashion
new remedies that might upset carefully considered legislative programs") (footnote
omitted); see also Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 533, 529
(1989) (rejecting a private right of action under the Civil Service Reform Act when
Congress vested exclusive enforcement authority in the Federal Labor Relations Authority,
an administrative body created to enforce the Act's duties).
263 E.g., Milan Express Co., Inc. v. Western Sur. Co., 886 F.2d 783, 792 (6th Cir.
1989) (McQuade, J., dissenting); cf. Sedima S.P.L.R. v. Imrex Co. Inc., 473 U.S. 479,
504 (1985) (Marshall, I., dissenting) (a broad reading of the civil RICO provision
federalizes areas of civil litigation once solely in the States' domain and displaces areas of
federal law).
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by article 1I of the Constitution. 264 The doctrines also may seem like ready
substitutes because both purport to consider, as the Merrell Dow majority
stressed, "the increased complexity of federal legislation," "the increased
volume of federal litigation," and "the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of
legislative intent" in accommodating these underlying institutional
principles. 265
But these similarities should not obscure the telling differences between the
section 1331 and statutory implication inquiries. 266 Although congressional
intent is the ultimate guide for both inquiries, the dispositive intent for each
differs. The statutory implication test asks whether Congress intended to create
a cause of action or remedy for private litigants, while the section 1331 test
asks whether Congress intended to empower federal adjudicators to supervise
the conduct of that action or the application of that remedy. 267 Whether
Congress intended to provide for private enforcement of federal statutory rights
or standards is different from whether Congress intended the federal courts-
indeed, any courts-to play a role in that type of enforcement. 26 Thus, the gist
264 Compare supra notes 24-38 and accompanying text (describing the constitutional
and congressional limitations on lower federal court jurisdiction) with supra notes 230-59
and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's restrictive approach to
implication).
265 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 811 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377 (1982)), where the Court stated that these listed
considerations, "the very reasons for the development of the modem [i.e. post-19751
implied remedy doctrine.., are precisely the kind of considerations that should inform the
concern for 'practicality and necessity' that Franchise Tax Board advised for" § 1331's
application to hybrid claims. But see Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 829 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "[t]hese reasons simply do not justify the Court's holding"). See also supra
note 167.
266 Underlying the differences between the Court's jurisdictional and implication
inquiries is the basic postulate-which Merrell Dow seems to devalue-that jurisdiction,
cause of action, and remedy are analytically separate concerns. Supra note 103.
267 Put another way, the implication analysis is not, in and of itself, a jurisdictional
analysis. The source of the implied right of action or remedy is a substantive provision of
the statute containing the right plaintiff seeks to enforce, not a jurisdictional provision.
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 32 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979).
268 Jackson Transit Auth. v. Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15 (1982), illustrates this
distinction. There, the Supreme Court had to decide whether an agreement mandated by
and made in conformance with § 13(a) of the federal Urban Mass Transportation Act was
sufficiently federal in character to merit federal court treatment. The Court declined to
classify the case as a private right of action suit, reasoning that Congress expected § 13(a)
agreements to be privately enforceable. Id. at 20-21. "The issue, then," Justice Blackmun
observed, "is not whether Congress intended the union to be able to bring contract actions
for breaches. . . , but whether Congress intended such contract actions to set forth federal,
rather than state, claims." Id. at 21. Examining the language and legislative history of the
Act, the Court found that Congress did not intend federal law to govern this area, id. at 27,
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of the implication query is whether a private action or remedy should exist,
while the gist of the section 1331 query is where that action or remedy could be
heard (that is, whether private litigants should have the federal forum option).
Merrell Dow does not address the vital distinction between Congress'
substantive and jurisdictional intentions. 269 With its misplaced emphasis on
and accordingly held that the state courts should apply state law to these agreements. Id. at
29. The Court considered the possibility that Congress might have intended federal courts to
hear these claims, and to apply state law, but rejected it as inconsistent with the legislative
history. Id. at 28 n. 11. Cf Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 691, 696 (1963)
(contracts contemplated by § 204 of the Railway Labor Act are federally enforceable under
§ 1331 because they are creatures of federal law whose validity and interpretation must be
governed by uniform federal law to further the federal statutory scheme).
Justice Powell described the difference between the enforcement right and the
enforcing forum in his Cannon dissent:
The Court [here] states that a private cause of action also was implied in
Machinists v. Central Airlines. . . .A careful reading of that case suggests that it
presented a somewhat different question.... The cause of action rin Machinists] came
directly from the agreement, not from any provision of the [federal Railway Labor] Act,
and the only issue was whether this already existing private cause of action could be
brought in a federal court [citing Mishkin, supra note 27, at 166 and Smith]. Although
as a practical matter this result entails many of the same problems involved in the
implication of a private cause of action, see n.17, infra, at least analytically the
problems are quite different.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 734 n.5 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); cf.
id. at 746 n. 17 ("[i]t is instructive to compare decisions implying private causes of action to
those cases that have found nonfederal causes of action cognizable by a federal court under
§ 1331. E.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.").
269 Cf M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 100 (Merrell Dow "improperly confused the
substantive issue of the federal statute's reach with the jurisdictional question of whether a
state cause of action incorporating federal law gives rise to federal question jurisdiction").
Justice Brennan chided the majority for "nowhere" explaining the basis for its
conclusion that no remedy means no jurisdiction. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 825 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). He then argued that Congress' decision to withhold a federal cause of action
should not impact the jurisdictional inquiry unless the reasons for withholding the private
remedy are also the reasons for withholding federal jurisdiction:
Why should the fact that Congress chose not to create a private federal remedy mean
that Congress would not want there to be federal jurisdiction to adjudicate a state claim
that imposes liability for violating the federal law? Clearly, the decision not to provide a
private federal remedy should not affect federal jurisdiction unless the reasons Congress
withholds a federal remedy are also reasons for withholding federal jurisdiction. Thus,
it is necessary to examine the reasons for Congress' decisions to grant or withhold both
federal jurisdiction and private remedies, something the Court has not done.
Id. at 825-26; see also id. at 830 (noting the Court's failure to "examine[ ] the purposes
underlying either the FDCA or § 1331" in reaching its conclusion that the absence of
private remedy "withdraw[s] federal jurisdiction over a private state remedy that imposes
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Congress' specific private-enforcement intent concerning the FDCA, Merrell
Dow loses sight of the independent significance of discerning Congress' general
forum intent through the discretion Congress accorded the federal courts under
section 1331 to determine whether initial federal processing of the claim is
warranted. Collectively, the implication factors measure the legislature's
remedial intent with respect to a particular substantive statute, while the federal
question factors are especially geared to assess the centrality of the federal issue
to recovery, and, in turn, the need for expert, sympathetic, and independent
adjudicators. 270 Making the statutory implication test the dispositive predicate
for section 1331 jurisdiction works to eliminate or at least conceal these forum
considerations.
Moreover, any discretionary balancing that the implication analysis invites
is limited to the "question [of] whether Congress intended that a particular
party be able to bring suit under a federal statute"2 71 and does not adequately
address broader section 1331 concerns that can take into jurisdictional account
the distinguishing fact that the federal statute is presented within the context of
a state law cause of action. In this way, the implication inquiry's focus on the
specific substantive statute warps the jurisdictional inquiry: Any interest-
balancing the implication test allows is, at best, incomplete for section 1331
purposes and, at worst, a possible distortion of section 1331 objectives given
the different and more narrow congressional intent the test serves. 272 Indeed,
the broader, and different, question section 1331 poses is whether the
implicated federal statute as part of a hybrid state claim provides federal
question jurisdiction, not whether the statute on its own is privately
liability for violating the FDCA"); M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 100 ("[A] congressional
decision not to provide a federal remedy does not necessarily imply congressional
disapproval of the provision of a federal forum for adjudication of a state cause of action
turning on the interpretation of that federal statute.") (footnote omitted).
270 Overlap between the two doctrines is inevitable given that jurisdiction often "arises
as a byproduct of substantive interests." See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 33, at 52. But even
factors common to both tests measure different ends (i.e., whether Congress intended to
provide private litigants the potential advantages of a federal forum versus whether
Congress intended a private remedy under a specific substantive statute).
271 Jackson Transit Auth., 457 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added); see Hirshman, supra note
7, at 44 (noting pre-Merrell Dow that "[wihether a federal question is cognizable requires
interpretation of the jurisdictional statute" and the decision "to imply a private action from a
particular substantive statute is an inquiry directed at the act in question, reduced... to the
legislative intent in passing the particular act itself").
272 In any event, the Supreme Court's recent narrowing of the implication test requires
almost slavish adherence to congressional intent and does not readily allow for any
balancing at all. Moreover, resting § 1331 determinations in any part on the implied right of
action analysis is troublesome given the fact that some Supreme Court Justices are avowedly
hostile to them. E.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, I.,




enforceable. Thus, Congress' isolated enforcement intent for particular statutes
cannot be conclusive as to forum selection for hybrid claims under the general
federal question statute.273 Merrell Dow's compression of the jurisdictional and
remedial inquiries, however, obscures these larger considerations and
discourages the exercise of reasoned discretion central to principled section
1331 distributions.
Merrell Dow itself demonstrates the danger of this compression. In its
conclusory ban of hybrid FDCA-negligence claims from federal courtrooms,
the Court attempted deference to Congress' ostensible remedial intent not to
provide private remedies to enforce the FDCA. 274 The Court's decision,
273 This is particularly true in light of the distinction between jurisdiction, cause of
action, and remedy. Supra note 103.
274 Indeed, the weight of authority supports Merrell Dow's assumption that Congress
did not intend private enforcement of the FDCA. Section 337 of the Act provides that
"[a]ll... proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this chapter shall be
by and in the nan of the United States." (emphasis added). Legislative history confirms
this limitation to public enforcement. The original Senate bill contained an express private
right of action for damages, S.1944, 73d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. § 24 (1933) ("A right of
action for damages shall accrue to any person for injury or death proximately caused by a
violation of this Act."), reprinted in Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearings on S. 1944
Before a Subcommittee of the Comnittee on Conmerce, United States Senate, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 10 (1933); C.W. DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG AND COSMEIC ACT: A
STATEMENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD 23 (1938) (reprinted 1987), but the provision
was stricken after being attacked at the Senate Hearings as duplicative of existing state
common law remedies. Hearings, supra, at 114 (parties injured by fraudulent or improperly
labeled medicine can recover full common law damages in state courts), 219 (common law
covers the rights of injured citizens), 400 (common law right of action exists), 403 (bill
should not attempt to modify or restate the common law of personal injuries), 431 (injured
parties are already protected and writing proximate cause into statutory law would
encourage a flood of fraudulent cases), 444 (the bill creates no new right) (1933); see also
Florida ex. rel. Broward Cty. v. Eli Lilly Co., 329 F. Supp. 364, 365 & n.2 (S.D. Fla.
1971) ("the terms and legislative history of the statute compel the conclusion that Congress
did not intend to allow private rights of action for damages under the" FDCA).
The courts support this conclusion. E.g., Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products,
Inc., 610 F.2d 558, 562 (8th Cir. 1979) (the FDCA "aims to protect the general public, not
a particular class of persons"), aff'g, 466 F. Supp. 182 (D. Minn. 1979); Pacific Trading
Co. v. Wilson, 547 F.2d 367, 368, 370 (7th Cir. 1975) (the FDCA does not "expressly or
inferentially permit prosecution of a private action for monetary recovery" and provides
that only the United States can enforce or restrain violations); Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc., 732
F. Supp. 33, 35 (M.D. Pa. 1989), aft'd, 902 F.2d 1558 (3d Cir. 1990) ("The FDCA does
not create or imply a private right of action for individuals injured as a result of violations
of the Act."); National Women's Health Network, Inc. v. A.H. Robbins, Inc. 545 F. Supp.
1177, 1178 (D. Mass. 1982) (finding no implied private right of action under the FDCA, a
holding which "accords with that reached by every other federal court which has faced the
issue."); Keil v. Eli Lilly & Co., 490 F. Supp. 479, 480 (E.D. Mich. 1980) ("The law is
clear that there is no private cause of action under the" FDCA); Eli Lilly Co., 329 F. Supp.
at 365 (there is no private right of action under the FDCA); Clairol, Inc. v. Suburban
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however, raised possible barriers to Congress' broader regulatory aims that a
less mechanical analysis of section 1331 considerations might have avoided or
at least acknowledged. As shown below, an exploration of those considerations
in the context of the FDCA's purpose and scheme-an exploration Justice
Brennan endorsed in his Merrell Dow dissent275-demonstrates both the
propriety of federal question jurisdiction in the Merrell Dow scenario and the
better balance of Congress' general jurisdictional goals under section 1331 with
its specific remedial goals under the Act.
The FDCA's complex scheme evidences that Congress, to the extent it
provided for the Act's enforcement, had an express preference for federal
authorities-ultimately and exclusively the federal courts-to enforce statutory
requirements through injunctive and criminal sanctions in order to promote
uniform and effective regulation in the specialized national arena. 276 Thus,
Congress' failure to provide a private civil remedy for damages under the
FDCA is hardly dispositive as to its jurisdictional intent for state-created claims
implicating the FDCA. In fact, that failure is persuasive manifestation of
Congress' desire to achieve coordinated interpretation and implementation of
the Act's intricate regulatory scheme by centralizing the type and nature of
enforcement in federal hands and precluding random suits by individuals that
might disrupt or displace Congress' overriding and consciously chosen
regulatory means and objectives. 277
Given the FDCA's presumption in favor of federal enforcement, it is far
from certain that Congress wanted-if it had any vision at all of the Merrell
Dow scenario-state courts alone to enforce carefully prescribed federal
standards through generic state law rules of decision, such as negligence, which
have no direct relation to the federal interests Congress wished to serve in
passing the highly specialized Act that informs those standards. 278 To the
Cosmetics & Beauty Supply, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 859, 861 (N.D. I1. 1968) ("there does not
seem to be any case in which . . a [private civil remedy under the FDCA] has been
recognized").
275 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 826-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
276 As Justice Brennan explained, Congress gave the Food and Drug Administration,
the public agency with primary responsibility for supervising the Act's implementation,
authority to obtain ex parte court orders for seizure of goods, 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1988), to
commence federal court proceedings to enjoin FDCA violations, 21 U.S.C. § 332 (1988),
and to request a United States Attorney to bring criminal proceedings against Act offenders.
21 U.S.C. § 333 (1988); Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 830 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Act
placed final and exclusive enforcement authority in the federal courts. Id. at 830-3 1.
277 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 832 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278 The objections to private federal enforcement directed at the original version of the
FDCA in light of pre-existing common law fraud or negligence remedies, supra note 274,
did not necessarily comprehend a Merrell Dow situation in which plaintiffs seek to
incorporate the federal statutory standard as an element of the fraud or tort rather than to
rely wholly upon state-defined concepts of fraud or negligence. Congress may have
considerable interest in affording federal judicial supervision over interpretation and
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extent any money damages flow from FDCA violations, it is unclear that
Congress intended-or even anticipated-that local adjudicators should be
solely responsible for making decisions about the nature of relief or
compensation for violation of this federal statute. While any such damages
award would be a product of state law and the state courts should have the
opportunity to adjudicate these matters, enabling the federal courts to hear these
types of actions concurrently would help maximize treatment of the federal
interest or standard in a manner least inimical to congressional objectives.279
In this context, Congress' failure to preempt state jurisdiction or state law
is not necessarily indicative of Congress' hostility to concurrent federal
jurisdiction. Given the federal presumption against interference with state
governance, 280 and the traditional respect accorded state regulation of health
implementation of finely tailored federal standards transplanted to a state law enforcement
context while having little or no interest in providing federal forums for purely state law
actions seeking recovery for the same injuries, but without reliance on federal standards.
279 As Justice Brennan pointed out, precluding federal consideration of FDCA-
implicated state claims and leaving the states as the sole interpreters of the Act's standards is
"illogical." Id. State courts may lack the national perspective and experience that Congress
hoped would inform FDCA regulation, increasing the risk of incorrect interpretations of the
Act that will force the parties to act in ways Congress never intended. Cf id. at 828. This
could result in a large-scale subversion of congressional policy as more and more parties are
bound by results Congress never envisioned or are subject to conflicting commands from
the federal and state courts about what constitutes lawful behavior under FDCA standards.
Cf Matasar & Bruch, supra note 2, at 1315 (state courts could develop federal law
inconsistent with federal precedents and frustrate federal supremacy if the Supreme Court
refuses to review federal issues decided by state courts). Depending upon ultimate Supreme
Court review, as the Metrell Dow majority does, Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 816, to remedy
incorrect or inconsistent state court treatments of the Act provides little realistic comfort.
Obviously, Supreme Court cure may take too long or may never occur. Id. at 827 n.6
(Brennan, J., dissenting); infra note 336.
280 E.g., H-illsborough Cty. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707
(1985), in which the Court, in holding that FDCA regulations governing collection of blood
plasma from paid donors did not preempt certain local Florida ordinances, stated that
"every subject that merits congressional legislation is, by definition . . . of national
concern .... [But] that cannot mean.. . that every federal statute ousts all related state
law." Id. at 719; see also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981), in which the Court
explained that unless state law conflicts with or undermines congressional objectives,
"[clonsideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress
did not intend to displace state law." Id. at 746. The Court went on to hold that a Louisiana
tax on natural gas was preempted because it was "inconsistent with the federal scheme and
must give way." Id. at 751; R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK, & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 12.1, at 624 (1986) ("In initiating
a new regulatory scheme, Congress seldom articulates a specific intent to preempt an entire
field of regulation. . . . [T]he judicial branch has shouldered the responsibility for
discovering congressional intent and, if necessary, invalidating state laws" subject to
congressional reversal.).
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and safety matters,281 Congress may not have preempted state law actions in
the field, but left it to the federal courts under section 1331's safety net to
decide on a case-by-case basis when and if FDCA hybrid claims warranted
federal forum protections.282 And, finding jurisdiction in the Merrell Dow
scenario is plaintiff-empowering: Far from precluding state adjudication, it
simply creates a federal forum option for plaintiffs (and removing defendants)
who, on the basis of their own forum assessment, will select the appropriate
court system.
Indeed, unless and until Congress decides to preempt the private
enforcement of FDCA standards through state remedies, the federal courts
should at least be available as alternative forums to contribute their FDCA
expertise to state law development. Federal decisions can provide guidance to
the state courts and blunt the effect of incorrect state court precedent. 283 This
opportunity for shared expertise will encourage uniform interpretation of the
FDCA within the state court system and work to minimize conflicts with
federal goals until (and if) Supreme Court clarification occurs. 284 Moreover,
the state courts-themselves experts in local matters-can provide the federal
courts hearing these claims with the states' perspective on hybrid claim
enforcement. This may improve federal understanding of the federalism
interests involved, including the intensity of the state's interest in initial
adjudication, the extent of any conflict with congressional aims, and the
potential impact on state court dockets. Thus, however disruptive the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction to section 1331's expertise and
uniformity objectives, 285 both goals are more likely advanced by permitting
federal courts to participate in these hybrid claim adjudications.
In addition, the federal courts, as federal law experts, may be better suited
to spot and frame potential federal preemption and enforcement problems for
appellate or congressional review. Further, the federal courts are better
positioned within the system to alert Congress quickly about forum allocations
thwarting substantive legislative goals. Moreover, opening an independent, but
281 Hillsborough Cry., 471 U.S. at 719 (noting that "the regulation of health and safety
matters is primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern").
282 This analysis is not limited to the FDCA. As the lower court cases strictly
construing Merrell Dow show, other federal statutes pose the same or similar concerns when
incorporated into state law claims. Supra notes 195-227 and accompanying text.
283 See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 465 (1990) (with concurrent jurisdiction over
RICO claims, federal courts "would not be bound by state court interpretations of the
federal offenses constituting RICO's predicate acts" and state courts would "be guided by
federal court interpretations of the relevant federal criminal statutes.").
284 Cf. Luneburg, supra note 21, at 767 (arguing that coordination of federal and state
interpretations of the FDCA, which may differ over what the statute requires of drug
manufacturers, may be necessary to prevent confusion or subversion of the statutory
scheme).
285 See infra note 342.
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sympathetic forum, to private litigants may help alleviate the potential bias for
or against large local defendant employers who are subject to regulation or
individual plaintiff consumers who are victims of the violation. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court will benefit from considered federal court treatment of these
issues, cross-fertilized by state court perspectives, should the federal question
involved reach the Court on review of the state or federal court decision.286
In short, the balance of considerations that section 1331 requires can best
be done outside the confines of Merrell Dow's rigid remedy requirement in a
more discretionary approach to hybrid claim determinations that respects the
jurisdictional prerogative of the federal courts and puts Congress' remedial
intent in proper perspective.
C. The Apparent Advantages of Using a Private Action or Remedy
Within the Implicated Federal Statute as a Jurisdictional Prerequisite
Are Misplaced
As shown, the statutory implication test cannot double as a jurisdictional
test in the manner Merrell Dow attempts because the nature and purpose of the
tests differ significantly. 287 This section demonstrates that, above and beyond
these doctrinal incompatibilities between the two approaches, the apparent
advantages of making a federal action or remedy a jurisdictional prerequisite
cannot withstand close scrutiny.
Honoring Congressional Intent? A purported benefit of Merrell Dow's
basing the section 1331 inquiry on the implication analysis is maximizing
fidelity to congressional intent. In requiring Congress to provide a statutory
action or remedy as a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction, Merrell Dow, in
essence, requires courts to check whether Congress has sanctioned private
recovery for violation of the specific substantive statute at issue before
exercising their general federal question power under section 1331.288 What
better way to discern whether Congress intended the courts to hear certain,
286 Arguments to preclude federal jurisdiction could also be made. Preemption, of
course, is Congress' option in the event it concluded state enforcement undermined the
federal scheme. Thus, Congress' failure to preempt suggests that it was satisfied with state
court treatments of the statute. Further, the states' adoption of federal standards as their own
in the context of tort law enforcement in effect localizes those standards and deprives them
of their federal character, minimizing the need for or legitimacy of federal supervision. In
addition, federal courts should not be determining the contours of state negligence law
merely because interpretation of a federal statute might affect a single element of the
otherwise state law claim (whose other elements are controlled by state law). Whatever
arguments prevail, this Article contends that Merrell Dow's remedy requirement inhibits
these kinds of explorations and threatens the integrity of § 1331 determinations.
287 Supra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
288 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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statute-specific actions than to test the particular statute itself for clues as to
Congress' will? Arguably, the substantive statute carries a more specific and a
more recent indication of congressional intent than the older and more general
federal question statute. Thus, plaintiffs who would not merit a federal forum
had they attempted to file a federal action directly under the implicated federal
statute (because Congress provided neither an express nor an implied cause of
action or remedy) should not attain that forum indirectly by invoking that
statute as a mere element in a cause of action created by the state.289
These points, however, are misdirected. First, they mistakenly conflate or
equate cause of action or remedy with jurisdiction. 290 As shown, remedial
intent is not the equivalent of forum intent and simply cannot be the sole
jurisdictional guide.29 1 This is particularly true with hybrid claim dispositions,
which involve federalism interests that transcend Congress' intent concerning
direct enforcement of the federal statute standing alone.292 Moreover,
congressional "intent" is often difficult to discern. The implication test
typically takes the Court on a search for the impossible-the congressional
intent beneath the congressional silence. From a doctrinal integrity perspective,
it is far better for the federal courts to perform an explicit exploration of time-
honored jurisdictional factors rather than to attempt discovery of an elusive or
inconclusive legislative intent in hybrid claim cases that call for delicate
judgments about forum allocation. 293 Moreover, Congress' silence about
remedies in a substantive statute is a slim reason to eclipse, without further
2 89 See Hirshman, supra note 7, at 41 ("Since almost every hybrid case reflects a
failure by Congress to commit itself to private enforcement of its acts, allowing the federal
courts to entertain as federal a suit where only state law authorizes private enforcement
would be allowing the states to create private actions to enforce federal statutes where
Congress would not do so.").
290 See supra note 103.
29 1Supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the Merrell Dow
plaintiffs had argued to the district court "that jurisdiction is lacking because no private right
of action exists under the Act." In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., "Bendectin" Products
Liability Litigation, MDL No. 486, slip op. at 7a (S.D. Ohio May 14, 1984). The court
rejected this reasoning, stating: "This is not a situation where plaintiffs are seeking some
form of relief under the Act itself." Id.
292 Supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
293 Indeed, basing jurisdiction on the chimera of an unexpressed congressional intent
about remedies hinders the unique authority and ability of the federal courts, within the
confines of the § 1331 directive, to adjust their own jurisdiction after close consideration of
the legal and factual presentations designed specifically to sharpen the jurisdictional issues
before them in particular cases. To the extent that article ifi's standing requirement ensures
that the courts decide live cases and controversies with interested litigants who develop the
issues to be decided fully and factually, the courts are peculiarly suited to determine the
boundaries of their own jurisdiction in the enlightening context of concrete adverseness.
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analysis, as Merrell Dow did, resort to federal tribunals for clarification or
vindication of federal statutory rights or standards locked in state claims. 294
Yet another concern is Merrell Dow's failure to address what effect, if any,
its remedy requirement has on the pre-existing general federal question
grant.295 Congress, for example, may have reserved the question of federal
court access in these hybrid claim situations to the courts themselves under the
general statutory grant. 296 What if Congress, obviously aware of section 1331
when it passed a particular substantive statute, assumed that the federal courts
had the flexibility to take jurisdiction over state actions relying upon that statute
if they saw fit under prevailing section 1331 precedent and therefore felt no
urgency to legislate either a federal forum or remedy?297 By de-emphasizing
294 Cf Hart, 7he Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exerdse in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1366, 1370 (1953) (Congress, by denying
remedies, can effectively deny federal forums).
Merrell Dow appears to conclude that making a federal action or remedy a
jurisdictional prerequisite evidences respect for congressional relief and enforcement
schemes embodying delicate or complex legislative choices designed to achieve calculated
legislative purposes. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 811-12. Similarly, Merrell Dow
implicitly recognizes that Congress has created numerous agencies specifically empowered
to enforce statutory violations and they, in notable part, have taken over the courts' once
predominant role in interpreting statutes and providing remedies. Cf. Rubin, Law and
Legislation in the Adninistrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 369 (1989) ("agencies
have displaced common-law courts as the primary means by which [social] regulation is
effectuated"). But Merrell Dow's deference to congressional remedial objectives again
reflects the Court's failure to segregate the jurisdictional from the enforcement issues:
Federal courts may well be desirable-even preferable-forums to enforce state-defined
remedies which rest upon congressionally-defined standards even if Congress did not
provide for federal enforcement of the federal law raised by the hybrid claim.
295 Justice Brennan faulted the majority for failing to examine the purposes underlying
§ 1331 and cautioned that any limitations on that statute "must be justified by careful
consideration of the reasons underlying the grant of jurisdiction and the need for federal
review." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 818-19, 830 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But cf. Rogers v.
Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Congress is certainly free to create federal
rights or duties and provide for their enforcement outside the federal district courts-in
effect to modify section 1331-as long as it stays within any constitutional limits, which are
by no means clearly identified.") (footnote omitted).
296 See Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 511 (1900); see also Althouse,
The Humble and the Treasonous, supra note 2, at 1049 (the courts are "in a better position
to fill out some of the details in jurisdictional statutes" because generally termed statutes
"cannot anticipate the realities of litigation encountered by judges"); Friedman, supra note
2, at 60 (the Court is "simply more competent than Congress in refining jurisdictional
decisions . . . [and] Congress is ill-suited to fine-tuning in the first instance"); Shapiro,
supra note 2, at 547.
297 In Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 505, the Court acknowledged that Congress can legislate
with existing jurisdictional statutes in mind. Id. at 506-07; see also Hirshman, supra note 7,
at 61 ("[T]he scarcity of separate, explicit jurisdictional provisions strongly suggests that
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the potential freedom Congress gave the federal courts to refine their own
jurisdiction under section 1331, Merrell Dow, in some sense, made it easy for
the federal courts to abdicate their responsibility for confronting the close
forum allocation questions posed by hybrid claims by endorsing a reflexive test
for federal question jurisdiction.
Also problematic is Merrell Dow's tacit and unbounded invitation to
Congress to play "some continuous role in the interpretation of federal
jurisdictional statutes." 298 Indeed, automatically determining section 1331
jurisdiction through the vehicle of subsequent, substantive acts amounts to
jurisdiction by indirection: Congress can indirectly preclude lower federal court
section 1331 jurisdiction merely by failing to provide a specific remedy in
specific substantive statutes that are not necessarily targeted at jurisdictional
concerns. 299 This ad hoc and retrospective amendment of the federal question
statute ties the section 1331 hands of the courts to decide whether a federal
forum is necessary or desirable precisely in some of the most difficult types of
cases (i.e., hybrid claims) where federal and state interests may collide most
intimately and immediately. Any such restrictions on the federal courts' general
Congress thought it could rely on section 1331 the general jurisdictional statute to express
its intent regarding jurisdictional questions about any federal statute.").
298 Doernberg, There's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at 637. As Professor
Doernberg put the problem:
[Under Merrell Dow], [it is not just Congress' intent at the time that section 1331
was enacted that is important; the Court implicitly stated that any later Congress, even
when enacting a statute that does not deal with jurisdiction, may be inferred to have
added its own intent as a gloss on the interpretation of the jurisdictional statute. This is
strong medicine indeed. The Court did not, however, provide any guidelines for
determining when a Congress that fails to mention federal subject matter jurisdiction in
a new statute dealing with a different topic nonetheless intends to alter an existing
interpretation of federal jurisdiction.
Id.; see also id. at 638 (Merrell Dow "offered no suggestion about which nonjurisdictional
statutes are to be understood to amend § 1331 and which are not"); Doernberg, You Can
Lead a Horse, supra note 46, at 1006 ("it now seems that when a state-created claim
incorporates some provision of substantive federal law, one must ask whether the Congress
that passed the law simultaneously but silently contemplated a change in the scope of federal
question jurisdiction") (footnote omitted); Luneburg, supra note 21, at 764 (suggesting that
Merrell Dow found "an implied congressional negation of the exercise of jurisdiction" to be
dispositive).
299 See also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1040 (Merrell Dow "concluded that
what might otherwise be a general rule allowing § 1331 jurisdiction is trumped if, in a
particular statutory context, the Court discerns a congressional purpose not to give access to
the federal courts.").
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federal question authority should be carefully considered and clearly stated by
Congress. 300
Simplicity and Enhanced Predictability? After more than a century of
Supreme Court experience with section 1331, it is still unclear how sufficient
or "substantial" the properly pled federal issue must be before federal question
jurisdiction attaches. Merrell Dow's apparent appeal in providing a more
mechanical determination of this issue is its relative simplicity and
predictability. To the extent Merrell Dow reduces the section 1331 inquiry for
hybrid claims to the cause of action or remedy finding, it would seem to
eliminate some of the vagaries characteristic of federal question tests. Private
litigants will be able to research whether the implicated federal statute expressly
provides for private actions or remedies or, if not, whether courts have implied
rights of action or remedies under specific statutes. This will facilitate educated
predictions about a court's section 1331 determinations. Accordingly, litigants
would more accurately choose the appropriate forum at the outset of the case
and minimize litigation over threshold jurisdictional issues.
Simplicity and predictability, however, are not so easily attained. Even the
Supreme Court's implication doctrine, admittedly clear in theory as based on
faithful adherence to legislative intent, is often difficult to apply with certainty
in the context of particular statutes given the Court's manipulation of the intent
concept and its various indicia.30' Further, a jurisdictional test that turns on an
implication analysis applicable only to each statute is inherently unpredictable
because that analysis must vary from statute to statute. 302 Thus, Merrell Dow's
remedy requirement may increase predictability for any given case or any given
statute (particularly if the Supreme Court has spoken with respect to implied
remedies under that statute), but there may be little gain in uniformity in the
area as a whole. Instead of developing a section 1331 jurisprudence of more
general application, courts strictly construing Merrell Dow may develop
variegated section 1331 precedent based more on the specific statute under
scrutiny than more universal federal question concerns.
300 Doernberg, 7here's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at 637-38; H. FINK & M.
TUSHNEF, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: PoLIcY AND PRACtiCE 55, 56 (2d ed. 1987);
Luneburg, supra note 21, at 763; cf. Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 DUKE L.J. 34, 59 n. 146 (any congressional rejection of the
courts' standards for supplemental jurisdiction should be done expressly in legislation
limiting those standards).
301 See E. CHFMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 317 ("The law in this area [of private
rights of action] is difficult to summarize because there are a great many cases that are not
completely consistent either in their methodology or in their results.").
302 f Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 101, at 687-
88, 691 (The Anerican Well cause of action test "provides little certainty because of the
great flexibility that exists in determining whether a federal cause of action exists.... Once
a particular statute... is held to embody or not embody a particular federal remedy, we
have guidance for the future, but not until then.").
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Moreover, the emphasis on efficient disposition of the "threshold"
jurisdictional issue too easily overlooks its significance and the corresponding
need to treat it seriously and thoroughly. First, the jurisdictional decision
embodies important institutional choices about the allocation of judicial
authority between the federal and state systems. Sound federal question
determinations are necessary to maintain the peaceful coexistence of sovereigns
and a limited national judiciary.30 3 Second, the jurisdictional decision may
itself affect or even determine the outcome of the lawsuit-the very reason for
the protective offerings of section 1331 in the first place-and merits close
judicial scrutiny.
Of course, leaving the apparent certainty of the more mechanical test
throws the federal question analysis back into the apparent murkiness of
discretion and interest-weighing that Merrell Dow admirably attempted to
clarify or minimize. This is, however, an unkind characterization. Discretion
does not mean unprincipled decision. 30 4 Section 1331 often requires the
judiciary to make hard choices about whether the implicated federal issue
warrants involving the federal judiciary sooner rather than later in interpreting
or protecting that interest. Those choices can best be made as products of the
considerations that underlie them.305 The federal courts must be given the
303 As then-Professor Frankfurter noted:
Like all courts, the federal courts are instruments for securing justice through law.
But unlike most courts, they also serve a far-reaching political fiinction. They are a
means, and an essential one, for achieving the adjustments upon which the life of a
federated nation rests. The happy relation of states to nation-our abiding political
problem-is in no small measure dependent on the wisdom with which the scope and
limits of the federal courts are determined.
Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 499, 500 (1928).
304 See supra note 23; see also Shapiro, supra note 2, at 545 ("discretion need not
mean incoherence, indeterminacy, or caprice; nor is discretion at odds with the recognition
of responsibility for adjudication of disputes").
305 Courts must continue to confront the federal question factors explicitly not only to
make appropriate claim allocations, but to increase the predictive value of their decisions, to
maintain their institutional credibility, and to open their decisions to meaningful review by
Congress or the appellate courts. Thus, as Professor Field has observed in discussing
discretion and federal question determinations:
One advantage to making discretion explicit [in federal question decisions] is that
you thereby inform litigants, and lower court judges, to talk about the factors that are
relevant .... Another advantage of starting to discuss the real variables is that such
discussion, over time, can help to develop factors that lead to more appropriate,
predictable, and uniform results.
Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 101, at 694.
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opportunity to face these interpretative challenges, rather than be forced or
encouraged to circumvent them with jurisdictional formulas that obscure their
enlightened resolution.
Alleviating Docket Overload? Merrell Dow reveals the Supreme Court
caught in a jurisdictional quandary: How could the Court refine a section 1331
test that is sufficiently principled and predictive, yet practically responsive to
the growing caseload demands placed on the federal and state court systems?
Importing the Court's remedy requirement into the federal question area may
well make it more difficult to secure a federal forum because of the strictness of
that test.306 Indeed, the Court's jurisdiction denial did serve the important
federal interest in relieving federal docket pressures, an interest that probably
figured into the Court's rationale. In particular, the Court may have feared that
granting federal access in this hybrid claim situation might open the floodgates
to, in essence, "state-created" federal question jurisdiction. In these claims,
state court litigants or legislatures could, in effect, create federal jurisdiction by
pleading or including federal standards or interests as part of otherwise purely
state law causes of action. In these days of federal docket crises, 307 there is
much to be said for a principled federal question test that may also promote
district court caseload management.
Principle, however, is necessary. A virtually automatic test that obscures
reasoned forum allocation is unjustifiable regardless of its possible reductive
effect.308 Even Merrell Dow's alleged saving for the federal system as a whole
may be smaller than expected if it merely translates into more appeals to the
Supreme Court from the state courts. 309 If Merrell Dow has the effect of
deflecting to the state courts countless hybrid claims seeking private
enforcement of federal standards, the potential for the states to render diverse
306 In addition, the well-pleaded complaint rule, especially as tightened recently by the
Supreme Court, supra note 194, will help to eliminate any number of claims from federal
court.
307 Supra note 3; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 408-09 n.17 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The escalating recourse to damages suits
has placed a severe and growing burden on the lower federal courts."); Middlesex Cty.
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("In recent years, however, a Court that is properly concerned
about the burdens imposed upon the federal judiciary, the quality of the work product of
Congress, and the sheer bulk of new federal legislation, has been more and more reluctant
to open the courthouse door to the injured citizen.").
308 The fear that opening the federal courts to state common law claims incorporating
federal standards would precipitate an avalanche of claims under § 1331 may well be
exaggerated. Prerogative works both ways. The federal courts may use their discretion
affirmatively to screen out those state law claims that do not warrant the special protections
of federal trial forums. Further, docket concerns are important, but should not be
determinative when federal interests hang in the balance.
309 C. Doernberg, 77tere's No Reasonfor It, supra note 6, at 654.
1991] 1557
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
interpretations of those statutes that also conflict with congressional objectives
increases accordingly, and with it, the need for Supreme Court review to
ensure congressional goals are met. Moreover, a federal court system respectful
of the companion state court systems should hesitate before steering whole
classes of cases to them without first finding sufficient justification for closing
the federal courthouse doors. 310 In any event, whatever docket relief the
310 The importance to both systems of considered § 1331 determinations is well-
illustrated by Merrell Dow itself, which was but a small part of an extensive multidistrict
Bendectin litigation assigned to District Judge Rubin by the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
in February 1982, a fact which the Supreme Court did not mention in its opinion. See
generally In re Bendectin Litigation, 624 F. Supp 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd as nwdified,
In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom Hoffinan v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). The complaints in these actions
were virtually identical to each other and to those in Merrell Dow, requesting recovery for
common law negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, fraud, and gross negligence,
and alleging a rebuttable presumption of negligence for Merrell Dow's alleged violation of
the FDCA's misbranding provisions. See In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d at 293-94;
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805-06.
In February 1985, months before the Sixth Circuit reversed Judge Rubin's finding of
§ 1331 jurisdiction andforum non conveniens dismissal in Merrell Dow, Judge Rubin began
a "common issues" trifurcated jury trial solely on the issue of causation of all Bendectin
cases filed in Ohio federal court, removed to Ohio federal court, and, upon plaintiffs'
voluntary request to "opt in," transferred to Ohio federal court from other districts. In re
Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d at 295-96. By the trial cut-off date, the district court had
before it 818 cases subject to the jury's decision, although during the course of proceedings,
the court had had "some contact" with a total of 1,186 Bendectin cases, some of which did
not opt in or were otherwise disposed of. In re Bendectin Litigation, 624 F. Supp. at 1216.
After 22 trial days, the jury found that plaintiffs had failed to establish that Bendectin taken
in therapeutic doses during pregnancy caused human birth defects, and the court entered
judgment for Merrell Dow. In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d at 294.
While the trial court had diversity jurisdiction over most of the cases before it, Judge
Rubin faced a more perplexing issue with Ohio plaintiff-cases (given Merrell Dow's Ohio
-citizenship) after the Sixth Circuit reversed his finding of § 1331 jurisdiction on July 15,
1985. In response, in August 1985, Judge Rubin dismissed without prejudice cases
originally filed by Ohio residents in Ohio federal court and remanded to state court cases
originally filed there, but which Merrell Dow had removed to federal court. Id. On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit in August 1988 affirmed Judge Rubin's trifurcation and other challenged
trial rulings, but modified his jurisdictional holding, finding inter alia that Ohio plaintiffs
who originally filed in federal court and tried the causation issue were bound by the jury's
adverse verdict. Id. The court of appeals reasoned that these plaintiffs, unlike those in the
related Merrell Dow action who had conceded that there was no private action under the
FDCA, "went to trial in federal court intending to take full advantage of any ruling that an
implied cause of action existed .... Until this court or the Supreme Court holds that there
is no implied private right of action under the FDCA [an issue the Court carefully avoided],
the opposite position cannot be deemed either frivolous or unsubstantial [for purposes of
federal jurisdiction]." Id. The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, Hoffman v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 488 U.S. 1006 (1989), which had presented, among
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remedy requirement might mean for the federal trial courts, this benefit alone
should not override the serious problems it imports into federal question
doctrine. 311
D. Merrell Dow's Invitation for Reassessment: A Comprehensive Smith-
Plus Section 1331 Inquiry?
As shown, Merrell Dow's remedy requirement revives the
underinclusiveness problem of American Well by overemphasis on federally
created actions or remedies, 312 this time at the second level of the federal
question analysis. In addition, it undermines the protective flexibility that
Smith-perhaps an unfortunate casualty of the Merrell Dow reassessment3 13-
provided in its outcome determinative test. Indeed, for all the difficulties with
the Court's federal question doctrine, Smith's requirement that resolution of the
state claim turn on federal law interpretation in order to qualify for federal
jurisdiction has notable advantages: 314 It ensures both the prominence (i.e.,
actual contention) and importance (i.e., decisiveness) of the federal issue within
the lawsuit (whether constitutional or statutory interpretation is required),
provides a fairly straightforward test for assessing that role, preserves the
judiciary's front-line prerogative in hybrid claim determinations, and liberally
others, this issue for review. 57 U.S.L.W. 3401 (Dec. 6, 1988) (listing as one question
presented for appeal: "Where plaintiff alleges violation of federal statute, which provides no
private right of action, in his complaint filed in federal court, does that allegation, alone,
impart federal question jurisdiction?")
311 And, as Justice Brennan observed, "while the increased volume of litigation may
appropriately be considered in connection with reasoned arguments that justify limiting the
reach of § 1331, I do not believe that the day has yet arrived when this Court may trim a
statute solely because it thinks that Congress made it too broad." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at
829 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
312 See Hirshman, supra note 7, at 37-38 (discussing American Well's
underinclusiveness); see also Cohen, supra note 5, at 899.
313 Even under a strict reading of Merrell Dow, Sndth may still offer the
operative rule for hybrid claims when the implicated federal statute (1) though devoid
of private actions or remedies, precipitates a federal constitutional inquiry or (2)
contains a private action or remedy.
314 As Professor Redish explained in concluding his evaluation of Merrell Dow:
In the close case... explication of the pragmatic and conceptual factors cited by
jurists and scholars to justify federal question jurisdiction logically leads to adoption of a
liberal version of the Smitnh test: even if the cause of action is state-created, federal
question jurisdiction should be found if the outcome of the case may turn on
construction of federal law.
M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 105; cf Doernberg, There's No Reason for It, supra note 6, at
658 ("federal jurisdiction should be upheld whenever either party demonstrates the presence
of an outcome-determinative issue based upon federal law").
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serves the purposes of section 1331 by ensuring (Moore aside) that state law
claims with dispositive federal issues will receive federal forum protections to
help ensure the correct and consistent interpretation of the implicated federal
law.315
But whatever Smith's future, there is some reason to pause a figurative
moment at this juncture over the outcome determinative test despite its relative
superiority as a jurisdictional measure. As shown, in reiterating the basic rule
that the jurisdictional finding must comport with congressional intent, Merrell
Dow gave new emphasis to the importance of Congress' substantive objectives
as part of that determination-an insight offered by Shoshone (though in the
context of a hybrid federal law claim)3 16 at the turn of the century and later,
although less expressly, by GulIyP17 and Russell.318 In this context, Smith's
apparent deficiencies surface: Essentially, Smith gauges jurisdictional
sufficiency by evaluating the role played by the federal element within the
action, but does so without regard to its extrinsic source, nature, or
significance. Merrell Dow infers that, at least for certain types of claims, this
insular perspective may be flawed because it cannot adequately accommodate
substantive interests that impact the section 1331 forum determination.
Thus, Merrell Dow's apparent assumption-though mistakenly applied by
the majority in its stringent remedy requirement-that a sound jurisdictional
formula for hybrid claims should examine the federal statute for congressional
clues bearing upon the forum determination, cannot be summarily rejected
because it raises a vital issue for the Court's statutory federal question doctrine:
How responsive should the section 1331 inquiry for hybrid claims be to
Congress' substantive objectives reflected in the implicated federal law? Indeed,
Justice Brennan in dissent, although adamant that Smith provided jurisdiction
over plaintiff's state law FDCA claim in Merrell DoW,3 19 nonetheless explored
the purposes underlying section 1331 as well as the FDCA's statutory
enforcement scheme in order to demonstrate the fallacies of the majority's
approach.320 "I certainly subscribe to the proposition," he stated, "that the
Court should consider legislative intent in determining whether or not there is
315 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 828 (Brennan, J., dissenting) Cif made an "essential
element of a state-law claim," the implicated federal law "operate[s] to shape behavior" and
Congress provided federal forums to ensure "that federal laws would shape behavior in the
way that Congress intended.").
316 Supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
317 Supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
318 Supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
319 Justice Brennan stated: "There is, to my mind, no question that there is federal
jurisdiction over the respondents' fourth cause of action under the rule set forth in Sndth and
reaffirmed in Franchise Tax Board." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 822-23 (Brennan, .,
dissenting).
320 Id. at 826-32.
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jurisdiction under [section] 1331."321 Further, he admonished the majority for
"not examining the purposes underlying either the FDCA or [section] 1331"
before concluding that the lack of remedy meant that Congress withdrew
jurisdiction over the hybrid claim at issue.32 2 Accordingly, Merrell Dow invites
exploration of the need, not only for restoring judicial prerogative within the
section 1331 collaboration, but for contemplating a standard which reflects all
pertinent considerations-both jurisdictional and substantive-that bear upon
the forum determination in order to maximize principled hybrid claim
allocations. 323
Thus, a comprehensive federal question assessment might attempt to
account for both Congress' general jurisdictional directive in section 1331 and
its specific substantive goals within the statute triggering the jurisdictional
inquiry as they bear upon the forum determination. 324 In this way, the dual
congressional messages conveyed by hybrid claims-one general and one
specific-will be harmonized so that section 1331 is not rendered superfluous
by the subsequent federal enactment (as Merrell Dow effectively accomplishes)
and the implicated substantive statute is properly accounted for in the
jurisdictional analysis (as Merrell Dow suggests). In this context, the presence
or absence of a cause of action or remedy within the federal statute becomes
but one-not necessarily the dispositive-factor for the court to assess in the
mix of jurisdictional considerations under section 1331.
321 Id. at 830.
322 Id. (emphasis added).
323 C. Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, supra note 52, at 286, 324 (arguing that "[t]he
availability of two court systems provides an opportunity to take substantive considerations
into account in making forum decisions" and that "the capacity to consider substantive
interests in allocating cases between court systems is a valuable appurtenance to our legal
order"); Wells, 77w Inpact of Substantive Interests, supra note 68, at 499, 519 (arguing that
"substantive factors exert a powerful and often unrecognized influence over the resolution
of jurisdictional issues" and jurisdictional choices may be "a convenient rationalization for
results whose true motivation is their substantive impact").
Interestingly, the Supreme Court's inclusive use of the American Well rule to provide
federal forums for causes of action created by substantive federal law is, itself, a recognition
of the twining ofjurisdictional and substantive concerns. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 912 (a
federal cause of action may represent a congressional or judicial judgment that a protective
federal forum is necessary).
324 Shoshone and Gully come closest to illustrating this approach. Supra notes 316-17;
see also L. BR1mUAYER, supra note 33, at 52 ("The rationale behind the federal question
doctrine is the provision of a federal forum to vindicate federal substantive interests. ...
[J]urisdiction is a byproduct of the subject matter of the dispute."). As Professor Luneburg
observed: "[fIn interpreting the scope of section 1331, the Court [in Merrell Dow] was not
legally bound by Congress' later action with regard to a totally different statute, although it
might be prudent to take that into account in sketching the parameters of the federal
question statute." Luneburg, supra note 21, at 763.
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Thus, one response to Merrell Dow's invitation for reassessment is to
adopt a "Smith-plus" standard of jurisdiction, an approach implicit in Justice
Brennan's Merrell Dow dissent: Federal question jurisdiction may attach to
state law claims whose resolution turns on construction of the implicated and
action-less federal statute unless "the reasons Congress with[held] a federal
remedy are also reasons for withholding federal jurisdiction. "35 This
experimental approach has the merit of preserving the well-established outcome
determinative test as the presumptive measure of jurisdiction while accounting
for Congress' specific substantive remedial intent concerning the federal law at
issue as it bears upon the forum determination. It also keeps the locus of the
jurisdictional decision (with section 1331's permission) with the courts. Thus,
this comprehensive approach to federal question hybrid allocations would
attempt to ensure that any jurisdictional finding under the general federal
question statute is also consistent with any pertinent congressional intent under
the specific substantive act at issue. At the same time, this approach seems to
preserve, and accord primacy to, the traditional section 1331 determination as a
distinct inquiry-an end the Merrell Dow majority failed to accomplish within
the compression of its stringent remedy requirement. 326
What, then, post-Merrell Dow, might a discretionary, synoptic Smith-plus
approach to hybrid claim allocations, consistent with the purposes underlying
section 1331 and reflecting the substantive aspect of federal question
jurisdiction, include? Here is a suggested list of considerations:
1. Is the federal question well-pleaded?327 To start, the federal issue must
be properly presented to the court in accordance with the well-pleaded
325 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 825 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan addressed
the relationship of jurisdictional and substantive interests in demonstrating the flaws of the
remedy requirement and offered a two-step analysis of the problem which reconciled the
federal question finding with the remedial finding. First, he explored whether the reasons
for federal question jurisdiction-expertise, uniformity, and receptivity-justified federal
forums for state law claims with essential federal elements, and found that they did. Id. at
826-28. Then he examined whether Congress' decision not to provide a private cause of
action altered his conclusion that federal question jurisdiction was appropriate for state law
claims as the one before the Court. Id. at 829. As part of this second step, Justice Brennan
explored the FDCA's regulatory enforcement scheme and concluded that its lack of private
remedy did not at all signal congressional intent to preclude federal jurisdiction over FDCA-
implicated claims. Id. at 830-32. "[I]f anything," he wrote, "Congress' decision not to
create a private remedy strengthens the argument in favor of finding federal jurisdiction
over a state remedy that is not pre-empted." Id. at 832.
326 As Justice Brennan stated: "[Llimitations on federal question jurisdiction under §
1331 must be justified by careful consideration of the reasons underlying the grant of
jurisdiction and the need for federal review." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 818-19 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
327 Supra note 44.
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complaint rule.328 This rule is best seen as governing the location, rather than
the evaluation, of the federal issue or interest.329
2. Does case outcome depend upon construction offederal law? Under the
comprehensive approach, a federal court, applying Smith, could presumptively
assert jurisdiction over a state law claim whose resolution depends upon
construction of the implicated federal law. The principled assumption
underlying Smith is that federal forum safeguards (that is, expertise, sympathy,
uniformity, and independent judgment) should be available when the federal
law is central to case outcome, regardless of its intrinsic importance in the
hierarchy of federal statutes. Any determination of the federal interest's
importance or significance for jurisdictional purposes is more a function of
legislative, and not judicial, intent. Precisely because Congress, and not the
federal courts, should rank the relative importance of federal interests, the
judiciary should provide federal forum protections for all claims involving
dispositive questions of federal law, unless Congress directs otherwise. Thus,
Smith saves the federal judiciary from substituting its own jurisdictional
judgments for those of the legislature by confining the federal question
assessment to the prominence and importance of the federal issue in particular
cases, rather than entangling the courts in system-wide policy decisions they
should not make.330
But to the extent Merrell Dow mandates exploration of specific
congressional intent bearing upon the forum determination, these additional
questions seem pertinent:
3. Did Congress intend to withdraw federal jurisdiction over the hybrid
claim in failing to provide a private cause of action or remedy in the implicated
federal statute? If the implicated federal statute is outcome determinative, but
not privately enforceable, the court could next determine whether the
congressional reasons for withholding the remedy are also reasons to withhold
federal jurisdiction. This affirmative determination is crucial. As
demonstrated, 331 even in the absence of private federal enforcement, Congress
may still have a keen interest in providing federal forums to ensure that state
enforcement of federal standards are consistent with congressional
328 See supra note 148.
329 As Professors Doernberg and Mushlin point out, the Supreme Court's federal
question inquiry "has not always distinguished cases concerning the importance branch from
those involving the placement branch" of that inquiry. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 6,
at 535. Indeed, the well-pleaded complaint rule should not-and cannot-be used to assess
the nature of the federal issue at stake. As traditionally defined, the rule ensures the proper
positioning of the federal question within the complaint, but provides little assistance in
determining whether federal trial protections are warranted in adjudication of that question.
In any event, the rule is too mechanical to accommodate the discretionary balancing § 1331
allocations require.
330 Supra note 64.
331 Supra notes 274-86 and accompanying text.
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objectives.332 Congress' remedial intent concerning the isolated federal statute
is simply not dispositive or even predictive of its intent concerning the
jurisdictional treatment of that statute as part of a state liability scheme.333 In
addition, the fundamental distinctions between jurisdiction, cause of action,334
and remedies undermine the automatic equation of these concepts. 335
As part of this analysis, the court may wish to consider whether state
enforcement threatens the congressional scheme or federal interest. A denial of
section 1331 jurisdiction is tantamount to a declaration of exclusive state court
jurisdiction over the claim at issue. The only federal safeguard for protecting
the implicated federal interest within the state law scheme may be the uncertain
prospect of Supreme Court review. 336 Thus, the court might examine
332 As Justice Brennan observed in explaining why hybrid claim cases like the one
before the Court in Merrell Dow arose under federal law within the meaning of § 1331:
[A] federal law expresses Congress' determination that there is a federal interest in
having individuals or other entities conform their action to a particular norm established
by that law. Because all laws are imprecise to some degree, disputes inevitably arise
over what specifically Congress intended to require or permit. It is the duty of courts to
interpret these laws and apply them in such a way that the congressional purpose is
realized.
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 828 (Brennan, J., dissenting). And in evaluating the jurisdictional
significance of Congress' failure to provide a cause of action, Professor Redish explained:
[I]t is by no means clear that merely because Congress does not choose to provide its
own remedy, it would not want a federal forum available to adjudicate a state remedy
for violation of the federal standard. It is one thing to have no enforcement at all; it is
quite another to have enforcement that is adjudicated only in state court.... [O]nce the
state is allowed to enforce the federal statute, state court misinterpretation of the federal
statute could give rise to several potentially harmful results.... Moreover, Congress
may have a legitimate interest in preventing precedential confusion caused by the
dramatic increase in the number of interpreting courts.
M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 100-01.
333 Supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
334 Viewing "cause of action" as an enforceable right to legal relief, see C. CLARK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 130 (2d ed. 1947), or in the Supreme
Court's formulation, as a "question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class
of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the court,"
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 240 n.18 (1979), helps to distinguish "cause of action"
from "jurisdiction," which, as the Supreme Court has noted, is "a question whether a
federal court has the power . . . to hear a case" in the first place whether or not it is
appropriately invoked by any particular litigant. See id. at 239 n.18.
335 Supra note 103.
336 The Supreme Court, of course, is the ultimate check on incorrect or inconsistent
state court interpretations of federal questions, but it simply "cannot do the whole job"
because of docket pressures, limited appellate fact review, debilitating delays, and deference
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Congress' statutory plan for effectuation of that interest and decide whether its
enforcement by the less specialized, more localized, and possibly indifferent
and vastly differing state courts might endanger the legislative scheme. 337 The
court might also assess any priority the state may have in hearing these claims
and consider what, if any, friction or suspicion is generated by providing a
federal forum option.338
4. Did Congress provide any other indications in the statutory scheme that
might bear upon the jurisdictional determination? The implicated statute might
contain other substantive provisions to aid the forum assessment. The court
might determine whether the federal statute's overall scheme and purpose
provides jurisdictional insight, 339 including whether Congress intended state
law to govern disposition of the federal rights or duties contained in the
statute. 340 Also pertinent is any indication from Congress that federal law
to adequate state grounds. D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 160 (3d ed. 1982). Justice
Brennan has observed in agreement that "having served on this Court for 30 years, it is
clear to me that, realistically, [the Court] cannot even come close to 'doing the whole job'
and that § 1331 is essential if federal rights are to be adequately protected." Merrell Dow,
478 U.S. at 827 n.6 (citing D. CURRIE).
337 As Professor Wechsler cautioned: "Initial state adjudication ... tends.. . to give
the states the final voice on any federal questions, for review by the Supreme Court... can
never function on a quantitative basis.... The problem is... to determine when relatively
final state determination involves least risk of error upon federal matters, or when such risk
as it involves is counterbalanced by the disadvantages of an original jurisdiction in the
federal courts." Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 216, 218 (1948).
338 E.g., Mishkin, supra note 27, at 159 (permitting initial federal question
adjudication by the state courts subject to Supreme Court review "may avoid friction and
wasted effort... without sacrificing national authority"); see also Shapiro, supra note 2, at
583 (the federalism and comity considerations in jurisdictional determinations "convey a
sense of the need for mutual respect" between the federal and state sovereigns).
339 E.g., Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900). Obviously absent from
the Merrell Dow majority opinion is any analysis of the FDCA itself. In contrast, Justice
Brennan dissected the statute's enforcement scheme in search of clues of Congress' forum
intent. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 829-32 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
340 _f Cohen, supra note 5, at 916 (noting that "a pragmatic limit upon federal
jurisdiction" will involve assessment of "the extent to which cases of this class will, in
practice, turn on issues of state or federal law"); Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 505 (noting the
jurisdictional significance of Congress' intent that local rules should govern resolution of the
disputes at issue despite congressionally authorized cause of action); Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 375 (1959) ("If jurisdiction of
maritime claims were allowed to be invoked under § 1331, it would become necessary for
courts to decide whether the action 'arises under federal law,' and this jurisdictional
decision would largely depend on whether the governing law is state or federal.").
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preempts state law3 4 1 or that the states are precluded from hearing claims that
seek to enforce or interpret the implicated federal statute.342
341 See M. REDISH, supra note 5, at 100 (while "Congress' failure to provide a private
remedy for violation of a federal statute [might] act to preempt a state's provision of a
private remedy .... Congress' decision not to create a private damage remedy in no way
automatically implies any congressional judgment about adjudication of the state cause of
action" unless "traditional preemption analysis" requires displacement). As the Court
explained that analysis in Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489
U.S. 493, 509 (1989):
Congress has the power under the Supremacy Clause... to pre-empt state law.
Determining whether it has exercised this power requires that we examine
congressional intent. In the absence of explicit statutory language signaling an intent to
pre-empt, we infer such intent where Congress has legislated comprehensively to
occupy an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the States to supplement
federal law, or where the state law at issue conflicts with federal law, either because it is
impossible to comply with both, or because the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of congressional objectives.
(citations omitted).
Necessary to consider at this point in the comprehensive inquiry is the complete
preemption doctrine. Under this theory, a court may find that even a purely state law cause
of action is retroactively transformed into one supporting federal question jurisdiction if the
preemptive power of a federal statute (pled, perhaps, in defense) is so "extraordinary" that
it "converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for
purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481
U.S. 58, 65 (1987). Any claim allegedly based on that completely preempted state law "is
considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore 'arises under' federal law."
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("if a federal cause of action
completely pre-empts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of
the federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law"); see also Francldse Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. at 23 (the entirely displaced state suit is "purely a creature of federal law").
The doctrine, therefore, refines the well-pleaded complaint rule and the rule that plaintiff is
the master of his or her claim. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392-93. It also stands as an
exception to the rule that federal preemption is typically a defensive issue that cannot
support federal question jurisdiction on removal. Id.; see also Francdise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
at 12, 14. The Supreme Court, however, has invoked this exception sparingly. Caterpillar,
482 U.S. at 393 (noting the Supreme Court's occasional use of this doctrine). See generally
Twitchell, Characterizing Federal aaims: Preemption, Removal, and the Arising-Under
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 812, 814 (1986) (arguing that
the courts have failed to develop an integrated approach to federal question jurisdiction and
preemption and have instead "compartmentalized" the inquiries without reconciling them).
342 Cf Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 816 (noting that to the extent Merrell Dow feared
that state court interpretation of the FDCA threatened the Act's scheme, it should have
argued that "the FDCA pre-empts state-court jurisdiction over the issue in dispute")
(footnote omitted). While the presumption for concurrent state court jurisdiction is "deeply
rooted" and our system of "dual sovereignty" recognizes that the "state courts have inherent
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5. How will providing federal jurisdiction affect federal dockets? Once the
court determines that the hybrid claim warrants the special protections of a
federal forum, the court might then assess the impact that accepting jurisdiction
over these types of cases will have on federal resources and dockets. 343 While
docket impact should not in and of itself be sufficient reason to disqualify
federal courts from hearing claims enforcing federal rights or standards, it is a
factor that may help weight the balance of considerations. 344
Pros and Cons. To the extent Merrell Dow signals that the Supreme Court
is moving federal question doctrine in the discretion-restrictive direction its
implication doctrine has taken, it may be wise to assess alternative approaches
to section 1331 allocations, such as the comprehensive Smith-plus inquiry, that
do less damage to judicial prerogative than Merrell Dow's remedy requirement,
but nonetheless account for substantive intent in the context of jurisdictional
determinations, as Merrell Dow may require. Unlike Smith's pure outcome
determinative test, this comprehensive federal question inquiry attempts an
explicit accounting for the jurisdictional significance of implicated substantive
federal interests-all in the context of satisfying the purposes of federal
question jurisdiction. In this way, the comprehensive section 1331 approach
may appear to strike a satisfying balance of power in the federal question
collaboration: It at once accords due deference to general and specific
congressional intent bearing upon the forum determination while preserving the
authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws
of the United States," Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458, 459 (1990), the supremacy
clause empowers Congress to "affirmatively oust[ ] the state courts of jurisdiction over...
particular federal claim[s]," id. at 459, and "confine jurisdiction to the federal courts either
explicitly or implicitly." Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981);
accord Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990) ("To give
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over a federal cause of action, Congress must, in an
exercise of its power under the Supremacy Clause, affirmatively divest state courts of their
presumptively concurrent jurisdiction."). Accordingly, Congress can rebut the presumption
of concurrence "by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from
legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal
interests." Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 459-60 (quoting Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478).
Of course, Congress' failure to preempt state court jurisdiction is not necessarily
indicative of its intent to preclude federal court jurisdiction given the compromise of
concurrent jurisdiction, which permits federal presence in the interpretative chain without a
blanket ban on state involvement. Plaintiff (or defendant upon removal) may then decide
whether the potential protections of federal adjudication are necessary in light of the case
particulars.
343 E.g., Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569-70 (1912); Shoshone Mining Co.
v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900).
344 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 829 & n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (increased
caseloads might be appropriately considered in a reasoned limitation of § 1331, but it
"would be wholly illegitimate ... for this Court to determine that there was no jurisdiction
over a class of cases simply because the Court thought that there were too many cases in the
federal courts").
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judiciary's prerogative to assess this intent and other pertinent forum
considerations in the context of particular hybrid controversies. While the
simplicity of Smith may be lost in this approach, gained may be the added
congressional "insight" on the forum determination without the discretion-
restrictive onus of Merrell Dow's remedy requirement as the cause of action or
remedy becomes one among several jurisdictional considerations.
But despite these apparent advantages, the comprehensive approach to state
law hybrid claim allocations has serious flaws. Requiring the federal courts, in
essence, to confirm their preliminary section 1331 determinations against
specific statutory schemes effectively nullifies the general federal question
statute, which would no longer operate on its own power (when the implicated
federal law lacks private remedies). Such a radical change to the flow of
authority between Congress and the courts in the federal question collaboration
should be explicit, and Congress has not altered section 1331.
Further, asking the federal courts to divine what, if any, significance they
should attribute to Congress' substantive intent in hybrid claim allocations-
even that intent which the court, on its own, decides may bear upon the forum
determination, as the comprehensive inquiry suggests-might embroil the
judiciary in speculative forum assessments based upon Congress' non-
jurisdictional intent. 345 In fact, there may be no jurisdictional signals to be
derived from Congress' substantive scheme, and the courts should be loath to
create any. Congress may have purposely defaulted on the jurisdictional
designation in reliance on its residual forum intent contained in the general
federal question statute. The judicial discretion that section 1331 has sanctioned
becomes especially important and appropriate in close hybrid state law claims
where case-specific judgments by the courts may be necessary-judgments
which Congress did not address in the substantive statute, and which Congress
has traditionally delegated to the courts in enlisting their assistance to protect
federal law through forum selection. Moreover, tying the courts' jurisdictional
decisions to Congress' substantive intent will undermine the presumption of
federal law protection that Smith provides by confining section 1331
considerations to case-centered determinations about the dispositive nature of
the implicated federal issue within the lawsuit.
Indeed, putting an affirmative burden on the federal courts to show that
their exercise of section 1331 power is proper despite the absence of private
remedies in the implicated act is an exercise of supreme futility given the
impropriety, in the first instance, of basing hybrid claim determinations on
Congress' enforcement intent for the statute standing alone.346 And, to the
extent the comprehensive inquiry would in any way require the courts to assess
345 Of course, Congress' intent to preempt state court jurisdiction is a valid
consideration even under the pure Smith approach, as are other traditional, jurisdictional
factors, such as docket concerns.
346 Supra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
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the significance of the substantive federal interest at stake, it would be difficult
and unwise for the judiciary to delineate standards for that assessment, which
arguably should be performed by the legislature in any event. Of course,
Congress, if it wishes, could provide for federal jurisdiction over subject-
specific claims in the substantive statute itself.
Thus, Smith, in its principled simplicity, grows in stature as the federal
question test most likely to fulfill the general mandate of section 1331 to
provide federal forums protections for the construction of federal law most
efficiently and effectively consistent with the proper role of the judiciary in the
federal question collaboration. Its inherent operating premise is still sound: If a
primary purpose of the federal court system is to ensure the vindication of
federal law, and by definition, the congressional objectives they embody, all
national enactments, regardless of substantive content, should merit federal
interpretation absent congressional directive otherwise once their construction
affects disposition of the state law claim and is therefore central enough to the
relief requested to justify sharing adjudicative authority with the state courts.
Because Merrell Dow's remedy requirement and, to a lesser extent, the
comprehensive inquiry, unduly restrict the courts' delegated and as yet
congressionally sanctioned section 1331 authority to make hybrid claim
decisions based on the dispositive nature of the implicated federal issue, they
are of questionable merit. Both demonstrate that Smith, even in its narrowed
focus on the case before it, most effectively maximizes the protective purpose
of the general federal question statute consistent with the roles Congress has
long ordained for both section 1331 collaborators.
V. CONCLUSION
In the absence of specific forum directives, Congress has empowered the
lower federal courts to make certain forum allocations in accordance with the
general federal question statute. Merrell Dow, however, endorsed a federal
question test that undermines the judiciary's rightful authority to make those
determinations as the legislature's case-specific delegate. The Court's emphasis
on a congressional cause of action or remedy as the predicate for jurisdiction in
state law hybrid claims suggests a troubling direction for federal question
determinations that elides judicial discretion and enervates section 1331. The
courts' ability to explore and weight section 1331 considerations may be lost,
limited, or distorted if they unduly focus on the restrictive and jurisdictionally
inconclusive question of whether Congress provided a private action or remedy
in the implicated federal statute.
The federal courts should not take forum cues that Congress did not send.
The traditional case-centered approach to state law hybrid claim allocations that
rests upon the court's discretionary assessment of the centrality of the federal
issue to the claim's disposition is most likely to keep the legislature's
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jurisdictional and substantive signals straight while maximizing the federal
forum option consistent with Congress' general jurisdictional directive. In
concluding that Congress' remedial intent has primary jurisdictional
significance in hybrid claim allocations, Merrell Dow based the forum
analysis-at the expense of judicial discretion and the integrity of a free-
standing section 1331 analysis-on a congressional substantive intent that
cannot and should not direct the jurisdictional inquiry.
